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1	in the superior court of the state (1) April 2014 2:01
2	IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF YAJEAHAE HICKS. CLERK ,
3	S. KELBAUGH BY:
4	THE STATE OF ARIZONA,
5	Plaintiff,)
6	vs.) No. CR 2008-1339
7	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,)
8	Defendant.)
9)
10	
11	BEFORE: THE HONORABLE THOMAS B. LINDBERG
12	JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT DIVISION SIX
13	YAVAPAI COUNTY, ARIZONA
14	PRESCOTT, ARIZONA
15	TUESDAY, APRIL 7, 2010 9:02 A.M.
16	DEDODEED IS EDANGED IN OF DESCREENINGS
17	REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
18	PRETRIAL MOTIONS
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24	ROXANNE E. TARN, CR Certified Court Reporter
25	Certificate No. 50808

1 2 PRETRIAL MOTIONS 3 APPEARANCES: 5 PAPOURE. FOR THE DEFENDANT: 6 HAMMOND AND MS. ANNE CHAPMAN. 8 THE COURT: 9 10 and Mr. Butner. 11 12 13 14 15 call her first and deal with that. 16 remarks on either side? 17 18 19 20 21 22

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APRIL 7, 2010 9:02 A.M.

FOR THE STATE: MR. JOE BUTNER AND MR. JEFF

MR. JOHN SEARS, MR. LARRY

This is State versus Steven Carroll DeMocker in CR 2008-1339. Defendant is present with his counsel, and prosecution is represented by Mr. Paupore

The first issue that I had that I think we ought to take up is with young Mr. Knapp and his mother. My understanding is that the mother is here, so if we could

Do you want to make any preliminary

MR. BUTNER: Judge, all I would say is that we filed a motion asking that this child be allowed to testify by virtue of a closed-circuit television sort of hook-up but still in such a fashion to honor the defendant's confrontation rights under the Constitution. He is not a major witness, and I think the documentation presented to the Court establishes that this would be a very traumatic experience for him and might result in his, so to speak,

1	unavailability in the event that he were to clam up, which is
2	a distinct possibility. So I would ask that the Court honor
3	the request of his mother and the State to allow him to
4	testify in this fashion. I think that she will come in and
5	plead further.
6	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
7	THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear or affirm
8	under the penalty of perjury that the testimony you are about
9	to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
10	the truth, so help you God?
11	THE WITNESS: Yes.
12	THE COURT: Good morning. You are
13	Mrs. Saxerud?
14	THE WITNESS: Yes.
15	ANNA MARGARET SAXERUD,
16	called as a witness, having been duly sworn, testified as
17	follows:
18	DIRECT EXAMINATION
19	BY MR. BUTNER:
20	Q. Miss Saxerud, the judge wants me to do this by way
21	of an examination. It will be very easy for you, I think.
22	Would you please tell the Court your full
23	name.
24	A. Anna Margaret Saxerud.

Q. What is your occupation, by the way?

1	A.	I am a registered nurse.
2	Q.	You are the mother of Alexander James Knapp?
3	A.	Yes.
4	Q.	How old is Alexander?
5	A.	12.
6	Q.	He is your son?
7	Α.	Yes.
8	Q.	Does he continue to reside with you?
9	Α.	Yes.
10	Q.	You wrote a letter to the judge, and you also
11	consulted	with a therapist of some sort, concerning
12	Alexander;	is that correct?
13	Α.	Yes.
14	Q.	Would you tell us who that therapist was?
15	Α.	Tony Himes.
16	Q.	And are you
17		THE COURT: Could you spell "Himes."
18		THE WITNESS: H-i-m-e-s.
19		MR. HAMMOND: Could she pull the microphone a
20	little clo	ser or speak a little louder.
21	BY MR. BUT	NER:
22	Q.	Are you aware of Mr. Himes' qualification as a
23	therapist?	
24	A.	Yes, I have the letter, and they are stated under
25	his signat	ure.

1	Q.	What are his qualifications?
2	Α.	Licensed marriage and family therapist.
3	Q.	And how is it that you had Alexander going to Tony
4	Himes?	
5	Α.	For some support during my former husband Jim
6	Knapp's di	vorce and mine and since then. I think it is
7	important	for him to have a person that he can talk to that
8	is outside	of our family.
9	Q.	How long has Alexander been consulting with and
10	treating w	ith, so to speak, Tony Himes?
11	Α.	I believe about a year-and-a-half to two years.
12	Q.	And approximately how many times has he visited
13	with Mr. H	imes?
14	Α.	I would say maybe eight to ten.
15	Q.	And did you consult with Mr. Himes concerning
16	Alexander	testifying in these proceedings?
17	Α.	Yes.
18	Q.	Well, you filed the letter with the Court; right?
19	Α.	Yes.
20	Q.	Basically, would you tell us what Mr. Himes told
21	you?	
22	Α.	Could I just read it?
23	Q.	Sure.
24	A.	"Judge Lindberg, I am writing regarding Alex James
25	Knapp Th	is young man has been seen by me on several

1 || occasions."

- Q. It's okay. Take a break anytime you need to.
- A. "And my impressions of Alex are that he is at a fragile juncture in his emotional development. Currently, he is still grieving the loss of his father and attempting to manage various stressors involved with court proceedings. He has become a patient. I believe it would be beneficial if he provided whatever information is sought in a closed chambers setting. I hope that you will consider what is left of this youngster's innocence in your decision-making process. I appreciate your attention and time concerning this matter. Respectfully, Tony Himes." Excuse me.
- Q. And, of course, you are Alexander's mother, so you are around him a lot; right?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. He continues to reside with you; is that correct?
 - A. Yes.
 - Q. And have you talked with him about this?
 - A. Yes.
- Q. And what are your views as his mother -- and I guess also as a registered nurse -- concerning the effect that in-court testimony in a live setting confronting the defendant -- what do you believe the effect would be on Alexander?
 - A. Alex has asked me specifically if he would have to

1	testify.	He prefers not to. He is scared of Mr. DeMocker
2	and has on	several occasions said "what if Steve gets off and
3	comes afte	r me." So from a child's that is from a child's
4	point of v	riew, regardless of how we adults feel about that.
5	And it is	intimidating for him to be in this setting. And
6	when I was	reading about preparing children for court, it is
7	particular	ly stressful for children, at least in the
8	documentat	ion that I have read.
9	Q.	Did you consult some professional literature in
10	this regar	rd?
11	Α.	Yes.
12	Q.	And what literature did you consult? Do you have
13	that at ha	nd?
14	A.	Yes.
15	Q.	What is it?
16	Α.	It is from the American Prosecutor's Research
17	Institute,	and it is titled "Preparing Children For Court."
18		And also from Commonwealth Attorney
19	Victim Wit	ness Assistance Program, "Prepare Your Child to
20	Testify."	
21	Q.	And?
22	Α.	And I have talked to people from Child Protective
23	Services a	and the consensus is that it is hard for kids, and
24	Alex is pa	rticularly fearful.
25	Q.	So what is your opinion in regard to the effect

1	that would have on your son Alex?
2	A. I believe it would be detrimental to his emotional
3	health.
4	Q. Do you think he would be able to do it?
5	A. I don't know.
6	Q. Are you concerned that he might not be able to?
7	A. Yes, and I think for children, I think it is
8	important to be considerate and treat them as kids.
9	Q. And so what is your opinion in regard to how Alex
10	should be allowed to testify?
11	A. I would like him to be I requested from Judge
12	Lindberg that he be that his testimony be taken by
13	alternative method specifically, closed-circuit T.V. in
14	chambers. And I read that is something that is done for
15	children that don't or that are fearful of being in the
16	courtroom with somebody they are scared of.
17	Q. Would you like to be there with him?
18	A. I would, yes.
19	MR. BUTNER: I don't have any further
20	questions of this witness at this time, Judge. Thank you.
21	THE COURT: Cross.
22	CROSS-EXAMINATION
23	BY MR. SEARS:

Q. Miss Saxerud, my name is John Sears. I am one of

the lawyers that represents Steve DeMocker in this case. Let

1 me say something to you, if I could, at the beginning. There 2 have been suggestions in this case, some in the press and 3 elsewhere. Α. Somewhere. There are some suggestions that the defense in 5 Q. this case is accusing Jim Knapp of murdering Carol Kennedy. 6 7 And I just want to tell you that what we are doing now is investigating his involvement, if he had any in this case, 8 9 and we have not said anywhere that we believe that Jim murdered Carol. I want you to understand that. 10 involvement in this case is a continuing mystery to us. 11 There are parts of his involvement about which --12 Objection, Judge. This is a nice 13 MR. BUTNER: little speech that Mr. Sears is making, but I don't think it 14 is appropriate at this time. It is certainly not questioning 15 16 or cross-examination. 17 THE COURT: A simple objection would suffice, Mr. Butner, yourself. 18 19 Sustained. MR. SEARS: I will ask a question, Your Honor. 20 21 Q. You and Alex were interviewed by the police in 2008. Do you remember that? 22 Alex was interviewed, yes. 23 Α. Do you remember being interviewed yourself? 24 Q.

25

Α.

I was with him.

1	Q.	Do you remember speaking to a police officer?
2	Α.	At the County Attorney's Office? Is that the one?
3	Q.	Detective Brown.
4	Α.	Yes.
5	Q.	Do you remember that interview was tape-recorded?
6	A.	Yes.
7	Q.	You have not been interviewed by anyone
8	representi	ng Mr. DeMocker in this case, have you?
9	Α.	I was contacted by a private investigator.
10	Q.	Mr. Robertson?
11	A.	I didn't see him. I just spoke to him on the
12	phone.	
13	Q.	And at some point in that discussion you told him
14	that you d	idn't really want to speak with him anymore?
15	Α.	Yes.
16	Q.	And you didn't want him or anyone from the defense
17	to speak t	o either of your sons; is that right?
18	Α.	He didn't ask me that question.
19	Q.	Let me put it to you this way: Would you be
20	willing to	allow, under appropriate circumstances, someone
21	from the d	efense to speak with you and to speak with Alex?
22	Α.	No.
23	Q.	Could you tell me why?
24	Α.	I am willing to talk to law enforcement and that's
25	i+ 2nd	e have been subposped so I am under the

1 impression that we -- that there is no choice in that. 2 Q. In the letters that were sent to Judge Lindberg, a 3 suggestion is made that Alex has some fear of Mr. DeMocker; 4 is that right? 5 Α. Yes. Do you know if Alex has ever met Mr. DeMocker? 6 0. 7 He saw him at Carol's funeral, and I don't know if 8 they met or not. I doubt it. 9 Do you know the specifics of that circumstance Q. that would cause him to be afraid of Mr. DeMocker? 10 11 He believes that Mr. DeMocker killed Carol. Α. 12 That is what he told you? Q. 13 Α. Yes. Have you discussed the possibility of consenting 14 0. 15 to an interview on your own and on behalf of your son with 16 anyone from the County Attorney's Office? And when I say an 17 interview, I mean a defense interview in this case. I am not sure I understand that. 18 Α. 19 Ο. You told me here today that you won't voluntarily 20 agree to be interviewed by the defense; correct? 21 Α. Right. And you won't agree voluntarily to allow your son 22 23 Alex to be interviewed by the defense? 24 Α. Right. Have you discussed that subject, the subject of

25

Q.

1	defense interviews with you and your son, with anyone on the
2	prosecution side?
3	A. No.
4	MR. SEARS: I don't have any other questions,
5	Your Honor.
6	THE COURT: Mr. Butner.
7	MR. BUTNER: Nothing further. Thank you,
8	Judge.
9	Thank you, Miss Saxerud.
10	THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you.
11	Any other witnesses on this topic?
12	MR. BUTNER: None, Your Honor.
13	THE COURT: From defense side?
14	Any objection to Miss Saxerud being
15	allowed to leave or remain in the courtroom?
16	MR. SEARS: No. I have no objection.
17	THE COURT: Mr. Butner.
18	MR. BUTNER: Judge, I think that under the
19	facts and circumstances concerning this particular witness
20	that it would be appropriate for the Court to order that he
21	be allowed to testify in accordance with the request of his
22	mother in a closed-circuit setting.
23	THE COURT: Do you have any objection to
24	Miss Saxerud remaining in?
25	MD DIENED. Of gourge not

THE COURT: You are excused, but you may remain in the courtroom. So you can leave or stay, as you choose.

Go ahead, Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I think under the facts and circumstances it would be appropriate that the Court allow Alexander James Knapp to testify by way of closed-circuit television from the Court's chambers, but of course assuring that the defendant had the right to confront and cross-examine him through counsel. That has been done in a number of cases that I have handled; albeit, those were, of course, victim children that testified in that fashion. But I think that under the circumstances of this case and given Alexander's role in this case, I think it would be appropriate that he be allowed to testify in that fashion.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, we were planning to suggest, until this morning, that before you make a decision about how and under what circumstances alternative means would be provided for this young man to testify, that we be allowed to conduct a dignified and reasonable defense interview of this child and of his mother in this case. And just to remind you, Your Honor, we have talked a number of times about the relationship of Ms. Saxerud and her children

to what the State considers to be an alibi on the part of Mr. Knapp on the night in question, that he was with them. And the time frame and some of the details of that are still a matter of continuing investigation to us. And it would be very important to us to speak with Ms. Saxerud and with her son about those matters primarily, but also some matters related to Mr. Knapp.

And the idea that my client's fundamental constitutional rights would be affected, when we really don't know precisely, beyond what Miss Saxerud said in these letters and said again here this morning, forms the basis for him needing and wanting to be able to testify in an unusual and alternative way, gives us pause. And we are not saying at this point that after these interviews we would oppose those arrangements. We just think it would be appropriate for us to understand more fully what happened.

Unfortunately, under the circumstances, unless the State can take the opportunity to try to persuade Miss Saxerud to a different point of view, we ask you to enter an order setting depositions of both the child and Miss Saxerud in this case. I can assure Miss Saxerud and the prosecution team we would make every reasonable effort to be respectful of everyone's interest in this case and within reason to arrange for an interview that would be as non-threatening and non-confrontational as possible.

This is information we need to have, and it is as clear as it can be that we are not going to get the information from the State and voluntarily from these witnesses. So I think under the rule we are entitled to the Court setting a deposition. Again, in the face of that order, we would be happy to do that. We have explained a number of times now why this information is necessary to our investigation in this case.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: If I could have a moment to confirm with Miss Saxerud.

THE COURT: We will take is a brief recess and go off the record.

(Brief recess.)

THE COURT: The record can reflect that

Mr. Butner and Mr. Paupore have returned to the room and

Miss Saxerud is still in the room.

MR. BUTNER: Thanks for your patience, Judge, and opposing counsel.

I spoke with Miss Saxerud, and basically, her primary concern, of course, is her son Alex. And she is concerned about him having to go through this experience on multiple occasions. And so her preference is that Alex be simply allowed to testify one time, so to speak, closed-circuit, in chambers, in the Judge's chambers, so that

1 the defendant will have his right of confrontation honored. 2 She does not wish to submit to a defense 3 interview, and she does not wish to voluntarily submit to a deposition either. And that is on behalf of herself and her 4 5 She is greatly concerned about the effect on her son. 6 THE COURT: You have asked her, in your 7 motion, for testimony pursuant to 13-4253(A), as 8 distinguished from 13-4253(B). (B), in essence, allows for, 9 essentially, the possibility of testimony outside the courtroom, but recorded for showing in the courtroom before 10 11 the Court has distinguished from doing some kind of closed 12 circuit. MR. BUTNER: Judge, we would be happy, in the 13 alternative, to proceed under (B), and do that by way of, if 14 necessary, a deposition, so to speak -- a Court-ordered, you 15 16 know, video deposition. Generally speaking, you recognize 17 THE COURT: that the defense has a right to an interview of any witness 18 19 that the State is going to be calling, and if somebody --20 MR. BUTNER: Generally speaking, I do. 21 THE COURT: -- if somebody won't consent to interview, generally speaking, they are subject to being 22 23 deposed. MR. BUTNER: Yes, Your Honor. I understand 24 25 that, generally speaking.

THE COURT: I presume that that was conveyed to Miss Saxerud, also?

MR. BUTNER: Yes, Your Honor, it was.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Sears, any thoughts on use of subsection (B) rather than (A) or other possible considerations in the case?

MR. SEARS: Judge, we have been looking at an older Arizona case, State versus Vincent, 159 Arizona 418, a Pima County matter. And in this case, there are some similarities in that case where -- except that it was the defendant's children that were being offered through videotaped testimony -- and that conviction was reversed because the Court, despite those letters -- which sound somewhat similar to the letters that have been presented to you here -- didn't make a particularized showing of the traumatic effect of in-court testimony on each of the children.

And what we have proposed, and I would propose again, because I think it makes some sense, is that before anyone asks you, again, to order or consider ordering alternative methods of testimony either under (A) or (B), either live, via closed circuit or a videotaped deposition, that at a minimum we be allowed to interview the mother and child to get more information about the particularized harm, so that we would be in a position to speak to that question

beyond the little bit that's been presented here. I do that rather than simply object and say they haven't made a sufficient showing, because there may be, Your Honor -- there may be good reason to do this that doesn't come to us now, but after we see this child, get a sense of who he is and how he really is affected by this, what he has been told, why he thinks what he thinks about our client, we may have a different view. But right now, we are here to protect Mr. DeMocker's Sixth Amendment rights, and we don't think the State has made a showing.

What we are offering, as distasteful as it may be to Miss Saxerud, is really a better and more reasonable way to get at what it is that we think the Court needs to know before making this decision in a capital case. As between (A) and (B), I think you can see that there are problems either way with that, but those problems are really secondary to the fact that we don't want to be conducting our defense interview while the child is testifying, either during a deposition that would be played to the jury or, worst of all, while the child is testifying versus closed circuit with the jury on the other end of that link-up.

So I would propose that no ruling be made yet, that the matter be taken under advisement. And if she won't -- sounds like, again, she won't consent to an interview -- that the Court order a deposition. I would

remind the State that Rule 15.3 presumes that Mr. DeMocker would be present at that deposition, and I would again offer to do it via informal interview, if that would be a particular problem. If that doesn't solve it, then that is certainly a right of our client that we would likely not waive under Rule 15.3. But I would ask that you would do that, and we would work with Miss Saxerud and the State to find a quick time and place to do this.

THE COURT: All right. I will take the motion for out-of-court testimony, pursuant to 13-4253, under advisement, that motion having been filed April 1st by the prosecution. At this point, I will not order a deposition. I will allow the parties to see if there may be some method of interviewing.

It seems to me, just as an aside, having had some experience in dealing with children, as a defense attorney, as a prosecutor, and as a judge, that to leave Alex not having met Mr. Sears, Mr. Hammond -- may not have even met Mr. DeMocker -- that seems unclear, based on the testimony at this point -- that it actually increases the potential trauma to him, if trauma there be, by delaying all of that to some later trial date. So I recognize, under the Rules of Procedure, the defense is entitled to an interview. If the witnesses for the State will not consent to an interview, they may be entitled to a deposition. That is a

matter of procedural law, and I don't dispute the other statements that Mr. Sears made or what Mr. Butner made in connection with this question.

I may need some additional testimony as relates to the case. I recognize *State vs. Vincent*. I've read that case previously.

So I'll take the matter under advisement.

See what you can work together on. And failing to have an interview, you may apply to the Court for a deposition.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, it would seem to me that we have reached that bridge and not gotten across it here today. If I was hearing Miss Saxerud and Mr. Butner correctly, they have posed that very question to her again today and did it again in private, and her position has not changed. I think that is where we are, and I am not sure what more could be done to change that position.

THE COURT: Well, I am prepared to order a deposition, if that is what you are seeking.

MR. SEARS: I am. I am. And what I'm saying -- and maybe I didn't make myself clear. What I am suggesting is that I will still offer, up to a reasonable time before the actual deposition, an interview in lieu of deposition. But in view of the crush of time, we need to have that deposition in hand to keep this moving forward.

THE COURT: I will authorize you to have a

2 Alexander Knapp. Thank you, Your Honor. 3 MR. SEARS: MR. BUTNER: Judge, I understand the Court's 5 order. And in regard to that order, particularly in regard to young Mr. Knapp, I would ask that the Court consider 6 7 allowing that deposition to be videotaped, then, and used --8 THE COURT: That is between the parties. 9 don't see any hangup with authorizing a videotaped 10 deposition. I will authorize you to have that videotaped, if one or either side desires that. 11 12 I am not ruling on the admissibility of that at this point. That may depend on some other factors 13 involved in the case. 14 15 The goal, of course, if we MR. BUTNER: Okay. do a videotaped deposition would be that that be used in lieu 16 17 of Alexander Knapp's live testimony at trial. 18 THE COURT: I recognize that there may be some 19 difference of opinion between counsel with regard to that, 20 and the question would remain whether he is available or unavailable for future testimony, I suppose, at that point. 21 22 MR. BUTNER: Thank you, Judge. That is not an issue I am ruling 23 THE COURT: I am just simply ruling that either side may have that 24 25 videotaped deposition so that the possibility could be there,

deposition of both Ms. Saxerud and young Mr. Knapp --

Let

1 that if both sides are satisfied with the results, it 2 possibly could be used for that purpose. I am not ruling on whether it would be admissible. 3 And so you may serve a notice of 5 deposition at whatever time and convenient location you choose. 7 MR. SEARS: We will, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: And I may or may not authorize the 9 closed-circuit video at the time of the trial. Depends on where things go from here. 10 11 MR. BUTNER: Okay. Okay. Did we have the other 12 THE COURT: 13 civilian? THE BATLIFF: Not at the time. I looked. 14 15 me take one more quick run. Some of that may have to do with 16 THE COURT: our changed location. I think she was notified of it being 17 18 down here, though. With regard to that question that was 19 20 having to do with the potential juror Smith, who noted some 21 post-filling out questionnaire communications. 22 advised -- or my office was -- by the jury commissioner's office that they had understood from something that the 23

potential juror said at the time of filling out the

questionnaire or reporting the incident to her that she may

24

not have been in town this week, so I can't confirm that she has actually received notice. The jury commissioner's office was attempting to contact her by phone. My office issued the order and sent it by mail to the address, but the jury commissioner had an understanding that the juror may not have been returning to town until the 12th. Obviously, we haven't gotten there yet.

The bailiff advises that she is not present. So we may have to defer that question to a later point in time, as far as examining her to determine what contact, if any, she had with other potential jurors.

MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, if it is case that she is not going to be here today and the information that you have is that she is out of town, I think it would still be valuable for us to have her here when we get back together on the 13th.

THE COURT: That was my thought exactly.

So, to the extent that I can do so, I will issue another order, and we'll try and have the jury commissioner's office communicate with Miss Smith so that I can have her here first thing when we resume on the 13th and at least enlighten us about the lack of clarity in my admonitions. So I will issue such an order and have her come on the 13th.

Moving on, there were a couple of things

that looked like they might need to be more urgently addressed, and I would suggest that one of them may be the issue of interviewing Ruth Kennedy. I don't know if you have some other thoughts on other motions that need to be taken up more urgently than that.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, in terms of the motions, that is a good one to start with. There are some matters not related to pending motions, but things we talked about last time we were together that we have given considerable additional thought to, that if you wanted to take some time now, we thought would be appropriate.

The first area, generally, has to do with the continuing jury selection process. And we have spent a great deal of time working with the questionnaires, consulting with our jury consultant expert at length about this. And there are a couple of things, and one of them is still an issue for us, which is how we are going to proceed on May 4th, and how many jurors would be summoned, and how they would be examined. And I think we have a sharper focus on that, that we could share with you, if you are inclined to hear about that.

THE COURT: I am.

MR. SEARS: Okay.

THE COURT: I will note that my office received some communication from the jury commissioner about

where you all, both sides, stood on calling other jurors in this week, and my understanding was you think you have a sufficient number as of right now to deal with. She was

going to cancel the rest for this week.

MR. SEARS: We do. And we had something in the neighborhood of 315 completed questionnaires that we have been working with. The originals have now all been returned to the jury commissioner and scanned copies have been provided to the State. And here is the approach we have taken, and we think it makes -- to us it makes good sense, and we hope it makes sense to the rest concerned in this case.

But what we did was to start going through them with an eye that there would be certain jurors, from answers to the questionnaires, that everyone could quickly agree were not able to serve for hardship reasons. Primarily, jurors who answered clearly and unequivocally that they had long-standing pre-paid travel plans for some period of time in the suggested range of dates for the trial. And we produced a list of those jurors, and we e-mailed those, late last night, to Mr. Butner and said to him in an e-mail message transmitting that, that these were the people that we felt that anyone looking at the questionnaires would conclude have irreparable hardships. There were a couple that had

serious personal illnesses. There was one person whose answers were pretty clearly evidence of some severe thought disorder on his part. There was one gentleman that couldn't read and produced a letter saying that he couldn't read and that he could fill out the questionnaire if somebody read it to him and he gave his oral answers. And so we've added that person to the list.

And so our hope would be that the State could quickly review this list of people and, of course, at any point in this process if they have questions about individuals that we think are in this group or other people that they want to add to the mix, then we would have this list. And we think those people can, under the rules, be excluded by the Court on that business from the questionnaire, without having to come in.

Then we have had a number of different discussions internally about what to do with the remainder. That number, by the way, is somewhere between 35 and 50. We didn't count them up, but on our spreadsheets it was two pages. So I would estimate that to be about 35 to 50 people that we think, if they came here for traditional voir dire, would be dismissed very early in the process.

Then we had groups of people that we were looking at and evaluating on a number of different levels, using different matrices to get information. It occurred to

us, based on experience -- and this is an idea that

Mr. Guastaferro brought to the table -- that rather than

spend the time between now and the 13th and on the 13th,

arguing about cause challenges, people that, for one

reason or another, based on something they said in the

questionnaire, one side or the other, we'd suggest, should be

excused for cause off their questionnaire answers. Maybe it

would be better to look at this in a more positive way.

And so we produced a list that we will forward -- as soon as we are able to put it together, probably this morning -- to the State, of about a 124 names of people. And these people, we think, based on our reading of the questionnaire, did not provide enough information on the questionnaire so that anyone, the Court or either side in this case could say clearly that person should not serve. These people are not -- I don't want to make the overstatement that these people are qualified to serve. They are simply people that survived the first cut and should be brought in for questioning.

That number, 124 people who don't clearly express something that we think would be a cause disqualification, those people, I think, are a sufficient number for us to get to 36, if that is the number we are seeking. We have given some thought that maybe we even want that number to be a bit higher, maybe 40 -- but somewhere in

that range.

We think there is a high probability that from this group of people we could get the strike pool produced in this case. That would mean that the people about whom there is going to be considerable argument because of their views on any number of things -- on publicity, knowledge of the case, statements about the death penalty, other things that came up in the questionnaire -- we can put those people to the end of the line and only consider bringing in any of those people on a limited basis, should we not get the strike pool out of the 124 first group of people. And it just seemed to us to be a way to expedite the process.

And rather than bring the difficult people in at the beginning and take the time to do that, put them behind the people that, at least at a first-cut level, would be people who could be talked to in more depth about whether they could and should serve on this jury. So that is our proposal. And we think that would greatly reduce the time on the 13th that we otherwise thought we'd be occupied discussing strikes off the questionnaire that we want and whether the State had any or not.

Now, to be more thorough on this, looking at this group of 124, there are jurors on there who have expressed things that seem to be things that the defense would embrace, and there are just as many people on that list

that would say things that we think the prosecution would be looking to hear. This is not some sort of cherry-picked dream pool for the defense comprised of people. What we are trying to do is to weed out people whose views are so extreme, one way or the other on a lot of these topics, that they would be controversial and probably be struck off the questionnaire and try to bring in a group of people who, at an early screening level, would appear to be people that could potentially serve on this jury. So that gives us enough people, and that gives us a cushion.

And if you take the 315 and you subtract 35 to 50 hardship strikes, then you subtract the 124 -- I think that's the number of people on our pool list -- the people to be brought in on May 4th and thereafter, then the remainder is enough of a cushion so that if for some reason we went through the 124 and didn't have a strike pool yet, we could start reaching into that group to see if we could find other people, and I think that is a more efficient way to do it.

What this really illustrates, for us at least, is the need for individual voir dire, and the idea that small group voir dire or old-fashioned large group voir dire would be a real problem. And we've seen this -- the potential of taint already from people like -- like the juror that didn't appear this morning. The idea would be that if

we had 124, that's -- if we brought them in at 15 a day, that's less than 10 per day.

And this -- when we get right down to the logistics of it, Judge, this is what we see happening. If we brought in 15 on Day 1 and we didn't get to 15, and we saw 12 and there were three left over, it would be an unreasonable burden on the jury commissioner to then call three people off the second day list and push them off, so that we never brought in more than 15 on any one day. Fifteen is a number that we think is somewhat optimistic, but we think it's reachable, and I think we can get close to 15 per day, particularly if we use our methodology and the 15 are drawn from this group of people who made the first cut.

And the -- doing it any other way,
bringing in larger groups means if you brought in 30 or 45 or
50 and only saw 15, then you have got this real crunch at the
end of the day and overnight of what do we do, do we push
those people off to the next day? So you have another 35 or
45 or 50 coming in, plus the 20 you didn't see the day
before, and then we start getting large groups of people.
And first and foremost, that is not respectful of their time.
These are the people that are going to be upset that they
have to come back day against day to be seen this case, and
spend a lot of time sitting around for brief periods of
activity when they are actually called for voir dire.

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So we think our process will actually streamline the way in which we go about doing this, minimize the possibility of juror against juror taint, reduce the workload on the jury commissioner if we don't reach the number each day, and get us to a strike pool more quickly than some other process.

I think there is a good possibility that we would never have to have your time involved in arguing cause strikes off the questionnaire, if we do it in this order. I think that we skip over that process, and we can use the time on the 13th to focus in on fine-tuning the hardship list and coming to some agreement.

And again, on this list of 124, if the State thinks that there are people in that list that don't pass their first cut, that can be discussed on the 13th. I think we are talking about a very short list of people. Similarly, if the State has additional people that they think ought to be brought in to be questioned, then that can be the focus of the discussion on the 13th, rather than talking about a couple of hundred jurors, one at a time.

You know, we have our own system for managing and summarizing and using data off the questionnaires, but the question is -- you know, there are two boxes. I have two banker's boxes full of questionnaires in my office and three CDs, so it is a lot of data. But I

think the way in which we are looking at this, we can help the Court and help the State with our summaries, and we can take both the Court and the State to the places in the questionnaires where people have said things of particular interest. You know, there is no substitute for reading all of the questionnaires, but we think our focus will at least help at the outset, rather than sitting down and reading every questionnaire one at a time to each other and then having a discussion.

So that is our proposal, Judge. And so we would like some clarity today going forward that this is what -- we can make the first part of this happen. We can transmit this -- what we call the "pool list," which is 124 names to the State, almost at any time. That is ready to go probably in the next five or ten minutes. And then sort of take it from there.

And we also thought that doing it this way minimized the need for us to take Mr. Butner and Mr. Paupore's valuable time between now and the 13th for a face-to-face meeting. We think actually we can do this work through e-mail.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I understand what

Mr. Sears is suggesting. First of all, I don't think that

anything about this process has streamlined the jury

selection. We just seem to add more and more time all along.

But what I think is a real problem is that this 124 list, so to speak, that in the defense opinion don't clearly express any problems, I think really what that is is an opportunity for the defense to pre-cull jurors that they think might be appropriate for their case, and I don't think that that's the way that we should be doing this.

THE COURT: Well, that is not how he proposed it. He proposed --

MR. BUTNER: I understand.

THE COURT: -- he proposed that you be able to add others, or maybe there are some in the 124 that would not -- that your idea of what a fair and impartial juror might be, so --

MR. BUTNER: Judge, these jurors have a right to serve, also. And, you know, it is sort of interfering with that right to go ahead and pre-cull this list. There are a number of these people that are going to be rehabilitatable, so to speak, by way of the oral examination.

And I don't think that it is right to cut them off at the pass and have this pre-selected 124. I think we are better off doing it the way that we started out. This is just exactly the kind of problem that I envisioned at the outset when we embarked on this process. I understand the principle of individual voir dire and that -- that I think it

could be more expeditiously handled, but I understand why the defense wants it done that way -- the problem of taint.

But to take a select 124, when we have a number of others out there, and pull them out of that, as I understand it, that bunch, I don't think that is a good way to do it. I think we should just take it as they come, and give these people an individual opportunity to serve as jurors.

Now there may be some that I can talk with the defense about, and we would agree, as suggested by Mr. Sears, that this person has evidenced such extremes views on their questionnaire that they just can't serve. Okay? That is a distinct possibility.

But to cut the others off at the pass, so to speak, I don't think that that is right, I don't think that that's legal, and I don't think it is appropriate under the circumstances that those people be weeded out before they've even have a chance to be examined and possibly rehabilitated.

So that is the State's objection to this process in that regard, and I don't think we should go that route.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Thank you, Your Honor.

We can certainly provide Mr. Butner with

the list of those jurors, which is a larger list than 124, that we think we have put them in a group we call "cause." And there are people in there that have expressed extreme views about the death penalty. There are people in there that have made it clear that they have pre-judged the case, based on what they have been told. Disturbingly, there are people there that say they have talked to law enforcement and people inside the prosecution and obtained information that causes them to have an irrevocable opinion about the case.

The other group -- so that we are talking about the same thing -- the other group are not people that have been people pre-screened for attitude. They are simply people from the questionnaires who have not, by contrast, expressed such a clear opinion one way or the other. "I could never impose the death penalty," or "I will always impose the death penalty, no matter what the circumstances are."

These people have said things, as I suggested, that I think the State would embrace, about the death penalty and about its appropriateness and what it would take to convince them and probably will be subject to a challenge for cause from what -- you know, if they are leaning towards the death penalty in more cases, they may be a cause challenge candidate. But the only screening that has been done is that from the face of the questionnaire, they

have not said something that is so clearly extreme that we could hand them to you with good faith and say you can challenge this person for cause. And they are not off the

panel. We are not striking these people.

We are simply saying that as a matter of efficiency, if you know you have 214 jurors who have already in a questionnaire said something that is so extreme that one side or the other or the Court are likely to strike them for cause, would it make sense to bring those people in first or mix those people in if we could take people that everyone agreed, hopefully looking at it, have at least expressed enough of an open mind about this case that they're worthy of further examination. I am not suggesting that those people will be cause free. To the contrary. I think there are a lot of troublesome people in that group.

But it's just a matter of ordering the jurors -- it is not taking away the right of these other jurors to be heard. It is simply trying to figure out what is the most efficient way to use limited resources to get to a strike pool in this case without removing a single right of the State in this case or right of the defendant to be heard on a challenge for cause. And that's all we have done.

And the process of meeting with

Mr. Butner and the prosecution team to talk about these cause
challenges is still out there. In fact, that was our initial

idea, that we would do that. But when we saw -- and I think
I may have said a couple of times that I was expecting strong
answers, and I wasn't disappointed, in these
questionnaires -- the number of people that we would have to
talk about is a daunting number.

And so we thought it more efficient to take a smaller list of people, but a sufficiently large list of people, who have not, on the face of their questionnaires, disqualified themselves, and put those people at the front of the line to be brought in on May 4th. And I think, you know, we could do that. We could sit there and argue cause challenges back and forth for the other 200 and probably come very close to the same idea that of the 200-and-some people on our cause list, most of those people are going to wind up being struck.

And if the State insists that they be brought in, we're going to take our time in court, the most expensive time of all, and strike them for cause, based on what they said, which is why we suggested a questionnaire in the first place.

So with all deference to the State's ideas, I think what we are saying is a way to manage 315 people, and a way to do it that is most likely to produce a strike pool in a reasonable period of time, without the idea of bringing in people that, if we laid their questionnaire

out and took five minutes to look at it before those people came in, we would never make it to the box. Thank you.

THE COURT: I don't see a legal obstacle to doing a semi pre-cull, if that is how you want to call it, but I am under the impression that this was something that just was a proposal to Mr. Butner and the State's side. And so I think they need to take a look at what your list entails and that sort of thing. Perhaps some agreement could be reached for some of the numbers before the 13th, where we don't have to argue about them, but --

MR. BUTNER: Just to clarify, Judge, they sent an e-mail to me, I guess last night. I have to -- you know where I live. I have to come directly to Prescott and get here at a decent hour so we can proceed. So I have not seen that e-mail. And if they're going to send an e-mail, I hope it would be copied to Mr. Paupore so that, you know, we've got a copy over here in Prescott, rather than where I'm at over in Camp Verde, so I can see it promptly. But that is part of the problem, too.

THE COURT: Well, if you wouldn't mind copying Mr. Paupore on anything that is sent out. I don't know if Mr. Paupore was or was not copied on this particular item, but to the extent that you can consider what the defense has raised this morning, Mr. Butner and Mr. Paupore, take a look at it, and perhaps that will reduce the time that we need on

the 13th. I don't know. I will leave that to you folks.

MR. SEARS: I will speak in defense of Mr. Hammond and his computer skills. We were at a place and time when Mr. Hammond didn't have access to Miss Cowell and Mr. Paupore's e-mails. An e-mail to Mr. Butner says that and says would you please shoot this to them, and in the morning we will send them around, and we'll do that. We have e-mails in both places.

THE COURT: Thanks. I appreciate that.

MR. BUTNER: I understand those technological limitations. Got them myself.

THE COURT: All right. I will say this:

Conceptually, I don't have a major problem. If the parties can work out some reduced number from which we are going to derive the jurors who actually come in and then randomize those.

To the extent that anybody has a right to serve on jury, it is not a particularized right with regard to any particular case, in my opinion. They have a right to serve on juries, yes, but I don't know that anybody has a constitutional right to serve on a particular jury. And so to limit the number that we call in and then randomize that list I don't think has legal objections to it or constitutional objections to it, such that the Court would recognize standing on the part of somebody who doesn't sit on

1 | the jury.

I suspect most people acknowledge their civic obligation to serve on a jury. But for serving on a particular jury for a lengthy time, I think you probably would not have many of the 315 objecting to being pre-culled, but that is more an observation.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, if I might just make one statement to clarify.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUTNER: I understand what the Court is saying, and I maybe didn't make my objection clear. I don't know the basis for the defense culling this list out, and so it could --

THE COURT: I could tell.

MR. BUTNER: -- it could be that there are constitutional issues with the manner in which this list was formed by the defense, and that is why I noted that objection. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. If there are people that are obvious challenges for cause, I think that both sides can probably reach some understanding of that and take those out of the mix, so that when we are drawing the list up and then randomizing it, it would produce the numbers that we are going to spend a lot of time with when we do get to the individualized voir dire. I still am not opposed to

individual voir dire, and the numbers, based on the experience of the parties, would seem to lend itself to 15 or 16 people a day because of the number of hours that we have in court and the amount of questions that both counsel may have -- both counsel for either side may have for particular jurors, with any luck, with some degree of agreement on who comes in and who is challengable for cause, we can get through those numbers and get a jury panel to do the strikes from of 36 to 40 more quickly than the number of days that it would take to go through the whole grouping of them.

Mr. Sears.

Counsel, here is what we did. We sent you an e-mail -
THE COURT: I don't think you need to explain it again, Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Just so we can be clear here,

MR. SEARS: I didn't think I did either,
Mr. Butner stood up and said he didn't understand how we did
this, and I think it is pretty simple, what we did. But what
I will offer to do is, so that the picture is complete, they
will have one list, which is the list of hardship people,
about whom we think there should be little or no dispute, the
people have expressed a clear, traditional "I can't be here
every day" --

THE COURT: In fact, you said they have that already.

MR. SEARS: Yeah, they have that. We've now circulated that to Mr. Paupore and Miss Cowell.

Now, the second list, which will be coming shortly, is this list. I would resist the idea of saying that it's a cull list. This is simply a list of people that on the face of their answers in the questionnaires did not say something so extreme or so clear about something that would be disqualifying as to be in the bigger pool of cause strikes.

These are people that we think are reasonable people to be brought in to be questioned further. We are not suggesting that they are cause free or that this is some group of people that would not need to be carefully questioned. They just didn't say something that was so clearly a basis for a cause strike by one side or the other in this case.

But what we will do, so that the State can see by comparison, we will send the remaining list, which are the cause strikes. And I think that if they looked at a few representative questionnaires there, it would jump out at them, and we might even be able to provide them with some of our summaries saying take a look at their answer to these questions, and then tell us if you don't agree that these people have disqualified themselves based on their questionnaire answers. For example, one of the potential

jurors is Mr. Butner's secretary.

MR. BUTNER: Which I have no objection to being excluded.

MR. SEARS: She came in and filled out a questionnaire, though, and that raises some other issues. We wished that that had been brought to the Court's attention sooner rather than later.

MR. BUTNER: She doesn't consult me about her activities. I found out about it after the fact.

THE COURT: All right. Well, please take a look and continue to communicate prior to the 13th and see if you can enter any other stipulations or agreements with regard to particular members of the jury panel prior to 13th, where we are not arguing over things that are not necessary to argue over.

Next issue.

MR. SEARS: We are still talking about matters that we think impact jury selection. One of them was my colleagues were able to see the Division Two courtroom for the first time on Friday and were as wide-eyed as children on Christmas morning. They said, "This is a big room."

And it occurred to us that -- we started working very hard and doing diagrams and thinking about the logistics of trying this case in your court. And one of the things that we think is going to be somewhat awkward is the

way in which sidebars are going to be conducted in a case with a big jury like this. And we think, unfortunately, this may be a case in which there may be frequent sidebars. And the practice of going down the little hallway and back into your chambers is time-consuming, burdensome on Roxanne, and a bit disruptive.

We started looking at the layout of the courtroom and the location of tables and where things like ELMOs and projectors and laptops would go, and how to be in that courtroom and be in the right place and not tripping over each other and not blocking sight lines for jurors. And I'll just ask whether there is any possibility of suggesting to Judge Brutinel that this is a kind of case that might better be tried in his courtroom, and that if we provided him with regular coffee and donuts in your courtroom, if there was a chance of doing it -- it's just that the space -- particularly the space between the bench and the rail in that courtroom is so much bigger, the sight lines are so much better, the seats are more uncomfortable for the crowd. But everything else about that courtroom, I think, solves some of these problems.

And I remember from a million years ago being able to do sidebars off the judge's right-hand side, down there by the door, and being pretty confident that they are out of the range of hearing of the jury. And it just

1 occurred to us that that courtroom would be so much better on 2 some of these matters. 3 And if not, perhaps we could take some of 4 your time -- maybe even if we wind up not using all of the 5 day on the 13th on jury selection matters, maybe we could 6 spend a little bit of time brainstorming in your courtroom 7 about whether there was something that can be done. 8 would just ask politely that an inquiry be made about the 9 availability of the Division Two courtroom for this trial. 10 A couple of other unrelated --11 MR. BUTNER: Judge, if I might respond to that. 12 13 MR. SEARS: Sure. 14 I can make inquiry, but it doesn't THE COURT: 15 mean it would be fulfilled even if I make inquiry. Go ahead. 16 The one problem that it is not MR. BUTNER: 17 going to solve is the acoustics problem in that courtroom. 18 The court reporter probably joins THE COURT: 19 you in that observation. 20 It is just extremely difficult MR. BUTNER: 21 for everybody, I think, to hear. And some of us already have 22 some hearing limitations, and I am thinking for myself at

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issue.

It may be that we will be able to work

this point in time, I think. So, I think that that's an

out some of the other problems like sidebars and so forth in some other fashion, but I don't think it is such a great idea as a result of the difficult acoustics there.

THE COURT: All right. I'll ask Judge

Brutinel, and we are talking such a long trial here, I am not sure that he can accommodate that in any event.

MR. SEARS: I would be willing to bet that temporary sound arrangements could be made in that courtroom with things that the County already possesses -- microphones and things that would allow some of that problem to be solved. I think that if there were a better need of sound system in that courtroom, the acoustics problems -- all of us practiced in there when there were no microphones and shag carpeting and a big chandelier, and the windows were open in the summertime. So I think it's better than it was.

But just from a spatial point of view and a logistical point of view, that area is just so big compared to what we are working with in your courtroom.

THE COURT: I kind of like the federal courtroom, too, but I don't think --

MR. SEARS: You know, that's a possibility.

And I don't know whether that's even available --

THE COURT: No, it is doubtful the U.S.

Marshal service, anymore -- because they have to provide

security as a federal facility, aren't as gracious as they

used to be. It's not a slam on them, but can't be as gracious as they were in former days with regard to that.

MR. SEARS: Is that worth even talking about?

THE COURT: I don't think so, not based on my recent experience -- not personal, but with the system here in State court asking for it, it's -- they aren't readily providing that as they may have done in the past.

MR. BUTNER: Well, I would also like to draw the Court's attention that there are, apparently, according to my paralegals, some significant wireless limitations in Division Two, also.

THE COURT: Are there?

MR. BUTNER: Yeah. It is much more difficult in there than it is in your usual courtroom. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. SEARS: One other thought, after spending so much time with the questionnaires and focusing on this issue, a number of potential jurors answered questions indicating that they had been convicted of crimes and had been sentenced for those crimes. And we wondered, without knowing whether the State had or intended to run criminal histories on any of those jurors, whether they thought they could or should -- but we would ask this: If they do or have, that whatever they obtain on those or on any other jurors, be provided to the Court and to us in advance of jury

selection. It is something that we don't have access to and the Court doesn't have access to, but I think it would be important because it would, again, streamline those questions.

For example, we got the impression that one or more potential jurors had a felony conviction, but presumably, their rights were restored. It would be relatively easy to determine that from their criminal history in a case like this.

But I am also concerned, just on a practical level, if the jurors self-disclose that information, are they accurately and fully disclosing the extent of their criminal history, particularly from some other state. It's not easily searchable by us. So that would be my request of the State.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, in regard to running criminal histories, and I am sure the Court is fully aware, there is a special protocol on that sort of thing, in terms of disclosure and so forth. Certainly we wouldn't be precluded from disclosing to the Court, but I think probably a better way to handle that would be if we do run these criminal histories and we see that there is reason to do that, we would provide to the Court and counsel those felony convictions that are still on record, so to speak.

And in terms of -- as the Court is aware,

I think, in terms of our jury cards and that kind of thing,
we have always provided that information to the defense
voluntarily, and we will continue to do that. I think that
that basically addresses that issue appropriately.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. SEARS: That's wonderful. I was going to ask -- I was going to ask whether they still did jury cards, and if they did -- and in my personal experience, I have never gotten them. So this is a wonderful new day for that idea, and I would ask that if they have that, if they disclose that as quickly as possible, we would be very much interested in that.

On the criminal history, though, the question of felony convictions goes to their qualifications and fitness to serve as a matter of statute. But I think their criminal history on misdemeanors and some other things may certainly play on questions involving voir dire and their contacts with the judicial system. They were asked questions about it and, in fact, it's in those questions that they self-disclosed this, because the presumption was they wouldn't be on the jury list to begin with if they had felony convictions without their rights restored.

THE COURT: I would think. I appreciate the candor by Mr. Butner and willingness to help.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you, Judge.

MR. SEARS: The last matter -- not the last matter, but one of the next matters is the ongoing video conferencing -- the grand experiment. We have continued to try, and we've been in communication with the County.

Remember, this is a matter that we put over until today for further discussion, and I have -- Mr. Robertson prepared a little flow chart of where we are now for your reading enjoyment.

And what we are trying to show here is the way in which this -- this is not a hundred percent of the system, but the tests we have been running have been with three different sites -- my office, Mr. Robertson's R-3 investigation, and the firm of Osborn Maledon in Phoenix. Three different locations, three different laptop computers showing audio and video.

And what's happened, as recently as the end of the day yesterday, was yet another experiment, we now decided that rather than having Mr. DeMocker pulled and handcuffed to the wall, we are having the sergeants -- depending on which sergeant it is, come in and do this link, and we're going back and forth.

And one of the problems we have -- and I want to make it clear that I don't think anybody on the County side is doing anything other than trying to make this

work. We are not suggesting bad faith. The problem is the goalposts keep moving.

And there was a discussion over the last few days about maybe using a different IP Internet address, and we tried that. And then late in the day yesterday, one of the County people with whom we have been working pretty closely said "Well, wait a minute. You are supposed to schedule these multi-site interviews through the County MIS office" -- just a completely new first-time out-of-the-box never heard that idea before, so we haven't had a chance to do that.

But the net result is still the same as it was when I spoke to this the last time: Despite our best efforts and what we think the best efforts are of the jail and the County MIS, it has still never worked, and there has always been something wrong. The confusing thing is that it never seems to be the same problem time against time, that sometimes parts of it work in one way, and the next time you do it something else changes, and the problems shift around.

I think the logistical problem at the jail end, in terms of getting Mr. DeMocker in there and whether he needs to be handcuffed or not, can probably be worked out, maybe at the captain level -- maybe the sergeants and the DOs just don't feel comfortable changing policy for that, but I think we can work around that. But we can't make

the system work, and we can't make it work in the way in which it was intended to work, which is to allow conferences between -- this is a conference that would involve what we consider to be the core defense team -- the lawyers and R-3 investigations. And then we want to use it for experts and other people in lieu of having them come up and try to find a place in the jail to sit down and meet with Mr. DeMocker.

So this is where we are. And the ball has really not moved much past mid-field for the longest time, and it seems like there is some new problem or new requirement or new idea or new issue every time you try to do this. And everybody kind of laughs about it, but nobody has a solution, and nobody has a way to make it work, and now we are a month from trial.

And the problem is exacerbated in a way that I can't even describe to you and will try to describe later on today by ongoing disclosure from the State. We have gotten two disclosures in the last 24 hours and a third one last Friday that disclosed 60,000 e-mails. So this problem is stuck.

And the problem is devoting our time and resources to it is a real problem, and I am not sure at what point we have the time any longer to try to make this work. We barely have enough time to use it if it worked properly,

1 but the idea of spending more and more of our time and 2 resources and taking away from other things to work on this is just hard to imagine right now. 3 4 So that is where we are this morning. 5 declared it a failure, and I am afraid I have to say that my opinion has not changed. 6 7 THE COURT: Any observations on that issue, 8 Mr. Butner? 9 MR. BUTNER: First of all, Judge, nobody is 10 laughing about this. This is serious business. And I don't 11 know what to do about this. 12 I can talk with Mr. Fields, again, and 13 see if he has any insights into what is going on there. 14 is an ongoing problem, and I would hope that this can be 15 corrected immediately. I don't know what to say about it 16 because I just heard more about it, and I would ask leave of 17 the Court to inquire and see if I could find out some more 18 information about it. I think the Court knows that I, on 19. behalf of the State, have always taken this very seriously. 20 THE COURT: I will defer further action at least until later this afternoon. 21 22 MR. BUTNER: Okay. Thank you. 23 Judge, our notes from our last MR. SEARS: 24 session indicated that what Mr. Butner is proposing to do now

is what he said he would do prior to this morning's hearing.

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We expected to see these people here this morning.

MR. BUTNER: Well, right after the hearing last time, we provided Mr. Sears with another type of telephone number, so to speak, to connect to -- and they thought at that point in time that that would cure the problem. So I don't think that it is appropriate that Mr. Sears say that I didn't do anything about it. I thought it was handled at that point in time, and I haven't heard otherwise until just this moment.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Any other urgent issues that you had?

Otherwise, I would like to move on to talk about some of the things that have to be done before the trial, such as the interview of Ruth Kennedy.

MR. HAMMOND: I would like to get on to that as well as the Court would, but just in terms of things that were left undone from the last hearing, we were hoping to get a report from the prosecution about the further testing done at the Sorensen Laboratory. I think that the Court requested, and Mr. Butner agreed, to provide us with a summary of what had been done up there, and I don't believe we have that.

MR. BUTNER: I don't have complete information on what additional testing has been done at this point in time. But I do know that until Friday of last week, at least

if my information is correct, the defense expert was there observing the testing that was going on. This testing being additional DNA testing, where it was not completed by the D.P.S. crime lab or where they indicated that there was additional DNA left on the items that they had tested, and they got partial profiles and so forth, and that additional DNA that was left on the tested items could have been gathered but was not gathered by D.P.S., and so it was taken to Sorensen Lab to be gathered. So that's the gist of the testing.

I also have been informed that I should be able to provide the defense with a report concerning the Sorensen testing on Tuesday of next week, which would be the, so to speak, two-weekend anniversary of the time the testing commenced. So hopefully, we will have a report at that point in time, and that can be given to the defense.

THE COURT: You were also checking into whether the materials were what they purported to be, as regards the lab audit materials, and also whether the STR tables were already disclosed as part of that, and I think that was the other remaining aspects of Sorensen.

On Sorensen, Mr. Hammond, is it correct that a defense expert is up there and observing? Are you not getting feedback from that person?

MR. HAMMOND: It is correct that our

1 consultant was there, but nothing by way of analysis of the 2 additional swabbing and the creation of the additional 3 extracts -- nothing by way of analysis was communicated to 4 So all we know is that additional testing was done. 5 We observed that being done, but now we 6 have no idea what they have done since then. Presumably, 7 they are going to determine whether there are profiles 8 sufficient for comparison purposes. That shouldn't take 9 another week. My bet is that somebody at Sorensen today 10 11 knows the answer with respect to whether they were able to obtain sufficient DNA to make any other observations about 12 the presence of a testable profile or a comparable profile, 13 and we don't know that. 14 15 THE COURT: I suspect that is probably the 16 case, also. Could we have somebody from the State's 17 18 investigation team check that out to see if there is 19 something that may merit additional testing? 20 MR. BUTNER: So do you want me to get in touch with the Sorensen Lab and find out where they are in regard 21 22 to that additional testing? THE COURT: Not you personally, but I see 23

MR. BUTNER: You know what, Judge? I am the

Mr. Paupore is doing that with Mr. Sechez.

guy that keeps getting hung out in front of the judge and 1 2 having to explain this. I prefer to be the guy that calls 3 Sorensen lab. I'm the guy that talked to them last time --4 I don't have any problem with you THE COURT: 5 doing that. 6 MR. BUTNER: -- and filed that notice. 7 I am going to do it, then. I'll call 8 them during the lunch break and ask about these items and 9 where they're at in terms of the testing, and I'll come back 10 after lunch and provide a progress report, so to speak, as to where the testing is. 11 12 I would point out to Court and counsel that their expert was there for the first part of the 13 testing, certainly had the right to remain there while all of 14 15 this was going and could give them a report step by step or 16 blow by blow. 17 But I will call Sorensen and try and get 18 ahold of whomever is running that stuff and let me know what 19 is going on, and then I will pass that information on to 20 Court and counsel. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MR. HAMMOND: Thank you, Your Honor. When 23 Counsel contacts Sorensen -- let me just wait until 24 Mr. Butner's attention is turned back.

MR. BUTNER: My attention is perfectly

directed. Thank you, Sir.

MR. HAMMOND: When Mr. Butner contacts the Sorensen Lab, I think if he asks them directly about the process, he will find that our consultant stayed for as long as there was anything for her to observe. The work that has to be done between the final swabbing and extraction is not work that is done where a consultant just sits and watches it. I could go into details, but I don't think it would serve us to do so.

THE COURT: I agree with that.

MR. HAMMOND: But I do think that when he gets a progress report, he will find out what was done after our consultant left and why it didn't make sense for them to invite her to stay nor for her to stay past the three days that she was there.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you both.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, you asked about the audit information. Okay?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. BUTNER: D.P.S. audit materials were provided in the disclosure of January 29 of 2010, under the 46th supplement Bates Nos. 17323 through 17340.

In that same supplemental disclosure, an "N" -- I don't know what this stands for -- NRCL -- you don't know? Okay. An NRCL full assessment report, which I have

been told assessment is -- equates to audit. The first one I mentioned, there was one dated March the 2nd of 2009, at those Bates numbers. The second one was dated November 7 of 2008, disclosed in that same supplement, including a corrective action request, and that is Bates Nos. 17270 through 17322.

The scope of accreditation was disclosed dated March the 5th of 2009, in that same supplement, Bates No. 17342; an accreditation certificate dated March the 5th of 2009 was also disclosed in that supplement, Bates No. 17341.

Since that time, I got in touch with the lab personally and obtained a bunch of additional audits, going back approximately five years to 2004, and I disclosed those yesterday in e-mails to Ms. Chapman, and we did a formal disclosure last night to identify those things. So we provided them with the five years of audits, so to speak, yesterday, on top of these previous audit/assessments that have been disclosed.

And just to make the record clear, the way that the lab is audited, apparently, is it has a full audit done by an external lab every five years, which is what was disclosed back in January. And then on alternating years, in between those five years of audits, they do an internal audit one year and then they do an external audit

1 the next year, and those audits were disclosed as of 2 yesterday, Judge. So I think we've got all of the audits that we need to disclose now. 3 4 THE COURT: 5 issue that was left. 6 7 my understanding. 8 in time. 9 10 11 12 13 form. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 record. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 23 week?

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STR table materials was another MR. BUTNER: That was previously disclosed, to I don't have that specified at this point But I disclosed two types of STR tables yesterday, one of which is in a publication, and I e-mailed that to Ms. Chapman, and the other of which was in the form of information provided to us from the lab by Kortney Snider, and that was disclosed in the January -- no, not in that In any event, we have a Bates number of 20734 that discloses STR. I believe these are STR tables. They call them "allelic frequency tables." I think that that is a synonymous term, but I -- I'm not of a sufficient scientific acumen to state that with certainty for the Does that address, either Ms. Chapman or Mr. Hammond, the issues that you were concerned about last MR. HAMMOND: Well, I think it may address the question of do we now have them. We will have to go through them.

He did send counsel -- Mr. Butner sent us six e-mails yesterday to which audits were attached. He did send us what is called an allelic frequency table which -- if that is what they have, that corresponds to our STR frequency request. We will look at those to determine whether they are responsive, but I expect they are.

what it doesn't deal with is our expression of concern about the fact that it took us this long to get things that we know they have and that they have had for at least the last decade of the D.P.S. has had this audit process. They couldn't maintain their accreditation without it. We asked for it, and this Court ordered it, and yet now we are getting them only after considerable whining on a day a month before trial.

It puts us, as has been the case throughout, in a very difficult position. We now have to, with the aid of our consultants, analyze that. We still have not interviewed the D.P.S. personnel. But if this is the final work, then we will move as quickly as possible to interview those people.

But it does seem to us, Your Honor, that at some point there needs to be some sanction for the late disclosure. And I know we are going to talk at some point in

the next day or so about the question of sanctions for late disclosure or nondisclosure, and so I would like to defer that part of it until we get there.

And I will accept that what Mr. Butner sent us yesterday will comply with the outstanding request, and we will advise the Court if it doesn't.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Just to clarify, Judge, the main external audit that we've really been discussing about this so called NRCL final assessment report and accompanying documents, that was disclosed in January of this year, Judge. I scrambled and got the -- there is a manager of quality control or something, and I got ahold of him, and I got those additional internal audits of the interim years and so forth to be provided, also -- as I stated I would do in court.

But the main audit for this lab with its certification, et cetera, and with its requests for certain corrective action being made -- all of that was disclosed in January.

I would also like to note that there was actually a seventh e-mail sent, and I believe it was received, and that e-mail also had STR tables. Just to clarify for Counsel, that was a forwarding on of those STR tables from Becky Love-Holt, a lab -- an analyst. I thought so. Ms. Chapman indicated that she actually did receive that

1 e-mail, too. So we've got -- I think we've got the STR 2 tables thing handled. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. 4 Defense filed a motion March 22nd to 5 compel interview of -- in particular of victim Ruth Kennedy, who is a listed witness. Let's move on to that one. I --6 7 maybe we shouldn't move on to that until I have given everybody a chance to take a brief recess. Let me hold that 8 for a few minutes. 9 10 We will take a recess. 11 (Brief recess.) The record reflects the defendant 12 THE COURT: is present with all his counsel and both prosecutors here, as 13 14 well. Unless you have an alternative, I think 15 16 we'll move on to the Ruth Kennedy matter. 17 MR. HAMMOND: Thank you, Your Honor. We would 18 like to address the Ruth Kennedy motion at this time. 19 We have filed this motion seeking to 20 compel her interview, for reasons that we hope are well spelled out in our papers. She is a critical witness in this 21 22 case. I don't think that the State has any objection to the idea that she is an important fact witness as well as a 23 witness who might testify at some later stage, if we ever got 24

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But -- so we have in her case this situation that does sometimes arise in which someone is entitled statutorily to what appears to be the broad scope of the victim's rights statute and the need to weigh that against the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation, to counsel, and to be able to develop a To us, the tension here is really best typified by the United States Supreme Court decision in Chambers v. Mississippi. That case, which has now been cited as much as any case in recent American history by the Supreme Court, stands for the proposition that in some cases there is a need to balance the rules that govern State court trials against federal constitutional rights of the defense, and we believe that this is one of those cases where there is a collision between the constitutionl right of the defendant to representation by counsel and to the ability to build and have a defense in the capital arena.

So we have laid that out, we have suggested that there are certainly ways that the interview can be conducted so that it will be done as respectfully as possible, so that her status as a victim will be regarded.

But to say that we may not speak to her at all we think is an interference with the right of counsel and the right of this man to a defense.

We also have addressed the narrower

question of whether she is a victim of the burglary charge in this case. As the Court very well knows, the State has charged both an aggravated burglary and the first degree murder. She is not, under that statute, a victim of the first crime charged.

And at the very least, we think that the case that we have cited, the *Chamblin* case -- if that's how it's pronounced -- does acknowledge that if you are not a victim of one crime charged, your victim status as to another crime would not prevent an interview. And we understand that the facts of that case are different, that this is a situation in which the facts of one charge are close to the facts of another.

But nonetheless, in recognition of the importance of the constitutional rights involved, we have asked that the Court balance the statutory provision on the right of victims, which technically, at least, does not apply to the burglary charge, and acknowledge that an interview would serve the interest of justice in this case.

And I want to end by saying that we have done everything that we can do. Under the rules that bind us, we have attempted to contact her, as the rules require. We sent a letter to Mr. Butner, to the State. We have never received a response in writing, but we have received an oral response that the State claims that Mr. Butner did ask her if

she would be willing to talk to us, and she has declined.

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Given that this is a death penalty case and that her views on the death penalty are important for a host of reasons that I think are obvious to us all, we would ask that the Court order that we have an opportunity to interview her. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, I have read the response. Anything else that you would like to add?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I guess the thing that jumps out and is clearly conveniently ignored by the defense in asking for this interview, both orally and then written and then by way of motion, now, is Section 2.1 under the Constitution of the State of Arizona, setting forth the Victim Bill of Rights, and specifically Provision No. 5, which states that the victim of a crime has a right to refuse an interview, deposition, or other discovery request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or other person acting on behalf of the defendant.

And clearly, the Victim's Rights Statute, 13-4401, provides that when the victim of a crime is killed, that a family member then becomes the victim, and Ruth Kennedy is one of those defined family members, so to speak, under the Victim's Right Statute. She is certainly a victim in every respect of the word, as defined by the Arizona Constitution and statute in regard to both the burglary

offense and the homicide offense in this case.

asking that this 85-year-old lady, who has been repeatedly asked about being interviewed, be allowed to decline this interview. And to clarify how that was done, I did not interview Ms. Kennedy. I spoke with her in a telephonic conversation a couple of times about this. And in one of them, she asked me to read to her the defense letter requesting an interview, and I did that in the first conversation. And then we had another conversation months later, and I asked her again about it, and she asked that she not be required to be interviewed at that time, also.

So I think there is ample statutory and constitutional authority, not to mention the rules of humanity to allow her to refuse to be interviewed in connection with this case.

Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: So I am clear and the record is clear, the oral request for an interview, you posed to Ms. Kennedy, received an answer from her declining to be interviewed by the defense. When you got the letter, you sent it back and read it to her over the phone?

MR. BUTNER: That's correct. I did both.

THE COURT: You got a response back from her declining -- or expressing a desire not to be interviewed.

1 MR. BUTNER: Exactly. And then I spoke with her again in a subsequent telephone conversation and asked 2 3 her what her wishes were in regard to whether she wished to be interviewed, and she again indicated that she really 5 wished that she did not have to submit to such an interview. 6 THE COURT: She is, however, still a 7 prospective witness for the prosecution in the case. MR. BUTNER: Yes, she is, Judge. 8 THE COURT: Mr. Hammond. 9 MR. HAMMOND: Your Honor, it was the -- one of 10 11 the things that led us to feel strongly about this was one of the first interviews that Miss Kennedy gave, which we do have 12 a record of, in which, I think it is fair to say, her 13 response to questions about being further interviewed and her 14 views on the death penalty were at best ambiguous. 15 I think at that point, much more of an open mind, at least of 16 a mind to cooperate with both sides in this case. 17 This was a YCSO interview? 18 THE COURT: MR. HAMMOND: It was. 19 That was audio taped early on, but 20 THE COURT: 21 the quality of the audio tape, you indicated, was poor. 22 MR. HAMMOND: Right. The quality was poor, but it did cause us to believe that it was important for us 23 to continue to pursue this issue. 24 And I have nothing further to say in

response to the State.

THE COURT: I recognize the defendant's rights with regard to presenting a defense and trying to determine ahead of time discovery through the discovery and disclosure process what a witness will testify to. I don't find that the defendant's rights under the Sixth Amendment are any less preserved by the passage of the Arizona constitutional provisions having to do with the victim's rights. And I don't find that it is appropriate under the statutes implementing the Victim's Bill of Rights constitutional provision to order the compelled interview of Ruth Kennedy in this case. I don't think that that results in any loss of the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights or due process or confrontation rights.

I am going to deny the request to order Mrs. Kennedy to submit to an interview.

What other issues are more on the top of the list of the many that we have to go through?

MR. SEARS: Judge, not so much because this is on the top of the list, but because we thought it was something we could deal with, perhaps, before the noon break here, when it looks like both sides have a lot of outside business to do.

I would like, with your permission, to take up our March 10, 2010 motion to compel the State to make

a proper proffer and preclude witnesses.

THE COURT: Let me keep track of what I am doing.

All right. Mr. Sears, you may proceed.

MR. SEARS: Judge, this motion grew out of a reply that we filed on February 17th of this year in regard to a motion we had filed to preclude two of the State's witnesses, about whose expert status they are still continuing to debate, from testifying. And what we did in that reply is identify a list of witnesses that, based on the disclosure received to that point, we knew either nothing about and couldn't understand why they were on the State's witness list, or from what little we did know about them, appeared to us to have nothing admissible to say.

And the reason this became a problem is this ongoing problem caused by the State's unwillingness to reasonably rewrite its witness list. When we filed this motion, the State was still listing 142 witnesses and they were up to 22 experts. And those numbers have shifted somewhat but not greatly. In fact, as you will hear later, the number of new experts, particularly new experts for whom we have no reports or other information, has grown in the very recent past.

So what we did is take out of this list of witnesses a group of -- I think it was originally 27

witnesses that we just didn't understand the basis for their inclusion in the State's witness list. And you will remember that we have had many discussions, and you have issued orders directing the State, first in a cordial and friendly way, to make a real effort at reducing their witness list, and then as time went on and our request became more urgent and in a more direct way, directing the State to do that. And for whatever reason, the State really has not done that.

There is another motion we have filed dealing with an instance in which we actually conducted defense interviews of witnesses who clearly, during those brief interview, had nothing relevant or admissible to say in this case, and we have a motion for sanctions dealing with that. So what we were trying to then and what we are trying to do now is to avoid the need to investigate and interview and work on witnesses that we can't understand why the State would think they could or should call.

And in their response, rather than really get down and do the work necessary to show the Court why these witnesses could or should be called, the State chose, for the first time, to attack us and to say that we hadn't provided proffers and that we hadn't done disclosures, we hadn't disclosed recorded defense interviews and a whole laundry list of things that they had never, until last month, raised any complaint about. And we found that disheartening,

because we really hoped that the State would zero in and do
the work necessary to do. You'll remember that on March 2,
we actually were going to have these proffers done in court,
we ran out of time, the State offered to do them in writing.
They did. We have told you about this two-and-a-half page
e-mail that we got from the State several days later that has
this information.

And the proffers, many of which we have quoted either in part or in whole to you in our reply, just don't answer the question. We had in mind a real proffer, as defined in Livermore and Udall and the other learned treatises about evidence, that would provide us and ultimately the Court with a real understanding of what relevant admissible evidence these witnesses might have to offer at the trial in this matter. Instead, the State continues to use shorthand and other cryptic comments for witnesses and then provides some confusing and contradictory comments about people not being a witness, and then the word "rebuttal" in these limited proffers further confuses the situation.

So what we ask you to do is give them one last opportunity to make a proper proffer for a handful of witnesses -- David Soule, I believe his name, who was identified as a boyfriend of the victim in this case; Debbie Hill, a friend; Debbie Kasprzak, who we think works for Rocky

Mountain Information Network; Jeff Zyche and a person named Deane Shank -- or have those witnesses precluded. And we would ask that the Court make it clear to the State that the proffer has to be meaningful. It has to provide some reasonable basis on which the State makes the claim that these people could and should be State's witnesses against Mr. DeMocker.

And then disclose a real witness list in compliance with Rule 15.1, so that we don't continue to waste our time and the Court's time going through this list and trying to guess why and who the State intends to call.

And then finally, enter an order right now precluding the long list of people that are in our reply, for the reasons that we've stated in both the motion and the reply, for failure to provide any relevant or admissible evidence or any proffer of that evidence that would support those people being a witness. This is simply to allow us in the few remaining days before trial to use our limited resources efficiently, so that we are not chasing after people again simply because they are on the State's witness list, when either the State knows or should know that those people cannot be trial witnesses in this case.

That's all we're asking. That's all we asked before. We thought that the proffer process was a reasonable way to resolve this between the sides in this case

but, unfortunately, it just exacerbated the problem, so here we are asking you to make these decisions that we are unable to work out between the two of us. It is unfortunate, but that is where we are.

I would point out, just parenthetically, that the complaints about our disclosure are really interesting. First, when we filed our reply, the State was at the 51st supplemental disclosure. I may have mentioned a number, but we got the 58th supplemental disclosure delivered to my office after hours last night.

And we are filing motions regarding those, but we can't file the motions fast enough to keep up with these new disclosures. So you can expect, Your Honor, motions seeking to preclude -- now we're up to 55, 56, 57, and 58, probably, in the next round, depending on what these disclosures turn out to be. But it just points out the problem of trying to honestly understand what the State's case is and who their witnesses are and what their evidence is when they neither explain the basis for the people they have listed and keep adding, on almost a daily basis now, new witnesses and new exhibits and new evidence, sending us off on yet another chase to understand this late-disclosed evidence.

So these problems all interlock. I mean it's very difficult for us, and it must be difficult for the

Court to try and understand the discreet issues that each of these motions raise, because they do seem to relate to each other.

The problem is pretty simple. It looks to us like, notwithstanding this Court's prior orders regarding discovery cutoffs, that sometime about the end of January or first of February this year, some sort of decision was made inside the prosecution that work that was either in progress or had never been done or never been started in the months and months before that needed to be done. And so there has been this mad dash to the finish line from February that goes on today to pull all of these things together.

And not only do we not understand who their witnesses were as of February, as you will see and as you will hear, we are at a loss to understand how to respond to and what we are supposed to do with this dump of discovery witnesses and exhibits and new information that comes in at breakneck pace. You will hear that one of the disclosures -- it might be the 55th or 56th, I think -- I can't keep up with it -- contains something like 60,000 e-mails on five different CDs. And so at the end, our fundamental complaint will be much the same in each of these motions.

But as to these people, we just tried to identify the people that we can't see any reason to go forward with. The Court offered and we offered the State an

opportunity to explain why these people would be or clearly and unequivocally communicate that these people are not witnesses and they're not on the witness list and they're not going to call them, and we got a response from them that we just can't interpret. Thank you.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I am going to remain seated, if you don't mind --

THE COURT: That's fine. I don't mind.

MR. BUTNER: -- because I am looking at the written proffer that was provided to the defense.

And the proffer basically consisted of identification of each of the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office supplements and then a short summary of what the witness would be called to testify about in the event they were called to testify. And in a number of these instances, they're rebuttal witnesses, so we're not sure that they would ever be called to testify. If they are rebuttal witnesses, it is really hard to know specifically what they are going to rebut, until you hear what it is that the defense witnesses would have to say in that regard. Hence, the pointing out to the defense that, you know, their disclosure has not been voluminous or ongoing in this case, up-to-date.

But to give you an example, speaking about David Soule. David Soule is a boyfriend of, or was a

boyfriend of, Carol Kennedy's -- very close to her but living in a different state. He is referenced in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office Supplements No. 25, 27, 28, 34, 42, 44, 52, 57, 84, and 119. And basically, all of the information that Mr. Soule knows in connection with this case is set forth in those supplements.

In the little statement about what Mr. Soule would testify about, I indicate that he is the victim's boyfriend, that a DNA swab was obtained and tested, he is a rebuttal witness, and he does not live in Arizona.

Going on, reference Debbie Hill. Debbie Hill is referenced in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office Supplements 51 and 94. She is a close friend of the victim but lives at a distance. And she is a mitigation rebuttal witness. She would not be called in the State's case in chief.

In regard to Sally Butler, who is one of the people -- she was actually interviewed by the defense, and she is referenced in Supplements 25, 27, -- actually, 25 through 27, 37 -- 34, 40 through 42, 44, 52, 81, 94. The proffer goes on describing how she is familiar with the victim's habits. She is a close friend. The defense has already interviewed her. She has known the defendant and the victim. Known the defendant since they were 17 years of age. Met at Prescott College. It goes on and on about her.

In regard to Jeff Zyche, Jeff Zyche has a very small bit of information in this case. He was referenced in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office Supplement No. 27. A DNA swab was obtained from him and is being tested. His really sole attachment to this case, if you will, is that a piece of paper was found in the open rangeland behind the victim's house, and it was an auto repair paper, and it had blown off of Mr. Zyche's trash. And so we followed up on that and wanted to know what the heck that was doing out there, Mr. Zyche. And we ultimately ascertained that, basically, it had somehow blown off of his trash, and he basically had nothing else to do with this case.

Deane Shank. Deane Shanks, he's been interviewed. His reference to this case is set forth in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office Supplements 108 and 119. All of this was provided to the defense. A DNA swab was obtained and tested. He is a spiritual teacher for the victim in this case. He's offered as a rebuttal, not a witness.

Debbie Kasprzak in this case -- and I must confess, I did not make any proffer regarding Debbie Kasprzak. She was not on the list of people that I wrote down when we were in court. But she is part of RMIN. She has worked closely with Mr. Echols. She is basically an assistant of Mr. Echols, in this case. And I'm not sure that

she's ever going to be called to testify. If she were called to testify, it would, in essence, be in connection with the preparation of some charts and diagrams and things of that nature that would assist Mr. Echols or a time line that would assist the State's presentation of evidence in this case.

So in regard to those people that are mentioned on the first page of their motion, that is the extent of the proffer, but I must confess that most of the proffer is made in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office supplements.

Now, in regard to those mentioned thereafter, I've already described Sally Butler. Jana Johnson is specifically described in a Yavapai County Sheriff's Office supplement as -- I referred to her as the lady saw the bicycle rider, and that's basically it. She saw a bicycle rider around 630 p.m. on July the 2nd.

Dr. Diane Cornsweet, she was the victim's therapist. She is not going to be a witness in this case, but she was referenced in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office Supplements 10, 27, and 53.

Cody -- I hope I say this right -Buchser. I believe she is a real estate agent for the
defendant, provided real estate maps to the defendant. She
wouldn't be a witness in terms of the State's case in chief,
but she might end up being a witness in that regard. And we

really don't know a whole lot more about her, but she's, as I stated, referenced in Yavapai County Sheriff's Office

Supplement 87 as to her connection with this case.

Nikki Check. Nikki Check is a friend of Carol Kennedy's. She is familiar with Carol Kennedy's daily routine. She had spoken on the phone with Carol Kennedy on

July the 2nd of the year 2008. She is familiar with Carol's

July the 2nd of the year 2008. She is familiar with Carol's daily run and that the doors at Carol Kennedy's residence on Bridle Path were not locked. That is all set forth in the

proffer, and it is referenced, also, to Yavapai County
Sheriff's Office Supplement No. 64.

THE COURT: So like Buchser, are you calling her or not calling her?

MR. BUTNER: No. I don't think we are going to be calling her, Judge.

Sean Bailey and Morgan Jay. Those are witnesses the DNA swabs were obtained from and have been tested, as a matter of fact, and they are not witnesses.

They were specified in YCSO Supplements 93, and then 48, 76, 126.

I can go on with every one of these witnesses in the same fashion.

THE COURT: I guess the question is -- and no offense intended to either side -- but if they are witnesses that you have listed in the past, that you have a 99 percent

idea are not going to be called -- I mean, should there be a time that I have you submit whatever redacted list you have so that -- from both sides -- so that the other side knows who you are not going to call and won't be spinning their wheels?

MR. BUTNER: I can understand that, Judge, and yes, for the most part, that is the correct. But sometimes

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MR. BUTNER: I can understand that, Judge, and yes, for the most part, that is the correct. But sometimes there are things come up that are minor alterations. And I've already done that. I submitted a list to Mr. Sears months ago, basically, saying these people are likely to be witnesses, these people are not going to be witnesses. Since that time, I think there have been --

THE COURT: And then there is some gray-area witnesses --

MR. BUTNER: Exactly.

THE COURT: -- depending on what comes out of the other side.

MR. BUTNER: Exactly. And that was done months ago. And, I mean, I am looking at that list right now. You know, it wasn't done in a formal fashion. It was done by way of e-mail, but I know John got it, and we have talked about it from time to time. If I could -- I'm looking through it just to give you an idea.

At that point, I thought Cornsweet was going be a witness. I have sense since clearly indicated

that she isn't going to be.

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I thought at one point that Buchser was going to be a witness -- and maybe I'm saying her name terribly wrong. I don't think she is going to be a witness now.

But there are very few changes on this list. Let me see if I can find -- to be honest with you, Judge, I was concerned with -- for example, some witnesses like Sean Bailey and Morgan Jay, is there going to be some sort of a DNA attack or something like that, in which case they would be important witnesses, because they weren't around. But the possibility of their DNA could have ended up on the victim's fingernails. I don't think they are going to be a witness now. That is the kind of thing that I am dealing with. And the proffer, in essence, addresses those things.

For example, Debbie Sims and Terry Sims, they're very minor witnesses, but they will be able to testify that the defendant was not at the Hassayampa Fitness Center on the night of the homicide. You know, that's all that they have to say. They weren't referenced in a YCSO supplemental DR.

And same thing with Mike Bueler. It just -- basically, he would testify that the defendant was enrolled in Great Expectations, the Internet dating service,

1 as I understand it, and he is a rebuttal witness. 2 THE COURT: Rebuttal of mitigation or rebuttal of case in chief? 4 MR. BUTNER: Mitigation. 5 Similarly with Dr. Markham and 6 Dr. Wineberg. If there is some sort of testimony that 7 somehow the victim would have had contact with them on the 8 day of her death, they can be called in rebuttal. 9 didn't. And they weren't working there at that point in 10 time. 11 Dr. Ruben, again, he's referenced in YCSO 12 supplements, and he is a rebuttal witness. Don Wood is specified in three Yavapai 13 14 County Sheriff's Office DRs about the nature of his 15 testimony, and I set forth what I believe his testimony will 16 be. Steven DeMocker said to him, basically, by way of e-mail, that he was duped by Carol into believing that she 17 feared for her life. 18 THE COURT: Does that conclude? 19 20 MR. BUTNER: You know, I think that pretty 21 much specifies almost everybody. We've indicated to them, to 22 the defense, the nature of the other witnesses. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Sears. 24 You know, in some way, the State's MR. SEARS: 25 response today is a pretty clear illustration of the

continuing problem we have. And we heard your comments just now in the same way. Isn't it time, and can it be the time soon when the State will produce a real witness list and be able to defend the reason why each of those witnesses is going to be called in the most simple terms. And doing that on the fly here in court and listening to Mr. Butner say maybe not this one, maybe not that one, just points out the problem.

We're trying to investigate their case from the disclosure they gave us, telling us where these people make statements that appear in disclosures is, in our view, not a proffer. We have that information. We understand where these people came from.

For example, Mr. Soule, the boyfriend, wanted to say terrible things about Mr. DeMocker that he heard from Ms. Kennedy. That is in the police reports. We can't imagine for the life of us that the State would believe that it could or should try to offer that evidence through Mr. Soule. So absent that, our request simply was what is it that he could say in this case that would be relevant or admissible and in which part of the case are you proposing to call him.

Rule 15.1(I), which is the additional disclosure in a capital case, talks about penalty or mitigation rebuttal disclosures by aggravator in this case.

The State has never done that. They simply list, you know, police supplement after police supplement, and they say somewhere in there is the evidence that these people may say.

I would disagree with the State's position. I think the State has an obligation and should know going in what the rebuttal witnesses are going to rebut. They may not know the precise statements, but they will know the subject matter, at least, that a rebuttal witness will be called to rebut.

For example, Cody Anne Buchser, who is a realtor in this case. There was a suggestion early on in the disclosure that perhaps Mr. DeMocker was somehow secretly planning to get control of the Bridle Path residence from Carol Kennedy. In fact, the disclosure actually shows that it was a suggestion made during the divorce negotiations where she was complaining about her inability to keep up with the payments, and Mr. DeMocker proposed, through counsel, that if that was a problem, perhaps he would take it off her hands and he could try to make the payments.

And she was a realtor that had looked for properties for Mr. DeMocker before, and there was some suggestion in disclosure that perhaps Mr. DeMocker, in some sinister way, was looking for properties near Bridle Path. I don't think the State has any information from her that would be relevant or admissible. And if she were a rebuttal

witness, the State has to have some idea today what it is that would be said at a penalty phase in this case to which she would offer rebuttal. What it is that she could possibly say. Otherwise, she is just a witness that's out there, and we interview her, and she says "I don't know why I am a witness."

To be clear, we started this process from a handwritten list that Mr. Butner is talking about today they have, where they put initials by the names of witnesses on their witness list, which basically didn't exclude very many people at all. We took that list and then looked at it carefully and said, okay, we understand where you are today. At least as to these 27 people, we can't think of a single reason why these people would be prosecution witnesses, help us out here. And we are still in that same position.

So if we were to look at these today, do we need to interview David Soule? Do we need to interview Cody Anne Buchser? Do we need to interview Carol Tidmaret? Do we need to interview Dr. Markham? Any of these people? It's not clear.

The proffer process was a way in which the State could have made that clear, because part of the proffer could have been a simple declaration of the State saying upon further reflection, this person will not be a witness, and we take the red pen out, and that person would

not be the subject of any further investigation.

MR. SEARS: I will give an example. The State has disclosed a man named Rod Englert. There are several motions dealing with Mr. Englert. Mr. Englert is disclosed as an expert on crime scene and blood spatter. And he has prepared a report, which was disclosed to us in September of 2009. We've had some discussions with the State about him.

When we contacted Mr. Englert in the last few days, he told us that he was shocked that he was on the State's witness list, that he didn't write the report, an associate wrote it. He simply signed off on it, that he had never seen any evidence, he had never visited the scene. He had been asked to express opinions on evidence based on photographs and police reports, and was told that his services were no longer required for budgetary reasons in September.

We had been asking the State repeatedly day after day, are you going to call Rod Englert? Is he a witness? What are you going to do about that? And we were told, you contact him. He is on our list. He is a witness. That is the information we have today about Mr. Rod Englert.

We are a month from trial. Somehow, someplace there has to be an answer. We tried to get the State to do it. I think the Court tried its very best to get the State to do it. Now it is time to just take the judicial

1 red pen out and say, as to these people, there is nothing 2 that the State has presented that is even close to the 3 sufficient proffer that would justify these people being on 4 the witness list. These people are precluded. 5 MR. BUTNER: If I might, Judge. Something new 6 just came up. 7 I want to hear back from you, THE COURT: 8 Mr. Butner. 9 MR. BUTNER: Right. Concerning Mr. Englert, first of all, he 10 has provided a written report as to what he would testify 11 That was disclosed to the defense. 12 Secondly, it is not mentioned -- he is 13 not mentioned in any of these about a proper proffer, so to 14 15 He is an entirely new witness that they bring up out of the blue. 16 17 Thirdly, we have had discussions on-going about how we were going to arrange for Mr. Englert's 18 19 interview. And the defense continually requested, well, how 20 about you pay for the interviews of your witnesses, and we 21 will pay for the interviews our witnesses. I was initially 22 amenable to that, but I had to get authority from my bosses 23 in order to do that. We then had a problem with another

witness in terms of the way that that payment worked out.

They have told me I can't do that. If the defense wants to interview somebody, they are going to pay that expert witness to interview them.

The defense went around me to contact

Mr. Englert. I was going to set up an interview with

Mr. Englert for the defense. They went around me and then

come up with this stuff out of the blue. I don't think that

is really appropriate or kosher, and it certainly has nothing

to do with a proper proffer in this case.

This is another example of the defense conjuring up disclosure problems when we are attempting to cooperate with them. I see Mr. Sears smirking again. Judge, I don't like this kind of litigation. This is a shot in the dark that was not mentioned in the written motion, and it is highly improper.

THE COURT: Are you calling Mr. Englert?

MR. BUTNER: Yes. We are calling him. He was specified as an expert witness. His opinions were disclosed months and months ago. And then, I guess, the defense decided, we will see if we can shoot him out of the water. We will go behind the prosecutor's back with our investigator and see if we can do that. And, apparently, that's what they are trying to do.

THE COURT: Are they allowed to contact expert witnesses on their own?

MR. BUTNER: You know, I think they are,
Judge, but as a matter of decorum, we try to help and assist
and set up interviews just as we have done in this case with
one of our experts, so to speak, and are willing to do so
with others.

THE COURT: Mr. Sears.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, perhaps Mr. Butner over the noon recess might wish to talk to Mr. Sechez, his investigator, who advised us that we should contact Mr. Englert. That is why we did it. That is the sole reason. I would be happy to put on Mr. Robertson some day under oath to tell you that, probably Mr. Sechez to tell you the same thing.

I was not smirking. My back hurts. I was wincing when I got up. There is nothing funny about this. Mr. Butner is quite right.

But Mr. Englert's situation arose in the last couple of days. As I said before, we are having trouble filing motions fast enough to keep up with the circumstances as they change them. If the Court needs a motion and Mr. Butner needs a motion, we will file a motion about Mr. Englert. I am simply reporting to the Court and Mr. Butner -- and by the way, this isn't a surprise. We sent Mr. Sechez an interview saying -- an e-mail saying, you might want to talk to Mr. Butner. Here is what Rod Englert

told us about his situation in the case.

I point that out because we are chasing around after their experts, and we finally reach an agreement -- I don't need to burden the Court with the dispute about who is going to pay for these. I wish Mr. Butner had chosen a time other than this morning in court to announce this change in the policy. I believe we had an agreement, not just a suggestion, an agreement that the State would pay for their experts and we would pay for ours. Apparently that is not true. We will act accordingly.

I think the Court is right. There is no prohibition against us contacting any of the State's witnesses, who are not victims in this case. But we were trying not only to observe the customary practice in Yavapai County, the decorum that Mr. Butner is seeking, but also the specific suggestion of the County Attorney's own investigator about how to do it with this witness. That is the truth.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't see Mr. Englert mentioned anywhere in this motion, and I don't know what we are doing standing up here litigating this in front of the Court. It hasn't been raised by proper motion. If they want to interview Mr. Englert, we will set up an interview of Mr. Englert for them.

THE COURT: I don't think that is the issue

with regard to Mr. Englert. I don't know how we particularly got off on that tangent, except as Mr. Sears raised it, as example of one of the issues that may remain in the case about who the State knows they are going to call versus somebody that may be in a gray area of who you are going to call versus an identification of what part of the case they are going to be called in, the mitigation rebuttal as opposed to primary case rebuttal. And to observe that 15(i) had allegedly not been complied with in terms of identifying rebuttal on the basis of which factor.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, the last time Mr. Sears and I chatted in the courtroom upstairs, he asked me about Mr. Englert. He asked me if Mr. Englert was still going to be a witness. I said yes, he is going to be a witness. He asked me about the interview situation and who was going to be paying, and I thought that it would be appropriate that we pay for our experts being interviewed and they pay for their's. I indicated that I had to check with my boss to be able to do that.

I have done that. I can't. But I never deviated, never have deviated from saying Mr. Englert will be a witness in the State's case in chief, and was identified as such all along.

THE COURT: Back to the major point what the motion is dealing with, I think I could use, if nobody else

could, from each side, a list of who your witness are going to be and what portion of the case identified to primary case, defense primary case, rebuttal primary case and then penalty phase, aggravating witnesses, mitigating witnesses, rebuttal of mitigation witnesses. And so I am going to order that both sides prepare a list of who you are actually going to call, who you know you are going to call, in other words, who are less certain and what contingencies that may be based on. And to have that done, I want to give you enough time to do that and have some meaningful list, not a -- you know, I am just going to call everybody that has been in my disclosure sort of list.

So give me a time frame for when you can have that done -- by both sides -- throw the weekend in between, because I think you may need that.

MR. SEARS: Nine o'clock tomorrow.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I prefer to have at least until the end of the week to do that. How about Monday, if we file it Monday?

THE COURT: I will order it be filed by nine o'clock Monday morning. And that would be quite helpful, I think, to me and probably to both sides. I recognize where we are vis-a-vis the trial date.

MR. SEARS: And Your Honor, we still -- if some or all of the people who are listed in this motion in

this reply remain on the State's list, from our perspective, absent the kind of meaningful proffer that we asked for, disregarding the State's laundry list of supplements in which their name may appear in this case, we are at a point where we see absolutely nothing that would justify the work that we would have to do going forward to investigate these people if they turn up on the State's list.

And to the extent that any of these people are identified as witnesses we seek to preclude show up on the State's list, I ask that even if the State puts them in their Monday list, those people could be precluded at trial. It is too late for them to -- you know, this started -- this is a process that started nearly two months ago, now. And we have nothing more that helps us understand who these people are or an assurance that these are real witnesses that have something that could possibly ever get in front of a jury in this case to justify our time and our expense in investigating.

THE COURT: What is my authority under the rules to do that?

MR. SEARS: 15.7.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I would disagree. First of all, they have been specified as to what they are going to testify about.

Secondly, they have been identified --

for example, like Dr. Wineberg and Dr. Ruben, that they're -- Dr. Wineberg is not a witness, but he could be called in rebuttal because of the DNA, et cetera. people have been identified as witnesses for months, and what they would testify about has been specified for months in the DRs.

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Anything else, Mr. Sears? THE COURT: I don't know how many times I can MR. SEARS: say the same thing, Your Honor, so I won't. I just won't. I appreciate that.

THE COURT:

I don't find the requirement of a proffer being provided by Rule 15.7, and to the extent that the witnesses have been listed in the past, I would not find that to be a requirement of the disclosure rules. However, I will order that the parties supply the Court and each other with the materials that I have identified by nine o'clock on Monday, so that hopefully some -- there is that "culling" word again -- some culling can be done so we are down to the concentration on those witnesses who would be necessary to have interviewed prior to the trial commencing and both sides can be prepared.

Your Honor, I realize you have MR. SEARS: ruled it and it's a little late to say this, but I spoke, perhaps, a little too quickly when I said that the authority for these preclusions is 15.7.

In fact, the authority really, as we said in our papers, comes from your order. We concede that the disclosure rules do not, on their face, require a proffer.

and the State's own agreement to provide this proffer, and that is the basis for this motion, that notwithstanding the bare-bones disclosure that the State has made and will continue to make, that with regard to these particular witnesses -- not every witness on the list -- these particular identified witnesses, the Court ordered and the State agreed to provide a proffer. That proffer came back in essentially a useless form to us. That's what we've been complaining about here today, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I guess I don't reach the conclusion that the list and the information provided was useless.

MR. BUTNER: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: We can start another issue at this point. It is seven or eight minutes till 12, though. I don't know that it would be very productive to start something else at this point.

MR. SEARS: Your Honor, I think we could use the extra few minutes to do the things that we need to do over the noon hour.

THE COURT: Okay.

1 Judge, do you know what motion we MR. BUTNER: 2 are going to argue next? Maybe we can hear from the defense 3 about that? 4 I don't have any particular issue THE COURT: 5 of one versus another. 6 Anything in particular that's next on your agenda, Mr. Sears? 7 8 MR. SEARS: Yes, Your Honor. We have a 9 constellation of motions that were filed pretty much on top 10 of each other with supplements, all dealing with preclusion of late-disclosed evidence. All of them have the same 11 12 characteristic, that they all involve late-disclosed 13 evidence. 14 There is a motion to preclude the 15 late-disclosed UBS evidence and the State's motion to 16 enter -- that's what the motion says -- certain UBS e-mails. 17 Our motion to preclude -- which I think is really sort of the 18 central motion -- our February 5th, 2010 motion to preclude 19 late-disclosed evidence and to dismiss the death penalty as a 20 sanction, which --21 THE COURT: And that overlaps with what 22 Miss Chapman argued previously so let's --23 It does. It does. And that MR. SEARS: 24 matter is actually technically under advisement --THE COURT: It is. 25

1 MR. SEARS: -- and has been since February 2 19th, but there are two supplements to that motion, and then 3 a series of motions filed in sequence dealing with computer 4 forensics, late Sorensen testing, the motion that we filed on 5 February 26th -- I mean, I think all of these could be argued 6 simultaneously. I don't know that it is necessary to 7 separate them out one by one, because they are so closely 8 related. And of great importance to us are the motions 9 dealing with these late-disclosed experts -- Mr. Cooper and 10 others. Mr. Gilkerson from the FBI. All of those need to be 11 heard and resolved, so that is where we would like to start. 12 THE COURT: Okay. Let's start with the 13 generalized motions for preclusion, then, and then the specific ones can follow after that. 14 15 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. SEARS: THE COURT: Stand in recess until 1:30. 16 17 MR. SEARS: Thank you. 18 (Whereupon, a recess was taken at 11:53 a.m. 19 to resume at 1:30 p.m. of the same day.) 20 21 22 23 24

1 APRIL 7, 2010 1:35 P.M. 2 PRETRIAL MOTIONS 3 4 Record reflects in presence of the 5 THE COURT: 6 defendant and Mr. Sears. From the county attorney's office, 7 Mr. Butner and Mr. Paupore. And I see Mr. Fields has joined 8 us. 9 I will let both sides know I did issue 10 another order following up on the previous order for jury 11 panel member Smith to join us next Tuesday the 13th at 1:15. 12 That was the juror who had some exposure -- potential juror 13 who had some exposure to comments by husband or other information after the jury questionnaire. So, that will take 14 place before we meet at 1:30 for the jury selection issues. 15 16 Mr. Sears. 17 MR. SEARS: Judge, in that regard you had said that we might have more time the morning of the 13th, if we 18 19 needed it. Can I put my request in? 20 I am not sure of the current THE COURT: 21 You can put your request in. 22 Will you note my request for the MR. SEARS: 23 record? 24 THE COURT: I will. 25 MR. SEARS: Thank you.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't have any time at that point in time. I can't tell you right now what I have got going on, but something is plugged in there, I know that.

THE COURT: I think there are some things plugged into my calendar at this point, too. We will see what we have when we are done.

MR. BUTNER: Maybe not. Maybe it is gone away.

THE COURT: Did you want to address something while Mr. Fields as joined us?

MR. BUTNER: That would be good, Judge. Over the lunch hour we got ahold of the MIS people and talked with them about these on-going problems and what the issues were. And I think Mr. Fields can probably speak to what the situation is in a more learned fashion, I hope, than I.

THE COURT: Mr. Fields.

MR. FIELDS: Well, Judge, we are -- I talked with the MIS director. We know there had been a couple of technical issues, but we haven't been hearing anything until recently in the last week or so. We are certainly willing to try to take care of the technical issues, and we are going to try to get the MIS people and Mr. Sears' folks and try to do at least a simulated test run this afternoon.

But I can assure the Court that we will cooperate fully with trying to get the video conferencing up

and running. Frankly, as far as I knew, the last I heard was a month or month and a half ago, so I kind of assumed that no news was good news, so this was a bit of a surprise to us.

On behalf of the MIS department and the sheriff's office, we will make every effort to fix any snafu they request.

THE COURT: I don't know to what extent you and Mr. Sears have had communication personally.

MR. FIELDS: Just a little bit.

MR. BUTNER: I would ask if there is a problem that Mr. Sears and company contact Mr. Fields, really, because he is here in Prescott, and he can work with them and the MIS people and he obviously knows much more about this.

THE COURT: I am glad to hear at least there is some effort. After the test run this afternoon, we will see what anyone can do about it.

MR. SEARS: We never had any difficulty getting ahold of or working with the MIS people. I didn't think Mr. Fields needed to be in the middle of that. We did not have a problem getting ahold of and working with the people at the jail.

THE COURT: It is just the working of the equipment, as I understand it.

MR. SEARS: Just getting it done. We will continue to try to cooperate, but my observation still hasn't

changed over the last week, which is we essentially have run out of time and this was always intended to be an alternative. We, for whatever reason, have not been able to make it work. THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you for being here, Mr. Fields. Moving onto the further issues. Mr. Hammond has left us, but I presume that Ms. Chapman and you can handle the issues that are at hand. MR. SEARS: We will proceed -- Mr. Hammond will join us shortly, but we will proceed without him. I think Ms. Chapman was kind of THE COURT: covering these sorts of motions, in any event. I had a general motion that, of course, I had under advisement with regard to discovery issues and the requested preclusion of death penalty as a sanction, and have received some additional supplements, some additional motions that have to do with much the same topic. Miss Chapman. MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. Your Honor, I am going to remain seated, if you don't mind. THE COURT: Please. There are several topics areas MS. CHAPMAN: that I think intersect here.

THE COURT: Feel free.

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MS. CHAPMAN: What I would like to do is give you an update with respect to some of the items that were originally briefed in that February 5th motion that we discussed with you on the 19th that I think you took under advisement.

I know the State handed me some documents this morning that I think relate to some of those items that I imagine they will be speaking to. And then I also would like to talk to you about some of the motions that we filed since that time.

supplements that we filed immediately after that motion were with respect to Mr. Cooper, who was disclosed as an expert on February 18. We still have no report or no other disclosure from Mr. Cooper, other than his CV. He is apparently going to be testifying in the guilt and innocence phase of the trial, according to Mr. Butner at the argument on the 19th. However, we still have no idea what his testimony will be in substance. There has been no report from him, and we also intend and have filed a motion to preclude his testimony under Rule 702 that we will talk about later today.

There is -- Mr. Cooper's testimony is not related to a new area. Just generally speaking, it is with respect to the crime scene. The State was certainly aware since July of 2008 that there was a crime scene. This is not

a new item of evidence. There is no reason that the State was unaware that it needed a crime scene expert until February of 2010. Certainly, it's offered and provided no excuse or rationale for not disclosing this expert until just months before trial in this matter. And we ask you to preclude Mr. Cooper on the basis of the late disclosure alone.

The same is true with respect to this expert Cy Ray. He was also disclosed after we had briefed the February 5th motion. He is disclosed as a cell tower expert. I will note, as well, that a new expert on cell tower was disclosed, I believe, on March 17. That hasn't been briefed to Your Honor -- excuse me, March 30th. It may have been in the latest briefing, but as Mr. Sears has said, we can hardly keep up with the late disclosure and filing motions with respect to the late disclosure and the late disclosed experts and witnesses.

Mr. Ray was disclosed as an expert on cell towers on February 18. We have no CV with respect to Mr. Ray, or what his qualifications are with respect to cell towers. We have no report from him. We have no idea what the substance of his testimony will be. He was earlier disclosed as a witness with respect to the Blue Star aspect of this case.

Again, the State has known that cell

tower and cell phone data was going to be an issue in this case as early as July, 2008. There was no rationale to wait over a year to identify or for them to realize they needed a cell phone tower expert, and no rationale given for their failure to disclose him. We have been asking for cell phone data since at least November of 2009. And Your Honor will remember that that was part of the February 5th motion. had been asking the State for disclosure that we realized we hadn't received and the State had repeatedly said that we had received it. And then lo and behold in February they late disclosed the data that we had, in fact, been asking for and said "we didn't realize we had it." So there is no reason that the cell phone and cell tower data was a surprise to the State. We had been asking for it. They had it. repeatedly told us they didn't have it. They did have it, and they didn't disclose it to us until February.

I think those are the two supplemental pieces that were filed with respect to late disclosed experts subsequent to the filing of the February 5th motions that deal with those late disclosed experts, Mr. Cooper and Mr. Ray.

The next motion in terms of the chronology -- and I don't know if you want to have Mr. Butner to respond to those or just move on.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. CHAPMAN: -- would be with respect to the D.P.S. computer forensic reports. That motion was filed on February 25th, the original motion.

THE COURT: Right.

MS. CHAPMAN: The original motion, Your Honor, dealt with three CDs of D.P.S. computer forensic reports that we had received, and that was back in February. Those were preliminary reports, apparently, with respect to the iPods, flash drives, hard drives, CDs and DVDs that had been seized in this case. At that time we raised the issue of the volume of the late disclosure with three months to trial, and we requested that you exclude the evidence based on the volume and the timing.

Certainly, we learned then during that February 19th testimony that D.P.S. and the State had these items for several months before they began to examine them. Most of the items were seized in July of 2008. Mr. Arthur and Mr. Page testified in February that they didn't begin to examine those items until November, over four months later. With respect to Mr. Knapp's computer, it was seized in January of 2009, and they didn't begin to analyze it until October of 2009. That was over ten months later.

The State has still failed to disclose EnCase files for those items. And as we explained in our motion to you, the EnCase file contains critical information

about all of the searches that D.P.S. performs and the analysis that D.P.S. performs, and it is critical to our evaluation and examination of the case -- or excuse me, the State's own analysis. We attached a portion of that manual to the motion and explained why it was critical to our examination. We still haven't received it. All of those facts remain undisputed by the State.

Then on March 2nd and 17th, the State produced an additional seven CDs from Arizona D.P.S. Those CDs contained over 8500 pages of reports and e-mails. For most of those CDs, the examinations on those CDs were not requested until February of 2010. Your Honor, we provided supplemental briefing on this. I believe it was on March 30th. I tried to do it shortly after we received it. Again, the State waited 19 months to request examination of this material and provided it to the defense with less than two months to trial. And frankly, at that time there is just simply no way for us to physically review the amount of material, those 8500 pages given the time remaining and given the avalanche of other late disclosure that we have received.

Then on Friday, last Friday, April 2nd the State disclosed an additional five CDs of D.P.S. computer forensic materials. Most of those reports were requested in March of this year. Those CDs, I was advised yesterday, contain over 60,000 pages of materials, will cost us over

\$20,000 just to process, and it is just physically 1 2 impossible. We are not in a position to review that 3 material. 4 There is absolutely no reason why the 5 State waited until February and March to request examination 6 of items that it has had since July of 2008 and January of 7 There is no way for us to evaluate the D.P.S. 8 examination of these items which we were constitutionally 9 entitled to under the confrontation clause, and there is no 10 excuse even offered by the State as to why they would wait so long to do this and to provide this information to the 11 12 defense. So we ask you to exclude all of the 13 computer examination and D.P.S. testimony in this case given 14 15 the State's late disclosure and failure to provide any 16 rationale whatsoever for their failure to exercise due 17 diligence and disclose this in a timely manner. That is with 18 respect to the computer forensic examination. 19 THE COURT: Probably biting off enough for me and Mr. Butner to chew on. 20 21 MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. 22 MR. BUTNER: Thank you. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Butner. 24 MR. BUTNER: First of all, Judge, Mr. Cooper

is subject to interview. We don't have a report from

Mr. Cooper. I don't know that we are ever going to get a written report from Mr. Cooper. But we can set up an interview with him any time the defense wishes to do that. They have not requested that. If they do request that, we will set it up in a timely fashion, and he was disclosed in a timely fashion prior to the time of trial.

We don't need to discuss the Rule 702 objection at this point in time but this is not late disclosure. I think that we need to go back and remember that the Court ordered the State to do all of the disclosure that was within our possession on or about June 22nd, 2009, and we did at this point in time. We made tremendous efforts to make sure that all of the computers were completely copied, imaged, so to speak, in their entirety, as well as everything else that was in the State's possession. And there was that giant disclosure that took place on or about that date.

The D.P.S. computer forensic lab has had those computers at least since November, but there's evidence and they were preliminarily analyzed prior to that time. I draw the Court's attention and the defendant's attention to -- and let me give you this bunch of disclosure items right now, Judge, if I could for your reference when I talk about this. At the back of that packet is an e-mail.

MR. SEARS: We were given a stack of e-mails.

Is it the one that has a hand drawn diagram on the top?

MR. BUTNER: That's the one.

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THE COURT: That is the one that Miss Chapman has in her hand.

MR. SEARS: Thank you.

MR. BUTNER: Under Bates item No. 1422, there's actually the next thing under there is 1423. This is some of the earliest disclosure that took place in this case. That particular e-mail, and I apologize because the copy is really bad. In fact, it is even worse than what I thought it was. But that particular e-mail is part of that preliminary examination of Mr. DeMocker's computer that took place back at the outset of this case and that was disclosed at the beginning. It was requested that D.P.S. analyze those computers early on. I don't know why the defense keeps going on the dates of February and March of 2010. Those examinations were requested very early on in the case.

I do understand, and it has been very frustrating for the State, too, that it took an exceedingly long time for the D.P.S. forensic lab to analyze those computers. In some instances, their explanations to me was well, you interrupted our analysis so you could get specific periods of e-mails from us. For example, when we presented the e-mails from the defendant's computer going back and forth with the victim's computer in Mr. Echols' hearing.

Those e-mails back and forth, those were interruption in their analysis of these computers, and were things that they had to stop and pull off of the computers. But they had been continuing to analyze these computers, basically, on-going from before November of 2008.

So don't think that is accurate,

Judge. And I offer you Bates Numbers 1422 and 1423, which

allude to some of this e-mail. And, of course, some of this

also came by way of Gallagher and Kennedy in response to a

subpoena for things from them.

In regard to the cell tower expert, we were not aware that a cell tower expert was going to be necessary until it became apparent that the defense was going to try and, at least, shed doubt on the defendant by pointing the finger at Mr. Knapp. Mr. Knapp had been investigated almost immediately in this case, and his alibi was established through the testimony from his ex-wife and from his son in the investigation by Detective Brown.

It also was established at that point in time that he had made a voice mail call from the residence where he was at with his wife and son early on. We didn't think it was going to be a big problem in terms of the cell phone towers. However, I draw the defense attention to July of -- January 7 of 2010. A that point in time, a cell tower map was disclosed to the defense, and thereafter Detective

McDormett completed his reports with the cell tower information, and that was disclosed a little bit later. But that cell tower map information was disclosed on January 7, 2010.

Similarly, the defense keeps talking about things like late disclosure, and I have got to digress to the crime scene diagram, because I present to the Court Bates No. 6434, which shows -- they say that the crime scene diagrams were disclosed in March or later. The fact of the matter is that on June 22nd of 2009, this crime scene diagram, which has accompanying measurements, was disclosed under Bates No. 6434. That is the same kind of thing that is going on.

Yes, the State does continue to refine some of the things that they have done, and by that I mean, going through the computers that were imaged prior to June 22nd, 2009, and pulling off those e-mails. Judge, we were informed by the defense that they were doing exactly the same thing, and in fact, had pulled off e-mails from Carol Kennedy's computer that indicated that she was dating double digit guys, so to speak, ten or more individuals. They had the same information that the State had to analyze, and presumably they were doing that analysis. So we have disclosed all of those kinds of things early on.

The 8500 pages of reports and e-mails.

Judge, that stuff was requested much earlier. I don't know where they get the date of -- well, it wasn't requested until February or March of 2010. It may be something that was in the D.P.S. report. But I will tell you, it was requested much earlier. That is why those computers were at the D.P.S. forensic lab as early as November. And they may have started on them in November, but they were down there and had been, at least, preliminarily analyzed prior to that time and disclosure of that had been provided.

Similarly, I draw the Court's attention to Bates No. 1455, 14 -- not 1455, 1445, 1444, 14 43. This is really early disclosure, one of the first disclosures made in this case. It makes mention of the fact that

Mr. Gilkerson of the FBI lab is looking at this footprint information. Do we have anything of value at that point in time? No, we don't have anything of value at that point in time. But he was identified very early on in this case. My assistant beside me could tell me when those disclosures were made, 1445, et cetera, but it was some of the first disclosure in this case.

Judge, you can't blame the State for not having its analysis of these computers done, when the fact of the matter is that all of the information that was being analyzed was already disclosed to the defense. And they had the same opportunity to analyze it. And as soon as we got

reports on this stuff, final reports from the D.P.S. experts, we disclosed it.

We will provide a CV concerning Mr. Cy Ray, our cell tower expert. We disclosed him as quickly as we got his name.

Additionally, for example, we disclosed a cell tower expert from Sprint because that became, apparently, important and that person was disclosed promptly on March 30th. That is the other cell tower expert, and that came about as a result of investigation on-going through the cell towers. I note that the disclosure of these items No. 1440, 3, 4 and 5, that disclosure was made in November of 2008. In that disclosure that is one of the things that Mr. Gilkerson's name was mentioned as one of the reviewing experts that was looking at the footprints.

I don't have anything further at this point in time.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, if I might take those backwards, because I think those are all really illustrative, and I am glad that Mr. Butner has brought to the Court's attention this document, particularly 1445, because it is precisely illustrative of what the problem of how the State's handled this disclosure and this investigation and what they failed to do. And how if the Court permits the State to rely on this excuse, that they

have this duty to continue to investigate, without compelling them to exercise their duty and due diligence, there would be absolutely no reason to have any disclosure requirement whatsoever. If the State can simply wait until the months and weeks before trial, to exercise due diligence to do what they should have been compelled to do 15 months ago, there is no reason for there to be any disclosure requirements and no reason for there to be any sanction permissible under the rules.

This FBI shoe print data base search request form was disclosed to us, and it is dated in September of '08. It was disclosed to us with a report that said no request was made. This isn't a request to Eric Gilkerson to do anything. It is a request saying this is what you have to do if you want a request to be made. No request was made to him until April of '09, and that is precisely the problem with the way the State's handled this case.

They knew in September of '08 they could have made a request. They didn't make a request. They didn't disclose to the defense that they were going to make a request. They made a request. They got a report in October and they didn't disclose it to us until February of 2010.

So, the entire time that we are litigating these issues, the State is sitting on whether they are going to make a request

or not. They know they can make a request, and they do make a request. We don't have that information at all. All we know is that they could make a request, and they haven't made a request based on the disclosure that is available to us.

handled all of the disclosure in this case. That is why we haven't been able to prepare to review what they have done, because then they do things late, weeks and months before trial, and dump disclosure on us that we are physically capable of reviewing, and then they say, we have a continuing duty to investigate. Right. You also had that duty to do that when you could have done in it September of '08, and you didn't do it. And when you did do it in October and got the report, and you should have given it to us then, and you didn't do it then, either.

So the fact that you eventually gave it to us in February of 2010, doesn't make the fact that you didn't do it in September of '08 right, and it doesn't make the fact that you didn't give it to us in October, when you got it, of '09 right either. And it certainly doesn't excuse it that finally gave it to us in February of 2010. None of that excuses the fact that we got it late, that we got it with no time to prepare, and that the State sat on it while they had it and knew we were litigating these precise issues.

So there is absolutely no excuse, and the

fact that the State disclosed a piece of paper that said they could have done something that they should have done, that they had an obligation to do under their duty of due diligence that they didn't do, which they eventually did and then late disclosed to us, is absolutely no rationale for them to be excused from their duties of disclosure. That has been repeated through out this case.

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Let's talk about the computer reports.

The February and March dates come precisely from the reports that are on those CDs. The report states, I was requested to do this by the County Attorney's office in February of 2010.

I was requested to do this by the County Attorney's office in March of 2010.

I don't write the reports. I don't make the requests. I am just telling Your Honor and the Court when the requests were made. That is what the report states, that is what the disclosure says. Then the disclosure provides us with 8500 and 60,000 pages of information. We are not physically capable of reviewing that information.

It is not a matter of frustration, as

Mr. Butner states, it is a matter of what we are

constitutionally entitled to. We have had these three

computers to evaluate. We have been performing those

evaluations. That is not the point. We are entitled to

evaluate and confront their evaluations and examinations. We

are not able to do that because they won't even disclose the EnCase case files that would permit us to do that.

Apparently, their experts don't even know what that is, even though the EnCase manuals describes it as the most critical piece of information that EnCase creates. They don't have it. They won't disclose it to us. And we are constitutionally entitled to have that information to prepare to cross-examine and confront those witnesses. We don't have it today, and we are not able to review the volume of material they have given us.

Again, this is an issue where Mr. Butner says we disclosed it to them in January of 2010. That is exactly right, they did. And we have been asking for it since September of 2009, because we could tell from the disclosure, hey, look, you haven't given us everything you have. They repeatedly told us and they repeatedly told this Court, we have given you everything we have. There is nothing else there. We know that is not correct. Our expert needed it. We needed it. We told the Court we needed it. They told us it didn't exist, and it did.

The same thing is true with respect to these crime scene diagrams. Now, it is true, as Mr. Butner states, that this document 6434 was disclosed early on. It is also true that the document 17849, which is cited in the

motion that we filed on February 5th, was not disclosed to us
until March -- or excuse me, until February of 2010. That
document was made, and it states on it that it was from

measurements that were taken in July of 2008.

We had repeatedly requested, both in writing and orally before this Court, from the State for all crime scene diagrams. Detective Brown referred to crime scene diagrams in his testimony in November. We made another request, and were repeatedly told there are no other measurements, there are no other diagrams. Well, come to found out, there are, just like there were additional cell tower and cell phone information that existed that we were told doesn't exist. They late disclosed it to us.

Somehow the State acts like their eventual late disclosure should exclude the fact that they hadn't disclosed it earlier, even though we had asked for it and demonstrated a need for it. I simply don't know how to respond to that. We identified the information we needed.

We explained why we needed it. We wouldn't have asked for it if we didn't need it and hadn't identified a need for it. We were told it didn't exist. That was simply not true. And then it was finally disclosed, and the eventual disclosure is somehow seen as an excuse for the failure to disclose when it existed and when we asked for it.

THE COURT: It may be speaking to prejudice.

I am not sure how to interpret what Mr. Butner is saying.

Speak to me about prejudice. If the measurements were based on the same diagram that 6434 is --

MS. CHAPMAN: What I can tell you about 6434 --

THE COURT: -- and nobody told me precisely when the 17849 was created physically from the measurements that were made allegedly back in July of '08.

MS. CHAPMAN: 17849 is dated July of 2008. So I don't know when it was created, other than it has a date of July, 2008, and was disclosed to us in February. There are diagrams that come right after that that aren't dated. And there is a CD of drawings that was disclosed at the same time in February. But they are dated July of '08. The 17849 is dated July of 2008, and then the two pages after that are crime scene diagrams.

These measurements on Page 6434 are largely illegible. I can't read what the writing is on the diagram. So, I can tell that you in reviewing, without getting into too much detail, in reviewing these diagrams with our experts, we were told there should be other diagrams and other measurements from the crime scene that should be expected. And that is why we requested them. And we were told that those were needed for what our crime scene experts and analysts were doing. And that is why we asked for them.

1 We didn't have them for most of the month 2 that that analysis was going on from the first responders at 3 the scene. That is what I can tell you about the prejudice 4 in terms of our need. We identified early on that we wanted 5 And again, when Detective Brown testified in November 6 and referred to them, I think Detective Brown also referred 7 to the fact that there were recent crime scene diagrams. 8 That was in November of '09. And when we wrote, we said we 9 understand there were recent crime scene diagrams. 10 told, no, those don't exist. We don't have any way of 11 knowing other than those that were produced to us in February 12 were dated July of '08. 13 MR. BUTNER: If I could clarify concerning the 14 crime scene diagrams, Judge. 15 THE COURT: Okay. I will hear from you on 16 that particular issue. 17 MR. BUTNER: My paralegal is looking for that, 18 but they were prepared in relatively close proximity in time 19 to the time that they were disclosed in February, I believe, 20 of 2010. 21 THE COURT: Based on measurements that were 22 taken back in July of '08? 23 MR. BUTNER: Exactly. Based on the 24 measurements that were taken back in July of 2008.

And Detective Brown had been urged to

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prepare them much earlier, but he hadn't gotten around to it for whatever reason, and finally prepared a so-called final crime scene diagram, and then it was promptly disclosed as soon as we got it.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, if I might -THE COURT: We can go back to Ms. Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: There is a page that just says "office scene measurements," and has a date. I can show it to Your Honor. That was not disclosed to us until February, and it is dated 7/3/08. It has got a list of measurements of the rooms. And it lists from west wall, from south wall to the closet and lists a description, and that was not provided until February.

THE COURT: The measurement is different than what is 6434?

MS. CHAPMAN: Frankly, given my skill level, I can't -- it is literally a list of ladder west to south. It is in the narrative form, so that someone can create a diagram from the measurements. It is not a drawing. It is a list of measurements that was not disclosed until February. It is dated 7/3/08. That was not disclosed until February, 2010. And we were told by our experts that we should expect that would have been created at that time and at the scene by first responders.

THE COURT: You may proceed. Thank you.

MS. CHAPMAN: To go back, Your Honor, with respect to -- and I think this argument with respect to Mr. Cooper may really get at the heart of what the difference between what the State sees as their obligation and this June disclosure deadline and what the defense sees as the obligation.

What Your Honor said at that hearing, and we cited it to you in the motion, is that the State has an obligation to exercise due diligence and disclose what is in their possession. And what Your Honor also said at that time is that late disclosure would be permitted upon a showing of good cause. What we took Your Honor to mean at that time what not that the State could delay doing whatever investigation until it got around to it, but that if the State had an item of evidence that it knew needed to be performed, or an area of expertise that it knew needed to be engaged, that it should engage that process and undertake to perform those tests and analysis. Obviously, if those tests and analysis were on-going where the expert had been retained but wasn't complete, that is not something the State could do if it didn't have.

But the State also couldn't wait until the months and weeks before trial to identify experts for areas that it knew in July of '08 and certainly October of '08, and certainly by June, needed to be engaged and the

reports that needed to be prepared and examinations that needed to be performed. If that is the case, Your Honor, if the State can always say, well, yes, we knew we needed to do that in July of '08. For example, yes, we knew there was a crime scene. We knew we needed a crime scene expert. We just didn't get around to doing it. So we didn't have it at the disclosure deadline. We just decided to do it a couple of weeks or a couple of months before trial. Then due diligence and the exercise of due diligence means nothing in the context of the disclosure obligations of the State. And that is exactly what they did here.

There is no reason to think, and the State has explained no reason why they wouldn't think or understand that they would need or want a crime scene expert at the time that they discovered and developed the crime scene. To say that Mr. Cooper was not late disclosed in February makes absolutely no sense. There is no reason why the State wasn't aware they had a crime scene and wanted analysis of that crime scene before June when the Court ordered the disclosure deadline. It makes absolutely no sense to say that Mr. Cooper was not late disclosed simply because he was disclosed before trial, because the State finally got around to thinking about it or identifying him.

That is not the exercise of due diligence. That is not what the Court's order said when it

set the deadline in May or June, and that is not what is

contemplated by Rule 15.1, or by the Constitution, frankly,

because there is no way that Mr. DeMocker or the defense team

can prepare under the avalanche of late disclosure, given the

5 | way the State has responded and prepared in this case.

The same applies with respect Cy Ray.

The defense, again, has been requesting the information with respect to the cell tower data since September. And again, that is because it became pretty clear to us that it hadn't all been disclosed. The State was aware that that is what the defense was doing since that time. To say it was not aware until February, doesn't make any sense, because the State was aware and the defense had been requesting that information for months before Cy Ray was disclosed.

And, again, Your Honor, I can print out for Your Honor, if Your Honor and the State need to see when the D.P.S. reports note that the examinations were requested, but both the five CDs that I have outlined for you, the dates and the CD names and numbers in the motions, and I can do so with respect to the seven that were disclosed on Friday, but the dates the examination were requested are identified in the report that February and March, the disclosures are staggering in terms of the numbers of documents, and it is impossible for us to review those and to prepare adequately to confront them and to review the kind of examination and

analysis that the D.P.S. computer forensic people performed.

And it is true that we have had those items for our own analysis, and as Mr. Butner said we have been conducting our own analysis and review. The question is, are we constitutionally entitled to have the State's analysis, to confront that analysis, to evaluate it in advance of trial, to evaluate it in advance of an interview of the five State's computer D.P.S. forensic experts, who have been identified, and are we able to do that given the State's disclosure. And given the over 70,000 pages produced in the last several weeks, we are simply not at this point, if any of it comes in, we are just not in a position to confront it.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, is there any dispute about the number of pages that have been produced in the last three weeks?

MR. BUTNER: No, there really isn't, Judge. It is voluminous.

THE COURT: Any -- Ms. Chapman says you haven't presented any reason or justification for the disclosures that have been coming in the last three weeks.

Do you have some statement with regard to that?

MR. BUTNER: I sure do. It took so long because it so voluminous. It took them that long to get through all of this stuff. And that is constant prodding and

requests from the County Attorney's office to get this stuff done, to get the analysis of these computers completed.

And we basically got the fact that you are part of what we are working on all the time, and we are trying to get this accomplished as quickly as possible. And in fact, the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office took a deputy and put him down there to help D.P.S. -- that is Detective Page -- to help D.P.S. to get that disclosure accomplished.

So in terms of disclosure efforts in regard to that computer forensic material, they were working on that many, many, many months, Judge.

THE COURT: But to the extent of that, basically, as I understand what may have taken place is there is massive volume that has been disclosed, not that the State intends to use every bit of the volume of what has been disclosed. There just hasn't been any selection from what has been disclosed of what the State is, even now, likely to use or not use.

MR. BUTNER: Yes, there has been. Part of the problem is you can't select until the analysis is complete. So, what we have done is we had to select before the analysis was completed. The items that we planned on using, first of all, they were disclosed in the *Chronis* hearing with all of those e-mails that were relied upon by Mr. Echols and placed into evidence in that hearing.

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Secondly, early on some e-mails were disclosed in this case as part of the initial analysis of computers in this case, and that is why I drew the Court's attention to that e-mail that was disclosed under Bates No. 1423, 1422, that kind of information. And we provided the Court with a clean copy of that e-mail, which is one of the e-mails we were able to pull out of the defendant's computer, and its designated Wednesday, July 2nd, 2008. It doesn't have a Bates number on it, because it is part of these e-mails that we presented to the Court out of the defendant's computer, and then we were going to ask for special permission to use some of these e-mails.

For example, that particular e-mail was disclosed under Bates No. 1423. It just looks to be in a different fashion. And it is a terrible copy. I can get a better copy for the Court. That is basically the same e-mail.

So in terms of these e-mails, they have been disclosed. They were just disclosed in a, quote, unanalyzed fashion. And we have presented to the Court, and I gather we will go through these e-mails today in terms of what specific e-mails we would be allowed to use at trial, if any.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. CHAPMAN: I think just to make sure the

record is clear, with respect to that particular e-mail, this is an e-mail that has been identified in the UBS e-mails.

And I would like to take that issue up specifically when we get there. If we are going to address that issue now --

THE COURT: No, I was just trying to understand generally what the position was with regard to the kind of volume what you are talking about versus what they are actually intending to use.

MS. CHAPMAN: My understanding is that the 60,000 pages and the 8500 pages that we have gotten the last several weeks have not otherwise also been disclosed and produced and identified elsewhere.

THE COURT: All right. Anything else on your general issue, Mr. Butner?

MR. BUTNER: I just point out, Judge, those e-mails that are part of these reports and so forth, all of those documents that are part of these recently disclosed reports, those are things that came off of the computers that were imaged early on in the case and disclosed before the June 22nd, 2009, order.

THE COURT: Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I will move onto a different area. And I think what I would like to do, since we touched on it briefly, is talk about the shoe print information and the evidence that flows from that.

The State had, as you just saw, apparently information that it could have requested a shoe print examination from the FBI as early as September of 2008. That request, apparently, wasn't made at least until April of 2009. And we know that the FBI had contact with Mr. Gilkerson in a report from him in October of 2009. His report states that the photos, quote, most closely correspond, end quote, with a particular shoe.

That report was not disclosed to the defense until February. We believe that information constituted Brady information as of October when the State had the information. The State's rationale was apparently that it is not obligated to provide disclosure unless and until it could connect that evidence to Mr. DeMocker in some oblique way.

That State withheld that report for five months. That was during the time that we were litigating the very issue of the prints behind the scene with your court, and as a result the defense was not able to investigate or hire its own expert for comparison purposes during this time.

The State's own investigation, as we understand it presently, reveals that there may be other shoes with slight variations on this tread pattern. There are several witnesses that flow from this late disclosed report. There are two witnesses from La Sportiva that have

been identified. There is a witness from Outdoor ProLink that was not identified until March 10th. And then there is Mr. Fagen and Eric Gilkerson from the FBI, who is a late disclosed expert.

There is still no disclosure regarding -there was no disclosure regarding the shoe print comparison
until February. Again, we were litigating these issues and
the Willits instruction before the Court while the State had
this information and didn't disclose it to the defense.
Mr. Gilkerson was not disclosed as an expert until February,
even though the State had this report as early as October.

In March the State disclosed still additional information from La Sportiva, including photos of shoe samples, printouts from web sites and sales data regarding other shoes. And we have also moved to preclude this information in later motions. They were just simply filed as soon as we got the late disclosure from the State. It was made after the original late disclosure.

Also in March, the State asked
Mr. Gilkerson for a different opinion than the one he
originally made in October. Apparently, that opinion may
have been disclosed in the last several days to the defense.
I have yet to see it, but it may or may not have been
disclosed. My understanding is from a report about that
disclosure that he says it may match or be similar to some

particular pair of shoes.

La Sportiva. The defense has not been provided with any similar model shoe. And, Your Honor, our contention is that given that the State withheld this information for a period of five months, given that when the information was originally provided to the State in October, it constituted potential Brady information, and it was not disclosed. That all of the information pertaining to the shoe print and the shoe report should be excluded.

And closely related to this, Your Honor, the motion was not filed until March 30th, but we got a late disclosure about Commander Mascher, and you will remember that Commander Mascher was the subject of a preclusion piece in the February 5th motion. And during the hearing on February 19, Mr. Butner told the Court that Mr. Mascher would not be a shoe print identification expert, but he was simply offering Mr. Mascher on the issue of shoe tracking. And Your Honor made an initial finding at that time that Mr. Mascher didn't need to be qualified as an expert to offer observations about shoe tracking.

Apparently, since that time, and after Commander Mascher's defense interview, he has been engaged in some kind of shoe print comparison testing, and he has now provided us with a report on March 17 where he purports to do

shoe print comparisons. He purports to compare the sample shoe that was sent to the FBI with a photo of the shoe print from the crime scene. He also purports to draw conclusions between the sample shoe and the identity of heel patterns and size of shoes that left prints.

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All of this was late disclosed to us on March 17.

THE COURT: Has he been listed separately as an expert witness?

MS. CHAPMAN: He was originally listed as an expert witness. We filed the motion on March 5th to oppose his being listed as an expert. Mr. Butner then on the 19th said he was an expert with respect to tracking. And then now we get this report that he is going to be, apparently, be performing or was performing some kind of comparison on shoe print identification or comparison, which Mr. Butner specifically said he was not qualified to do at the February 19th hearing and wouldn't be offered to do at that hearing. So, we are also asking that you preclude that.

In that same March 17th disclosure, we also got disclosure that Sergeant Winslow, apparently after the defense interview and after the original motion about his proffered testimony, was also doing some kind of shoe print comparison where he was looking a photographs from the scene, and apparently identifying the direction of tracks and

comparing tracks from different photographs. And we are also objecting to him being offered or offering any kind of testimony about the comparison of tracks between photos and amongst photos. He has not been offered or identified as an

expert with respect to tracking.

Originally on the 19th, Mr. Butner identified Commander Mascher and Detective Kennedy as tracking experts. Apparently now that has changed, and Commander Mascher will also be offered as a print comparison expert, and apparently so will Sergeant Winslow. We would object to both of those as late disclosed and also as unqualified.

And again, Your Honor, all of these issues are late, and we are trying to keep up with the late disclosure and the interconnectiveness of this, but since we are dealing with the shoe prints, we got the original disclosure late. We got it well after the State had it, and then we are told these people are not going to be testifying about these particular issues, and then we are told that they are not qualified to testify about these particular issues, and then we are told they are going to be testifying about these particular issues.

We get reports after the defense interviews that they are performing, apparently, experiments on shoe print comparison, that we have been told they are not

going to be offering and that they are not qualified to do. So we think all of this has been presented and disclosed in violation of the order, your order, in violation of Brady, and in violation of our right to confront this evidence and that Your Honor ought to preclude it on those bases. All of it, the shoe print comparison and examination at this point.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, there is no change in terms of the State offering Commander Mascher as an expert on shoe print comparison. We are not intending to do that.

You know, when we have been arguing this, the Court made reference to a particular case, Amaya Ruiz, and cited as State versus Amaya Ruiz, 166 Arizona 152, a 1990 case of the Supreme Court. And basically, and I am sure the Court is familiar with this, the court found that even testimony from lay people that those things look similar, very similar, that is really not a problem. And quite frankly, that is all anybody would be seeking to do in this case in terms of testimony from like, for example, Detective Winslow or Detective Kennedy or Commander Mascher, but none of those people will be testifying as an expert.

I didn't request Commander Mascher to go and compare the shoe prints to the footprint photographs, so that he could be prepared to testify as an expert on that, and I never have listed him as an expert on that. I did

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indicate that he was going to be listed as an expert on tracking, and I do think that he is specially qualified to testify in that regard. So I think that is a different kind of a thing.

But let's back up to Mr. Gilkerson's report. First of all, it is not Brady material, Judge.

Nothing about it is exculpatory. It never was Brady material.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. BUTNER: Because it didn't exculpate. In fact, it inculpated.

THE COURT: Why did it not exculpate when you first learned of it prior to any comparison being done that identifies to it possible shoes or similar to possible shoes or like possible shoes that Mr. DeMocker has? Why do you hold off on disclosing that information five months, four months from when you learn it until you do have information that connects it up to -- allegedly connects it up to Mr. DeMocker?

MR. BUTNER: First of all, we can go back to the very beginning when I showed -- when I pointed out that disclosure under the numbers of 1445, 3 and 2. If you notice, there is a note on that disclosure from John Hoang, H-O-A-N-G. And Mr. Hoang is the guy that said, you know what, these things don't match, and the photographs are not

good enough to do me any good anyway. And that is basically -- and there is a couple of odd looking shoe print models that are presented there. We didn't think anything was any different at that point in time. And we got a report from Gilkerson that, basically, didn't seem to be any different than anything that had previously been disclosed.

I was not aware of that report from Gilkerson that came in October 22nd of 2009 for a couple of months. When we found out about that report, and it was then related to a specific kind of shoe that had been purchased by Mr. DeMocker, that is when we realized we have something here that we need to promptly disclose, and it was disclosed immediately. But it was never exculpatory evidence, Judge. It turned out to be inculpatory evidence, and it didn't change anything in this case. The situation at that point in time was that there is no shoe prints that match anything that Mr. DeMocker has.

THE COURT: When you have it identified or possibly similar to a particular shoe, why isn't that possibly exculpatory or probably exculpatory?

MR. BUTNER: I wouldn't say it was "probably."

It might have been possibly exculpatory. All we had, if I understood the statement that came out of the report, was something that most closely corresponds with a particular type of shoe.

1 That was the La Sportiva? THE COURT: 2 MR. BUTNER: Yes, the La Sportiva manufactured 3 type shoe. If I recollect what was in that report, it was 4 related to some kind of other shoe not identified as the same 5 one that ultimately ended up being purchased by Mr. DeMocker. 6 But it turned out that there were three shoes of that type 7 that had that sole. 8 THE COURT: When we are talking about what 9 comparisons Gilkerson is making with the La Sportiva shoe, 10 what are we talking about in terms of location of where those 11 allegedly were found? MR. BUTNER: We are talking about, of course, 12 13 the footprints out in the land behind the crime scene. 14 THE COURT: Which one? 15 Which footprint? MR. BUTNER: THE COURT: Are we talking about footprints on 16 the Carol Kennedy back door part of her property, in the 17 18 yard? Are we talking about comparisons to something that I heard goes back and forth behind, on the other side of the 19 20 fence from her yard? Are we talking about something that is back out close to where the alleged bike tracks were? 21 Do we know which --22 23 MR. BUTNER: That is a really good question, I don't really know specifically. I was of the 24

belief all along at that point in time that we didn't have

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any pictures that were good enough to make any kind of comparisons with even.

THE COURT: Right now you don't know what Gilkerson is comparing the La Sportiva shoe to, as far as which precise print and where it was located.

MR. BUTNER: That is exactly right. I don't know that. That may be known somehow through investigation, but I don't know that as I sit here before the Court. I know that it was made from some poor quality photographs, quite frankly, and we were told that those weren't of sufficient quality to even make comparisons from.

THE COURT: If the status was as you knew it in October, what if the status was not as you may know it or think you know it in January, but there is some connection between Mr. DeMocker and a La Sportiva type of shoe, would that not be potential *Brady* material if Mr. DeMocker had never bought a La Sportiva shoe?

MR. BUTNER: Yes. I think it would, Judge. I can't tell you that no, that wouldn't be possible Brady material. I think it would be. And when I got a report about it, when I found out about it, I would promptly disclose it. And I would fully have expected to receive such a report from the detective that had gotten that information from Gilkerson.

THE COURT: But even as of October, you

didn't, knowing that there was a connection at that point by Gilkerson with a print somewhere back there and a La Sportiva shoe of a particular sort. And we still may or may not have some disagreement between experts on both sides, if there are such, as far as whether there are additional shoes that could correspond in a similar vain to the track that was found.

MR. BUTNER: I didn't know about it in

October, didn't know that it could even possibly be Brady

material. I understand that there is --

THE COURT: Aren't you charged with knowing that?

MR. BUTNER: Absolutely. I was just going to say I understand that. There is an on-going duty on the part of the prosecutor in any kind of a case to be looking for Brady material when it is in our possession. Okay? And I am cognizant of that duty. And I certainly feel as if I would have lived up to that duty had it been brought to my attention or had I discovered it, Judge.

THE COURT: When it comes to your attention is actually after they hook it up.

MR. BUTNER: When it comes to my attention -THE COURT: When it comes to your attention
that there is a marking on the shoe that is equivalent to a
La Sportiva type shoe, that really doesn't come to your
personal consciousness, maybe it comes to the consciousness

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of investigators, but not to yours until they hook it up with a possible purchase.

MR. BUTNER: That's correct. I was aware in the Fall of 2009 that Detective McDormett was continuing to investigate the shoe prints and had contacted the FBI about that. I was aware of that. I was not aware that they had achieved any results in regard to that.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Miss Chapman, back to you.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I don't think that the preclusion based on the fact that it was Brady is a personal -- has anything to do with what Mr. Butner knew or didn't know.

THE COURT: I don't disagree with that.

MS. CHAPMAN: The fact is that the report was in the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office possession in October. The report said that the footwear impressions closely correspond to a particular shoe. That at that time, based on what we knew, and based on what the County Sheriff's office knew, that information was potentially Brady information. I believe it is still may be potentially Brady information.

Based on what we know right now, it should have been disclosed in October. Those issues were being litigated during that time. They are still hotly contested now, and it wasn't disclosed. That is the bottom line. For whatever

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1 reason, it is not a punitive sanction, but it wasn't 2 disclosed for five months while we were litigating these 3 issue. 4 THE COURT: What is the prejudice now? Do you 5 have a shoe print expert that can analyze whether other shoes 6 are potential sources for the same sort of thing? 7 MS. CHAPMAN: We are working to try to do that 8 now. The prejudice is that we lost five months of time. 9 prejudice is that we haven't had the access, the same access 10 to these witnesses that the State had during this time. don't have --11 12 THE COURT: "These witnesses" meaning 13 Gilkerson? There are all kinds of witnesses 14 MS. CHAPMAN: 15 from La Sportiva, from the people who make the sole in China. 16 Unfortunately, the sole is manufactured in China. 17 I understood that from your THE COURT: 18 motion. It is not an investigation that 19 MS. CHAPMAN: 20 happens in a short amount of time. It is not a simple investigation. And the other thing is that these shoes are 21 22 not sold anymore. We don't have a sample shoe. We can't 23 perform the same kind of examination that the State has now had performed because we were never sent the sample shoe, we

can't go out and buy the shoe, so our expert is simply

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incapable of performing the same analysis that has now been performed.

We still don't have -- I haven't seen, maybe it has been disclosed in the last couple of days, but whatever this ultimate report from Gilkerson is. The prejudice is that we are not in a position to evaluate and respond and analyze the same evidence that the State has. We are five months behind, and we have got less than four weeks to go. So, I don't think the prejudice can be overstated given those circumstances.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, speak of the nature of this in terms of its impact to the State's case.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, this is extremely important information. I can't really overstate its value. It is physical evidence that through investigation establishes a link with the defendant and the crime scene. It establishes that he purchased these shoes in 2006 from this outfitter in Boulder, Colorado. And that these shoes have since disappeared from his closet. And that the shoe prints from these shoes are most closely correspond with a particular shoe, the shoe prints do, the particular shoe having been in the possession of the defendant.

Judge, you know, there is basically case law that says that if it is inculpatory, it can't be exculpatory, so to speak. And if they are asking to exclude

it because it is inculpatory, then it can't be exculpatory, slash, Brady material.

We have been extremely diligent in disclosure in this case. As soon as this information was gathered and two plus two equal four, this was provided to the defense. Prior to that time, the situation was exactly the way it had remained since the day of the crime. That is, that there is some footprints in the outback area there, and we aren't able to match them up with anything.

And then ultimately we discover, when this is actually litigated in January of 2010, that these footprints are of insufficient quality and the photographs are of insufficient quality that we can't match them to any shoes. It is just an on-going investigation. We do continue these investigations. The discovery rules under Rule 15.6 allows us to continue investigating when we have evidence, and in fact, we have a duty to do that. And as soon as we find something, we disclose it.

If we had exculpatory evidence and we were aware of it, just as we had disclosed Mr. Hoang's evidence, we would disclose Mr. Gilkerson's evidence. We didn't think we had anything any different than we had when we disclosed Mr. Hoang's evidence, Judge. And we disclosed the Gilkerson evidence very promptly when we realized that we had something of significance in this case.

THE COURT: I think I kind of interrupted the flow of the general discussion that we were having by concentrating on this one, so I will go back to Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, if I could just close out with respect to this argument. The other thing, I think, especially putting in context in terms of a sanction for late disclosure in this kind of situation where we're not able to do the same kind of experiments. We had a five-month delay. These soles are manufactured in China. The prints were not preserved from the original photographs. We don't have a sample shoe. We cannot do the same kind of testing. And the report's hearsay. The shoes most closely correspond. These may be the same shoes. There may be other shoes with slight variation.

There is a lot of room here for potential continued investigation that we are just simply not able to do. And the conclusions in these reports, "most closely correspond," "may be related," "may be other shoes," and we are just not in a position to do that. Particularly in a death penalty case where this is the margin of error, and the State had this information for five months and we are five months behind the curve ball where these other situations exist, preclusion, we think, with this amount of time and the amount of delay that occurred between the State's receipt of this evidence and the disclosure, is really the only

1 appropriate remedy given the amount of time we have and the 2 kinds of conclusions that are in the report and the kind of 3 examination that could remain to be done. 4 With that said, do I hear Your Honor correctly, that you would like us to move from the shoes into 5 6 a different area? 7 THE COURT: Just to cover the rest of the 8 general motion, if you would. 9 MS. CHAPMAN: Sure. I think that takes us, Your Honor, to next in time, I think, would be the UBS 10 11 e-mails. Do you want to do that? THE COURT: Yeah, that is probably good. 12 13 have some time before I want to take the break, if everybody 14 is okay with that. Go ahead. 15 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor --16 17 THE COURT: Do you need a break? 18 No, Your Honor. MR. SEARS: 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, we had originally 21 filed a motion to preclude. As you will recall, we received 22 another 23,000 pages late disclosure of UBS documents. 23 Mr. DeMocker, you will recall, was arrested in October of 2008 at his place of employment, which was UBS. So the State 24 25 was certainly aware that Mr. DeMocker was employed by UBS in

October of 2008, however, they failed to subpoena UBS documents until December of 2009.

Then in February of 2010, they did a document dump of 23,000 pages of UBS documents. We moved to preclude those documents on February 24 of 2010, and Your Honor found at that time that the State did not act with due diligence in requesting these documents and disclosing them to the State, and at that time you entered a order generally precluding the documents.

Sometime thereafter, I believe it was the 8th of March, 2010, the State filed a motion to introduce approximately 197 e-mails.

THE COURT: March 5th.

MS. CHAPMAN: March 5th, they moved to introduce 197 e-mails.

Your Honor, we filed a motion to oppose the introduction of those e-mails on several grounds. Primarily on the ground that we had originally asked you to preclude those e-mails, that being primarily that the State has failed to exercise due diligence with respect to requesting those e-mails, failed to show good cause for their failure to request those e-mails, that it was a disclosure violation under Rule 15, it was a violation of your order setting a disclosure deadline.

They certainly knew and had a duty of due

diligence to request those documents. They knew as of July of '08 that Mr. DeMocker worked at UBS and could have

3 requested those e-mails at that time.

It is also impossible and remains impossible for us to review that quantity of e-mails. And if Your Honor just let's them introduce any of these e-mails, frankly, we are in a position that we have to review all of them to make sure they are done in context.

Then, Your Honor, with respect to the -I have them here. I am not sure what this is about, but we
were handed a small subset of them this morning. It is
distinct from the 197 that we were originally provided by the
State. So I will let the State speak to that.

With respect to the 197, and I am not going to go over them one by one, but I can categorize them, and they are also largely irrelevant. The first 140 largely deal with a business split between Mr. DeMocker and Ms. O'non. As Your Honor has heard, that business split was nearly finalized, and it is simply not relevant to the issues that need to be decided. And, Your Honor, I think that just on the basis of relevance, those first 140 e-mails can be excluded, period. That split was nearly final. They were simply waiting for approval from UBS people who were on vacation given the summer holiday, and there is absolutely no reason why that information should be submitted to this jury,

1 given what this jury is called upon to decide. 2 I don't know if you want to go category 3 by category. 4 THE COURT: That works. 5 MS. CHAPMAN: Or all the categories. 6 THE COURT: I think it works if you go through 7 all of them. 8 MS. CHAPMAN: Then there were two e-mails, 141 9 and 143 that were discussing the death of Carol Kennedy. This is an e-mail exchange between Mr. DeMocker and certified 10 11 financial planner explaining and Mr. DeMocker's absence and withdraw from the program, also completely irrelevant. 12 Absolutely no reason why this information should be brought 13 before this jury. 14 15 The third category was misidentified by 16 the State in its motion. 144 through 148 are e-mails between Steve and Carol. There is, again, there is nothing relevant 17 18 in these e-mails between Mr. DeMocker and Miss Kennedy. And 19 there is no conceivable reason why these e-mails would be 20 offered. 21 The other 149 through 158 are e-mails between Mr. DeMocker and others. It is not clear why those 22 are being offered, and they were misidentified by the State 23 as being between Mr. DeMocker and Ms. Kennedy. I am not sure 24 what that error was. The State didn't reply to our motion. 25

With respect to the e-mails, the forth category of e-mails that were sent on July 2nd, these e-mails deal with varying items from the casual dress code on the 4th of July at UBS and other issues, which again, we are at a loss to determine the relevance of.

And then there are a category of e-mails regarding Mr. DeMocker's cell phone. Apparently, the State wants to present Mr. DeMocker had a cell phone by use of these e-mails. And again, query what the relevance of these would be.

Then there are a series of e-mails between Mr. DeMocker and Barb O'non. This is 186 through 196. Certainly, the State knew about Ms. O'non's relationship with Mr. DeMocker as early of July of '08. There is no reason why they were unaware of this relationship or couldn't have investigated this earlier. And there is nothing relevant about these e-mails in particular, and particularly given the hearing we had last week, I don't think these e-mails would be admissible or relevant given Your Honor's rulings from last week.

Lastly, there is an e-mail, e-mail 197, which is, in part, identified in the Bates number document 1422 through 1425 that Mr. Butner handed to Your Honor earlier. You can see when you look at 1422 that this e-mail came, apparently, from Gallagher and Kennedy. 1423 appears

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to be a screen shot from a computer in box. As Your Honor can see, and anyone who looks at it can see it is also illegible and doesn't have any text on it.

1424 is a screen shot from Jennifer, whose last name I won't pronounce, Rydzewski. There is no date on this. It doesn't say who the e-mail was from or who the e-mail is to. And the last page also has no information about who the e-mail is from or who the e-mail is to.

The e-mail that was identified as 197 doesn't have a "to" or "from" on it. It does have the text that is identified in 1424 about the joint account. It also identifies that it was sent before Ms. Kennedy's death when Mr. DeMocker and Ms. Kennedy were in the process or had finalized their divorce, so would obviously be terminating any joint accounts they had. So to us, there is no foundation for this e-mail. We don't know who it was to. We don't know who it was from. The fact that it was disclosed in an illegible, undated, and otherwise unintelligible format of these pages, 1422 through 1425, doesn't make that any different than as it was raised in our motion with respect to the UBS e-mail.

We can think of no excuse why the State would wait 15 months to request these e-mails. There is no way for us to review the 23,000 pages. And we would ask you to remove and exclude all of these e-mails as a sanction

under 15.7 for late disclosure. These were not requested until December of '09. They were not provided to us until January. We simply don't have the capacity to review this volume of disclosure. They are not relevant, and there is no excuse for the State's treatment of this disclosure at this juncture in a death penalty case.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: I provided the Court with a packet of e-mails. Going from bottom to top, so to speak, in terms of e-mails, e-mail 197 is a copy of the e-mail sent from Mr. DeMocker to Jennifer Rydzewski on July 2nd, 2008, at 3:34 p.m. That is the same e-mail referenced in the disclosure under Bates No. 1422, 23 and 24. And if the Court will note under Bates 1424, that e-mail is quite legible and readable. And basically, it was disclosed in one of the very first disclosures in this case back in November of 2008.

And it is relevant because Mr. DeMocker is making a statement at that point in time in terms of burying a file and setting it on fire.

THE COURT: Well, don't misquote it. It says would you mind closing this account, setting it on fire and burying it.

MR. BUTNER: Exactly. It is a joint account with Carol Kennedy, and that is his statement in regard to

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So, I think it is relevant because it is made in close proximity to the time of the homicide, evidencing his state of mind at that point in time.

Moving up from the bottom to e-mail 150, and it says UBS e-mail 150 and then 153 follows that. are two e-mails that basically talk about the disagreement that Mr. DeMocker and his ex-wife are having. And these are statements made by Mr. DeMocker to other people by way of e-mail about his problems with the amount of the QDRO and his disagreement with what is going on with his ex-wife and the on-going dispute over the distribution and divvying up of the QDRO, so to speak. It demonstrates the on-going dispute after the divorce between Carol Kennedy and the defendant in this case.

Then moving up to e-mail 144. This is a statement made, an e-mail directed -- it is e-mail 144 and 145, and I don't know where 146 is, because I think this is a continuation. These e-mails talk about the on-going dispute between Mr. DeMocker and Carol Kennedy, and it is communication from Mr. DeMocker to Carol Kennedy back and forth about the resolution of their financial affairs and whose going to pay what, the \$20,000 on the UBS Visa account and the on-going dispute about finances in there.

THE COURT: That is all except 144, though, are long before the divorce settlement.

1 MR. BUTNER: No, its --THE COURT: February 29 of '08, April 10 of 2 108. 3 MR. BUTNER: 144, I have --4 While the divorce is going on? THE COURT: MR. BUTNER: Right. It is one that is 7 dated --8 That is what I said, all but 144 THE COURT: are prior to the case being settled. It is while the case is 9 10 going back and forth. 11 MR. BUTNER: That's true, Judge. 12 issued on July 1st of 2008. 13 THE COURT: The others are March 3rd, 14 April 10, February 29. 15 MR. BUTNER: That's correct. 16 And then coming up to e-mail 141 and 143, 17 these are basically statements made by Mr. DeMocker, in essence, that are trying to cover up, if you will, what the 18 19 M.E. discovered, which was that this was a homicide, and this 20 was discovered, of course, on July the 3rd of 2008 and became 21 a murder investigation virtually immediately, and then he is 22 telling people that the M.E.'s report is due any day, et 23 cetera, and he is trying to minimize his involvement, so to 24 speak, in the situation.

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And then coming up from that, the e-mails

1 are correctly described by opposing counsel between 2 Mr. DeMocker and Barb O'non and others, basically how he is 3 describing the on-going difficulties -- actually, I think 4 they are almost all between Mr. DeMocker and Barb O'non --5 how they negotiate back and forth the on-going difficulties 6 in resolving or dissolving, rather, their partnership 7 culminating with the e-mail No. 35, which basically describes 8 the agreement. And this is an e-mail to Jim Van Steenhuyse, 9 basically stating that they have worked out a 70/30 split on 10 that. 11 And those are significant because they 12 are corroborative of Barbara O'non's testimony that there was 13 this on-going dispute over their business and how it was 14 going to be divided, and ultimately it what resolved on or 15 about the same date as the murder of Carol Kennedy. 16 These e-mails, all of these e-mails were 17 not part of --18 THE COURT: June 24th is No. 35. 19 I think it is. MR. BUTNER: Right. And it noted that it is going to be --20 they would like to effectuate that on July the 1st at that 21

And, of course, then e-mail No. 3 is dated July the 2nd in the morning, talking about the proposed split at that point in time, and the fact that it still had

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point in time.

not been approved by management, so don't make any changes.

So it demonstrates this on-going negotiation. It is corroborative of Barbara O'non's testimony. It demonstrates the on-going financial stress that Mr. DeMocker was under, culminating on July the 2nd of the year 2008.

All of these e-mails were pulled off of those mirror images of the computers, rather than through D.P.S. forensic analysis. It simply had to be done in that fashion and printed out that way, hence part of the problem with the voluminous nature of the disclosure from the State on e-mails. Because we didn't get it from D.P.S., we ended up having to just pull it off and then print them out ourselves. And finally we went through them, thousands of them, and were able to -- here's that word again -- cull these out as being the most relevant e-mails in this case.

THE COURT: Do you want to speak to any of the other issues that are important according to the case law with regard to considerations of whether exclusion is appropriate or not?

MR. BUTNER: Judge, I don't think there is any prejudice in this regard. This is information that was in the hands of the defense, basically, almost as long as it was in the hands of the prosecution. And it comes off of the mirror imaged computers that were provided to the defense and

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have been scrutinized by their experts, as well as ours. And I don't think that the Court has heard any prejudice concerning these e-mails and their disclosure. In fact, they basically state things that have been apparent as we proceeded through this case. We found this information by printing out thousands of e-mails and going through them.

Nothing that the defense couldn't have done at exactly the same time, and I think that, in fact, they were doing that at the same time, at least in regard to Carol Kennedy's computer.

THE COURT: Back to you, Miss Chapman.

MS. CHAPMAN: A point of clarification, we never received mirror images of the UBS hard drive. These e-mails were dumped on us in a 23,000 page dump in February. We never got a mirror image of any UBS hard drive. Our understanding is that the State requested these e-mails in December of '09, and received them in February of 2010, and that is when we received them. We received them in a 23,000 page dump, and then in March we got the 197 e-mails, and then today we have another subset that was just disclosed to us this morning, that has also been disclosed to Your Honor. We never got a mirror image of any UBS hard drive.

I am not sure why Mr. Butner thinks we could have done anything differently than what we did, or could have searched the UBS hard drive, because we never

received it.

With respect to prejudice, the prejudice is that we aren't in a position to review those 23,000 pages. We simply don't have time given the avalanche of repeated and continual late disclosure from the State's side. And we are obligated to review all of those, if they introduce any of these.

I think Your Honor could -- the prejudice is that we have an obligation, if you are going to introduce any of these, to review all of them, and we don't have time to do that. And the State has a duty of due diligence that it failed to exercise in not requesting any of these e-mails until December of '09.

And Your Honor already found that they failed to exercise due diligence in failing to request these until December of '09, when it knew in July of '08 and certainly as of October '08, when they arrested Mr. DeMocker at his UBS office, that UBS e-mails may be relevant.

Your Honor, I would think in looking through these e-mails, and Your Honor has noticed that in reviewing them, these e-mails could be excluded under relevance. There is nothing in here that speaks to any relevant or live issues. When you look at the dates, the dates are well before -- between Mr. DeMocker and Miss Kennedy are well before the divorce.

1 3 think we saw. 7 worked it out. 8 9 10 it is to. 11 12 13 14 15 16 this material. 17 18 THE COURT: 19 20 21 23 MS. CHAPMAN:

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THE COURT: With a few exceptions, yes. MS. CHAPMAN: With the one exception that I

The e-mails between Mr. DeMocker and Miss O'non are stating that the resolution of their business disagreement is final before Ms. Kennedy's death.

This last page e-mail that the State is interested in introducing doesn't say who it is from or who There are major issues with these e-mails. the State simply can't wait until a mere month before trial to decide to do what it should have done 15 months earlier, dump it on the defense and then call it our problem.

That is not the way the disclosure rules are contemplated, that is not what Your Honor ordered. the prejudice is we simply don't have time to review all of

The reference Mr. Butner made to the defense bringing to the Court's attention certain e-mails between Miss Kennedy or Mr. DeMocker to Miss Kennedy or Miss Kennedy to Mr. DeMocker were not from the UBS materials. That was from other materials, as I understood it.

That's correct. We haven't utilized, because we haven't had time to review any e-mails, we haven't processed these e-mails because we haven't been

able to process these e-mails, and we have asked Your Honor to exclude them.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner, the correction or clarification for the record that Miss Chapman wanted to speak of, the UBS was not separately copied or separately available to the defense from the -- or was it -- from the scans that were made of the hard drive and --

MR. BUTNER: Some of that was, Judge. And it is my understanding that all of these e-mails came off of the defendant's laptop computer -- or rather his business computer. And that is where we got them, also.

The stuff from UBS that the Court found was not timely, I believe that this is a duplication of a lot of those things that we got from UBS. But I will tell you that I had been trying to get that information -- I know the Court has ruled on this -- I have been trying to find out about that for many, many months, and it resulted finally in a separate subpoena to UBS. It was basically with the guidance of UBS counsel. We were not aware that we could even get that information until I subpoenaed it back in December, I think, is when ultimately I did that.

THE COURT: Your impression is, or your understanding of the facts is, that while these came from a computer system that is under the control of UBS, the ones that precisely refer to communications by Mr. DeMocker or to

1 Mr. DeMocker were also on his personal computer that was 2 imaged. 3 MR. BUTNER: I think they were on his business 4 computer. 5 THE COURT: I mean his personal business 6 computer, not referring to his household computer, but his 7 office computer that was assigned to him at UBS. 8 MR. BUTNER: That's correct. 9 MS. CHAPMAN: Just to be clear, we never got 10 an image of his personal office computer. 11 THE COURT: You just got an image of the home 12 computer? 13 MS. CHAPMAN: We got an image of the home 14 computer, but we don't have an image of his personal office 15 computer. We have an image of his laptop. THE COURT: Office laptop or home laptop? 16 17 I believe it was his home MS. CHAPMAN: 18 You will see that these are from Barbara O'non. And they are marked UBS e-mail. That is how they are Bates 19 20 labeled. So, they are not from Mr. DeMocker. 21 MR. BUTNER: Judge, I believe his business 22 computer was imaged and was provided to the defense, along 23 with the images of the other computers. 24 MS. CHAPMAN: You will see there are other 25 people's e-mail from here. Patrick Berkenshaw {phonetic

1 spelling from him to other people. From Sue Young. 2 are not from Mr. DeMocker. 3 THE COURT: But to Mr. DeMocker? 4 MS. CHAPMAN: To Mr. DeMocker and a string of 5 other people. MR. BUTNER: Right. 7 THE COURT: So, if there was an imaging of the 8 business computer assigned to Mr. DeMocker, the ones received 9 may have been on there, as well as being on some UBS general I guess I am unclear about the representation that 10 system. 11 is made from a factual standpoint of what the defense has versus what the State has provided. I am not clear on that. 12 13 MS. CHAPMAN: Looking at this e-mail 145, it 14 says -- it is an e-mail from Mr. DeMocker to Ms. Kennedy 15 saying, I am forwarding the message to my g-mail address and 16 ask you correspond with me there. Because the e-mail came 17 from the UBS account, I can't use my personal e-mail account 1.8 on Friday. Indicating these came from his UBS e-mail 19 accounts, not his personal e-mail account. That's where 20 these e-mails came from. 21 I don't believe that we have a copy of the UBS computer. That is where I believe these came from. 22 THE COURT: Can you check that? I am going to 23 take a break.

MR. BUTNER: We are trying to check that right

1 now.

THE COURT: We will take a recess at this point, about 15 minutes.

(Brief recess.)

THE COURT: Record reflects the presence of Miss Chapman, Mr. Sears, Mr. DeMocker, Mr. Paupore, Mr. Butner.

Before we start going again on these discovery issues, request for sanctions issues, clerk's office left a message with my office today about is there some deadline for when exhibits are supposed to be coming in because they imagine that there is going to be a large number that they are going to have start marking. Questions about whether any of the exhibits that were previously used in other hearings are going to also be used, the precise exhibits also be used as part of this.

So, I think I need to set some requirement on the prosecution first and then the defense, in terms of deadlines to get with the clerk's office about the exhibits. And I am not sure that we have an identification of said date. So in terms of timing, do you think that you all can start with the State's exhibits, identify which ones from prior hearings you are going to use, and start doing that with the clerk's office the 19th of April, that week?

MR. BUTNER: Yes.

1 THE COURT: And then have the -- I will let 2 you do what you can with the exhibits for that week, and have 3 the defense start with its exhibits on the 26th, the week of the 26th. 4 5 MR. BUTNER: You just said from prior hearings 6 on the 19th of April; right? Do you mean all exhibits? 7 THE COURT: I want you to have as many of the 8 non-bulky or non-OSHA sensitive or contraband materials as 9 you can. Those other things can come in as we are into the trial days. But I want the other things marked, or the 10 process begun for getting those marked earlier, so that the 11 12 clerk's staff can do that for you, and it is not being done 13 in trial. 14 MS. CHAPMAN: Basically all paper exhibits? 15 THE COURT: Paper exhibits, photographs, 16 things like that that you are likely to be using. 17 MS. CHAPMAN: To provide to the clerk? 18 THE COURT: To provide to the clerk. For the 19 State, the week of the 19th, and the subsequent week, the week of the 26th for the defense. So that when we start the 20 21 actual trial of the case, which is probably going to be after 22 the 6th or 7th of May --23 MS. CHAPMAN: Would we customarily exchange them, or how do you handle that?

THE COURT: The clerk's office, and I think

they probably already provided both sides with this, sends
out a notice about wanting those sorts of things timely.

Usually, because the State goes first, the State has the
earlier numbers, but we may get to some mix of numbers later
on that, you know, you have some defense intervening numbers
and then have some State numbers after that, so defense
numbers after that.

MS. CHAPMAN: Do we exchange exhibits in

MS. CHAPMAN: Do we exchange exhibits in advance? Is that your practice to have the parties exchange exhibits in advance or not?

THE COURT: List of exhibits. But, I presume, that exhibits themselves have been -- Mr. Sears is more familiar.

MR. SEARS: Because we anticipate that the paper exhibits will be voluminous and they will be difficult to manage -- I think this discussion started today when some of our paralegals were here and went up and talked to Tina Fenton, who is the exhibits clerk, where some of this came from.

THE COURT: Probably.

MR. SEARS: But what we were thinking of was a way to digitize the paper exhibits. But it wouldn't make much sense to do that unless we had the clerk's numbers in advance. But if each side exchanged CDs with scanned copies of the digits, I think it would be possible to go back

electronically and add the exhibit number. That way, rather than the tiny little exhibit table and the tin box, we would be able to use exhibits -- you know, in other electronically updated courtrooms, there are all kinds of options.

THE COURT: We are still in a courthouse that was built in 1916, I think.

MR. SEARS: I could feel it yesterday, the day before yesterday, in the wind.

What I was thinking of is if we had documents that were scanned, each side could use those in a number of different ways. It would be easily retrievable without wasting the time to go through thousands of indexed paper exhibits to get the right ones, and then have piles of paper scattered around the courtroom. When we are talking about exchanging exhibits, that is what we were thinking of doing.

THE COURT: It certainly sound feasible to me. And to the extent that you know how many exhibit numbers you are definitely going to have, which I don't presently have that illusion, you may want to reserve some numbers for these other exhibits that may be bulkier or OSHA sensitive or contraband or other -- have some other reason for not bringing them in precisely on the 19th or the 26th, as the case may be.

But an issue in connection with that is

that the appellate level courts, of course, will need photographs as substitutes for those kind of physical exhibits. They don't take those anymore down at the appellate level courts or the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. So be prepared with that kind of stuff for substituting as an exhibit.

Another question precipitated by the defense staff, apparently, was to what extent there is some place in the building to store materials. Obviously, if you want to leave things in from Wednesday through Friday, or Tuesday through Friday in the courtroom, when you are the only game in town, so to speak, that's fine. But in terms of having a secure storage room elsewhere, I simply ask that you give with court admin. I am not aware of any particular --

MR. SEARS: We are thinking of our own materials. We are going to have boxes and notebooks and all kinds of things that we are going to be bringing to court. If there was a secure place in the courtroom where we could just lock those up, rather than moving them back and forth every day.

THE COURT: There isn't in the courtroom.

Maybe there is a place like that in the courthouse, but I don't know where it is, frankly. Space is at a premium in this building.

Those were a couple of issues that I

1 wanted to take care of before we resumed. 2 Any other issues like that that you think 3 need to be addressed or deadlines that need to be addressed? 4 MR. PAUPORE: Your Honor, maybe motion 5 deadlines. 6 THE COURT: Yesterday. That is when 7 disclosure stops. I think that is set by rule. 8 Back to the issues at hand. I guess I am 9 not precisely sure where we left off, other than generally 10 speaking about the --MR. BUTNER: Judge, I can clarify where we 11 12 left off. THE COURT: You were trying to find out some 13 information about UBS. 14 15 Exactly. What I found out is, MR. BUTNER: 16 yes, Mr. DeMocker's business computer was seized under 17 evidence item 301 and it was imaged, but these e-mails were 18 not captive on Mr. DeMocker's computer. These came off of 19 the central server back at UBS headquarters. And I apologize to the Court, because I was of the understanding that they 20 21 came off of a duplicate hard drive, so to speak, that had 22 printed out these e-mails from Mr. DeMocker's computer. 23 THE COURT: So what you are saying is these 24 were not also on Mr. DeMocker's office computer. 25 MR. BUTNER:

No.

1 THE COURT: They were solely on the UBS 2 computer. 3 MR. BUTNER: That's correct, Judge. 4 computer didn't captive or capture these e-mails, but rather 5 they were only on the UBS server back in New Jersey. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. 7 In terms of where the argument was as 8 between counsel, were you finished then, Mr. Butner? 9 Well, just to clarify, Judge, I MR. BUTNER: 10 think that these -- this small amount of e-mails that we are 11 requesting to use in this case is reasonable under the 12 circumstances. And I don't think that, basically, that we 13 have -- I don't believe that the defense has been prejudiced 14 in any regard as a result of these e-mails. 15 And similarly, with the shoe print 16 testimony, I don't believe they have been prejudiced by that. 17 The rule for sanctions under 15.7 talks about a requirement 18 that counsel confer concerning these things and see if we can 19 resolve them, that has never taken place in this case. 20 Actually, what is going on in regard to this stuff is just 21 machine gun motion fire, so to speak. As soon as we disclose 22 the shoe print evidence, they filed motions on it trying to 23 keep it out, and the same thing is going on with these

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e-mails.

THE COURT: Miss Chapman, back to you.

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Your Honor, Mr. Butner, MS. CHAPMAN: apparently, doesn't think we are prejudiced by anything. That is what he said every time we filed a motion. We have promptly brought these issues to the attention to the Court repeatedly, because the disclosures have been made late and repeatedly. We haven't complained about every late disclosure made. We have complained about those that prejudice us. We have tried to detail about when the disclosures were made, when the State had the information. We have been very detailed and we have been very specific about what the prejudice has been to us from the State's

And from -- to speak specifically, I think -- I don't want to rehash what we already said about the shoe print evidence, but I think it is kind of breath taking to me that specifically given that evidence Mr. Butner doesn't see how the prejudice has been for the defense in this case, particularly given the time we have remaining, the kind of results that the examination is at this point, given the language of those reports, what examination could remain to be done, and the inability of the defense to conduct those examinations given the time frame we have remaining. And it is just breathtaking.

With respect to the UBS e-mails, we don't have the capacity to review the 23,000 e-mails.

Mr. Butner to cherry pick, what I guess now is even a smaller subset than the 197 he cherry picked originally to present to the jury from the 23,000 pages that were produced to us in February with a few mere months to trial in a death penalty case that has been pending for over 15 months is prejudice.

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I don't have time, the defense team doesn't have time to review these late disclosures in the avalanche of additional late disclosure that the State makes and continues to make. We can't take these, however many e-mails that have been cherry picked now from among the 197, and take their word that these are the only relevant e-mails. We would have to review all of them. That is the prejudice. We don't have time to review it.

The State has also still failed to provide any rationale, whatsoever, for waiting until December of '09 to go and request e-mails from Mr. DeMocker's employer, whom they knew he was employed by from the date of the crime. They arrested him at his place of employment. So there is no reason for them to wait 15 months to request this information in a death penalty case.

There is no way for us to keep up with this avalanche of late disclosure. We have repeatedly tried to raise this issue with the Court. We have repeatedly written to Mr. Butner in letters, so I am not sure how he thinks we haven't done our duty to try to resolve these

1 issues with him, to ask for disclosure early and often, and 2 they repeatedly failed to do that.

At this point the State has offered no other alternative sanction. A sanction is required unless they couldn't have done it through due diligence, or unless there is no prejudice. It is clear they didn't exercised due diligence. Your Honor already made that determination on February 19th. It is clear we are prejudiced because we simply don't have time in the time remaining to do what is required of us to do, to confront this evidence, to review it as we would be required to do if any of this comes in. And the State hasn't provided us an opportunity to do that given their irresponsibility in requesting and disclosing this information at this late date.

THE COURT: Thank you.

What issues do you want to take up next with regard to this general heading?

MS. CHAPMAN: Chronologically, I think the next motion is the FINRA motion, Your Honor, but I think where we left that issue, and I just for the record want to be clear about this, the State had indicated that they don't expect to discuss this other than in rebuttal. And, so, if we are going -- if we are talking about mitigation rebuttal, which is what I think we are talking about, then as long as we preserve the issue that we will address the due process

1 confrontation and other issues about what is permissible in rebuttal testimony before the State uses that information. 2 3 don't think we need to address it now. If they intend to present it in any other format, then I would like to take it 4 5 up. 6 THE COURT: Mr. Butner, can you clarify at 7 what stage of the proceedings the FINRA information may be 8 used? 9 MR. BUTNER: Yes. In the event that the 10 defendant presents evidence of good character, then I believe the FINRA evidence becomes relevant at that point in time, 11 Judge, and would be usable. 12 13 THE COURT: So in case in chief, or in mitigation, depending on when the defense may raise it. 14 MR. BUTNER: No, it would have to be rebuttal. 15 If the defense in the primary 16 THE COURT: case, the guilt or innocence phase of the case, presents 17 evidence of good character in their part, then it would be in 18 rebuttal, but in the initial trial. 19 MR. BUTNER: Yes, I think it could be used in 20 21 rebuttal. THE COURT: And if not used there, and if the 22 defense doesn't raise good character as part of their case of 23

defense to the quilt or innocence phase, and they use it

subsequently in -- if there is an aggravation hearing and a

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mitigation hearing, and they raise it in that stage, then the 1 2 State is asking to be able to raise it in the rebuttal, but 3 not the first aggravating phase. 4 It is rebuttal MR. BUTNER: Correct. evidence. 5 6 Your Honor, this position is MS. CHAPMAN: 7 different than what the State took in their response to our 8 And I think this would be 404(b) evidence. 9 to have a 404(b) hearing on this issue. These issues are 10 unresolved by FINRA. And the State specifically said that 11 this would only arise during the rebuttal of the mitigation/ 12 aggravation phase. That is what they said in their pleading. 13 That is what they said prior to the 404(b) hearing. If that 14 is not their position now, we request an immediate 404(b) 15 hearing on these issues. MR. BUTNER: If I could have a moment, Judge. 16 17 THE COURT: Yes, you may. Judge, to clarify the State's position, 18 19 we are not going to use this at all as part of the main 20 trial, so to speak. But rather, we would reserve the right 21 to use it at the penalty stage, but we don't plan on using it 22 at all during the main trial. 23 THE COURT: Is that more clear, Ms. Chapman? 24 MS. CHAPMAN: It is, Your Honor. And I think we have made clear, and I think that Your Honor has already 25

1 indicated an intent to hold a hearing prior to the 2 introduction of any rebuttal at any aggravation or mitigation 3 phase, because I think there are significant issues as to the 4 admissibility of this and other evidence that the State has 5 identified they intend to introduce as rebuttal at 6 aggravation and mitigation. And we have concerns about the 7 admissibility of this and other evidence, and would like a 8 chance to litigate the admissibility of that before we get to 9 those phases. But if Your Honor doesn't want to take it up 10 today, that is fine with us, as long as we have an 11 opportunity to do that prior to those phases, assuming we get 12 there.

THE COURT: All right. Then I will consider that the March 10th motion filed by defendant and the State's response filed March 22nd and defendant's reply in connection with those issues are reserved for a possible post-verdict hearing, if it is needed.

MS. CHAPMAN: Okay.

Your Honor, the next chronologically is a March 10th motion to preclude late disclosed evidence. That motion was filed based on late disclosure that was received by the defense on March 4th and 5th. And we can take up those issues now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. CHAPMAN: Specifically, those issues, I

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think, can be grouped into a couple of categories. Those are bank accounts. There were several bank accounts. One was a J.P. Chase account that was known by the State as of February of 2008 and not disclosed -- excuse me, as of June of 2009; a Chase account that was identified by the State in February of 2008; a UBS account that was known in November of 2009. None of those were disclosed to the defense until March of 2010.

The State acknowledges that the information was known to them well before the disclosure.

information was known to them well before the disclosure.

They offer no response about why they failed to exercise their due diligence, no good cause for their late disclosure.

These bank accounts and reports are disclosed to us with weeks left to trial.

The same is true with respect to phone records that were disclosed to us in March for a period of time in June. The State acknowledges that they were aware of this time frame in mid-June, and yet failed to subpoena or disclose this information to the defense until March.

THE COURT: Specifically, those refer to Miss Gerard?

MS. CHAPMAN: They do, Your Honor.

And I want to also, both with respect to bank accounts and with respect to phone records, I filed additional briefing on March 30th because the State continues to disclose late disclosure with respect to additional bank

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accounts. There was an FIA account that was known to the State in December of '08, and a Provident Funding mortgage that was known to the State in November of '08 that wasn't disclosed until March 17th and briefed on March 30th.

And then there were additional phone records for additional parties, but during that same time frame. That wasn't disclosed again until mid-March and briefed again to Your Honor at the end of March.

Again, the State acknowledges that they knew about these issues, the phone issues specifically, in mid-June of '09, and failed to disclose to the defense until March of this year, and knew about the bank records in '08 and filed to do anything about it until March of this year.

They don't provide any excuse for their failure to exercise due diligence. They don't provide any showing of good cause for why they failed to do this. Again, Your Honor, at this late date the defense doesn't have a way to get this information to the experts. The experts don't have time to review and evaluate it.

And the State rightly says that Your
Honor needs to consider alternative sanctions, but the State
doesn't provide any analysis about what alternative sanctions
might be appropriate. With less than four weeks to trial,
Your Honor, we have no idea what alternative sanction other
than preclusion would be appropriate. The State continues to

make disclosures. Since the time that we filed this specific motion, the State has made approximately seven more disclosures, the latest happening this morning.

Also in this motion there were additional disclosures made with respect to the shoe print evidence, both with respect to FBI reports. There was a request for a new report. Apparently, that report was received just a few days ago, which we haven't yet filed a motion on, but it was also late received. There were sample shoes that were sent to experts that were not sent to us. Sample shoes provided to Commander Mascher, not provided to the defense, not disclosed to us. This all relates back to the disclosure from October of 2009 that was withheld from the defense for nearly five months.

And then also included in this motion were e-mails that the State had as early as September of 2008, but did not disclose to the defense until March of this year, related to rental property that Mr. DeMocker rented. The State's only response is, well, the officer who had these didn't have much to do with the investigation.

Again, you know, just responding, reviewing, processing this volume of evidence when we are in the middle of trying to identify jurors four weeks out from a death penalty case, Your Honor, we simply don't have time to process this kind of information at this late date. The

State has had this information, in most cases, for well over a year and is just now disclosing it to us.

Some of this information, as I mentioned, has been supplemented by a March 30th filing, and there will be additional filings because we received and continue to receive additional disclosure. We would ask that Your Honor exclude this information simply because the defense doesn't have time to process it, get it to the experts and be prepared to confront it at trial.

We ask in this motion and the ones that are going to follow, when it is going to end? And, Your Honor, I just want to be clear because every time we have this argument, Mr. Butner stands up and says the State has a continuing duty to investigate. This is not about the State's continuing duty to investigate. This is about the State's duty of due diligence, and their failure to do 15 months ago what they should have done, and their failure to disclose 15 months ago what they should have disclosed.

This is not new evidence. It is not new matters for investigation. There is nothing new about this. The only thing new is that the State is finally disclosing what they should have disclosed 15 months ago with absolutely no excuse for their failure to do so when they should have done so. And we are asking Your Honor to exclude this information.

THE COURT: Thank you.

In regard to the La Sportiva shoe

State filed a response March 22nd concerning these particular issues. Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: That's correct, Judge.

First of all, in regard to the bank accounts, the same bank accounts in this case have been subpoenaed over and over again, and we continued to get incomplete records multiple times. That is why multiple subpoenas ended up going out for these bank accounts. We also then discovered, once we got complete records, additional bank accounts, and that necessitated additional subpoenas for other bank accounts. It is like we have been chasing our tail when it comes to finding all of the defendant's bank accounts. He would open one and close it and move onto another.

And it has taken us all of this time with steady flow of subpoenas, and the defense has alluded to that fact, to get these records. And as soon as we get them, we disclose them to the defense. I would point out that, presumably, they have access to all of the defendant's bank accounts at every step along the way, but certainly we do not. So it necessitates subpoenas for those records. That is what we have been doing in regard to all of these bank accounts.

information, that was disclosed on January 29 of 2010, and we have simply sought additional information about those shoes thereafter. This is not a new or different report from Eric Gilkerson that has been provided to the defense in recent disclosure, almost immediately upon its receipt, but rather it is a supplemental report that we requested Mr. Gilkerson continue to work on this with better photographs, if at all possible, so he could make sure about his opinions in regard to the La Sportiva shoes.

And I would also add at this point in time, Judge, these are shoes that were purchased by the defendant in 2006. He knew about the purchase of those Presumably he shared that information with his They could check on that kind of stuff, too. attornevs. This Outdoor ProLink information, that is the outfit that he bought the shoes from. That fellow that owns that company, to my understanding is a former acquaintance or a current acquaintance of the defendant's from Prescott College. bought them from somebody he knew that runs a business, an internet business out of Boulder, Colorado. It was by sheer luck that we stumbled on to that information, pouring through the volumes and volumes of financial records and credit card receipts that were subpoenaed through bank records from the defendant.

In regard to the information about

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e-mails between the defendant and Cheryl Hatzopoulos, I hope I said that correctly, H-A-T-Z-O-P-O-U-L-O-S, that information, yeah, it was discovered relatively early on, but we didn't realize at that point that we could go ahead and obtain additional information, e-mails between the defendant and Cheryl Hatzopoulos to further substantiate the rental of that residence, and then, of course, the ordering from that residence by computer of these books that have become an important topic in this case.

You know, it is an on-going example of continued investigative efforts, Judge, and quite frankly, these are diligent investigative efforts. Given the volume of materials that has been poured through by the Yavapai County Sheriff's Office in this case, it is totally understandable and explainable how these things occur.

In regard to Rene Gerard's phone records, the defendant and Rene Gerard in their jail phone calls, which have been disclosed to the defense, were using a secret code talking to each other. It then became apparent that maybe it would be necessary for the State to subpoena Rene Gerard's telephone records to see if we could somehow ascertain what this secret code was referring to. That is what necessitated the subpoena of Rene Gerard's phone records.

In terms of due diligence, this has been

an on-going diligent investigation from start to finish. I understand that there were substantial delays. That isn't as a result of a lack of diligence. And presumably, the defendant and Ms. Gerard knew what they were talking about when they communicated with each other by way of secret code.

Is there is a prejudice? I think not.

THE COURT: I guess I don't understand what you are seeking to have admitted under these various categories. Some accounts at J.P. Morgan Chase bank and some other bank accounts. What is disclosed that you are seeking to have admitted at trial?

MR. BUTNER: At this point in time, Judge, I don't know that there is anything that we are seeking to be admitted, other than that fact that we will now have complete records for these accounts, when it took us multiple subpoenas to get them. We have, basically, been able to establish what the account balances were by subpoenaing the records early on, but sometimes people want complete records to establish full account balances and have a complete understanding of what took place in that account. You know, that is typically an objection when you go to saying, when you have testimony concerning, well, his account balance was "X" number of dollars at this point in time. Do you have the complete records of that account? The problem was we didn't have, because the banks kept not sending complete records.

THE COURT: Gerard phone records, it says of activity between June 17th and 21st of '09.

MR. BUTNER: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Are you seeking to admit that she made certain calls to certain other phone numbers?

MR. BUTNER: We were seeking to try and find out if she was involved in sending e-mails to Mr. Sears' office. We also believe that she was involved in some other kind of criminal activity connected to Mr. DeMocker, and they were communicating about this by way of secret code. And we didn't discover that this was actually a secret code until substantially later, when we figured out they were talking in secret code.

THE COURT: So, whether they are talking in secret code or not, how is that relevant in and of itself? I presume that you are trying to get some information of those records that there were some calls or communications of some kind between Miss Gerard and somebody of importance in the case.

MR. BUTNER: It appears as if there was communication between Ms. Gerard and Mr. DeMocker about Mr. DeMocker's initial plans to flee in this case. And Ms. Gerard was part of those plans to flee. And these records will help substantiate that, because they may lead to the discovery of physical evidence.

1 THE COURT: June 17th to 21st of '09? 2 MR. BUTNER: Yes. And they were communicating 3 about that by way of secret code. 4 THE COURT: When were they obtained? 5 MR. BUTNER: The phone records? 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 MR. BUTNER: I am looking to see when they 8 were disclosed, Judge. 9 THE COURT: They are disclosed March of 2010, 10 according to this. The question I had was when they were 11 obtained. MR. BUTNER: I believe that they were obtained 12 13 within two weeks before that date, possibly even sooner than 14 that. 15 THE COURT: More approximate to --16 MR. BUTNER: More approximate to the 17 disclosure date. 18 Your Honor, if I may, the MS. CHAPMAN: 19 State's response indicates that they knew in mid-2009 about 20 the investigation, which they think Miss Gerard may have been involved in sending that e-mail, and the State has been 21 22 continuously reviewing telephone calls between Mr. DeMocker 23 and Miss Gerard, even though they weren't disclosing those 24 summaries to the defense until January of 2010. They were

reviewing and summarizing those phone calls for themselves

1 concurrently since 2008. 2 THE COURT: Do you want to add anything on that point, Mr. Butner? 3 MR. BUTNER: Only that we still don't, Judge, 4 at this point in time know what the secret code was, and we 5 6 are still trying to find that out. We are still searching 7 for that physical evidence that I was just describing. 8 What about the e-mails between THE COURT: 9 info@enjoyPrescott and Mr. DeMocker? As I understand it, you 10 are talking about some communication for purposes of property 11 rental post the time of the homicide? 12 MR. BUTNER: I don't know exactly. The e-mail that I think that we are talking about is an e-mail that was 13 14 sent during the pendency of this litigation from an internet cafe in Paradise Valley. 15 THE COURT: I am looking at the defense reply 16 17 referring to Item 8. MR. BUTNER: You mean the e-mail concerning 18 19 the shoes? 20 It is the e-mail -- well, I THE COURT: No. 21 don't know. It is No. 8 in the motion. It is No. 8 in the 22 It is e-mails between Mr. DeMocker, apparently, and 23 in the State's possession since September of 2008, referring 24 to a Cheryl and rental property.

MR. BUTNER: I understand now. I didn't

recognize the e-mail address. That is the Hatzopoulos e-mail where basically the defendant was ordering books using the e-mail address from a rental property in Prescott. And I must admit it took us a long time to figure that out and subpoena that particular information, Judge.

THE COURT: Are you referring to the books that were ultimately, apparently, located at the office from Amazon.

MR. BUTNER: Correct. That is my understanding, yes.

THE COURT: And the defense asserts that those e-mails were in the State's position since September of '08, even prior to the arrest of Mr. DeMocker.

MR. BUTNER: If that's the case, Judge, I don't quite understand what the prejudice would be about that, and they were disclosed at that point in time, too, promptly in connection with this case early on.

THE COURT: They are saying that it wasn't disclosed, that it was not disclosed until March, but was in possession of the county sheriff's office September of '08.

MR. BUTNER: Yes. They were possession of a detective that apparently had not provided the actual e-mails. We were just aware that the purchase had been done by way of e-mail.

THE COURT: And tell me why is that

1 significant to the State's case as far as the e-mails between 2 Mr. DeMocker and info@enjoy as distinguished from the e-mails 3 that pertain to the actual ordering of the materials. I don't know. I don't know. 4 MR. BUTNER: 5 give up. I don't know why detective -- the detective that 6 had those kept them in his possession, Judge, and --7 THE COURT: I think I understand the import of 8 the Outdoor ProLink information. 9 MR. BUTNER: Right. 10 THE COURT: And the bank account. All right. 11 Miss Chapman, anything else after my 12 questions with Mr. Butner? 13 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I guess the only thing I would add is the State seems to be shifting the 14 15 burden here with respect to what Mr. DeMocker may have known or didn't know. It is the State's burden to make the 16 17 disclosure it going to make in a timely manner, perform its 18 investigation with due diligence and disclose information 19 that it intends to use in a timely manner to Mr. DeMocker 20 under both the Court's orders and 15.1. 21 It is pretty clear both from the State's response and from Mr. Butner's remarks that the State didn't 22 do that, hasn't done it, and in most cases doesn't know why. 23 24 And it is also pretty clear that the prejudice to

Mr. DeMocker isn't that Mr. DeMocker and his defense team

couldn't have gone out and requested every bank record that Mr. DeMocker has from 2003 to the present that it didn't know that the State needed or wanted, or was going to request or had requested, didn't receive, but that the State didn't do it and didn't disclose it to the defense, and now the defense is left with a few weeks before trial trying to scramble together to make sense of what the State is disclosing in tens of thousands of pages of disclosure.

And, you know, the State has known about this information in most cases for over a year. Most of the bank accounts were known to the State in 2008. The disclosures were not made until March.

With respect to the jail phone calls, the State was concurrently reviewing those calls. And again, it's response indicates it was aware of these e-mails in June of 2009. It didn't do anything about them until March of 2010. The Gilkerson report that it mentioned is a new report. It has to do with an exemplar shoe that the defense can't go out and purchase because the shoes aren't created anymore, that the defense wasn't provided, in terms of an exemplar shoe, an examination that the defense is incapable of doing.

So all of those things put the defense in the position of not being able to evaluate the information the State is providing, not being able to perform

examinations or investigation that the State is able to perform, not being able to evaluate the State's examination that the State is performing because we simply don't have enough time. The manner of the State's investigation, the manner of the State's disclosure in this case has made it so that the defense can't respond to the State's investigation, can't perform its own evaluation, and the State has provided no excuse, other than, well, we just don't know. We don't know how we want to use the information, we don't know if we want to use the information and we don't know why we late disclosed it. All we know is maybe Mr. DeMocker also knew about it, and that is simply not sufficient. It is not constitutionally sufficient. It is not sufficient under the rules. And it is not sufficient under your own orders about requiring disclosure.

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If the State is provided to simply say, well, you know, we do the best we can, then the defendant essentially isn't entitled to a constitutional right to confront the evidence and prepare for trial and to due process. That is what is happening here. That is the State's position. We are doing the best we can. That is constitutionally sufficient. And it is not.

We are not able to prepare. We are not able to confront the evidence. We are not able to conduct our own investigation, and it is precisely because the State

has not done what they are obligated to do. We are asking you to preclude this late disclosed evidence on that basis. There is nothing new about this information, other than the State is finally getting around to doing what it should have done months ago, and in some cases over a year ago.

THE COURT: Did you want to address the Cooper matters separately under 702, other than preclusion? Or do you want to save that for a later time?

MS. CHAPMAN: I am ready to do the 702 matter, Your Honor.

I also wanted to take up with respect to we have also asked Your Honor to dismiss the death penalty as a sanction for the cumulative effect of the late disclosure. I think it is helpful to define what we are not talking about here. We are not talking about newly discovered evidence. We are not talking about tests that the State just learned needed to be performed. We are not talking about subject matters that the State just learned were at issue. We are not talking about examinations that the State just learned about as a surprise that needed to be done. And we are not talking about the State's duty to investigate this case. We are talking about the State's duty of due diligence and the State's duty to do what should have been done 15 months ago.

And if the State can come into this courtroom and rely on the fact that they have a duty to

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investigate, to excuse their obligation to do what they should have done 15 months ago, there simply is never an opportunity for this court or any court to sanction for their failure to comply with the disclosure obligations.

What we are talking about here are evidence and facts that have been in the State's possession in some cases for well over a year, and in some cases for Tests it knew it should have performed or over 15 months. were advised by DPS that it should have been performed, needed to be performed, in some cases in August of 2008. Subject matters that it was aware were issues early on in the case; crime scene, for example, and with the subject matter of Mr. Cooper; documents and evidence that the defense repeatedly requested and were told did not exist in the form of crime scene diagrams, and also in the form of cell tower evidence; examinations of items of evidence that the State seized in July of 2008, but didn't ask for examinations to be performed until February and March of 2010 with less than two -- or in this case, less than a month to trial; experts in areas for whom we have no reports, with less than one month to trial; reports and witnesses that were withheld for months at a time, and no explanation for the failures of the State where the State is seeking the death penalty.

We have been filing our motion as soon as we receive the late disclosures. It has been on-going. We

let the State know when we know when the State had this evidence and when they are disclosing it. And we also outlined the prejudice to the Court. We haven't been able to review the tens of thousands of pages of late disclosure. In the past month it has been tens of thousands of pages, in the last month. We, as we talked about, received over 70,000 from the D.P.S. computer forensic lab in the last several weeks, and this information apparently isn't complete. We continue to receive disclosure.

We haven't been able to hire the experts that we need to evaluate the State's examination. The experts we do have haven't been able to review the information that has been provided. We aren't prepared to confront their evidence. We are not prepared to interview their experts. We don't have reports, and were are in the middle of jury selection. We don't have any way to prepare for this testimony, and the forensic testing is on-going. We are awaiting forensic testing as we sit here today, and their disclosure has literally crippled our ability to prepare.

We have talked to you about the requirements under 15.7 for imposing the sanction, and sanctions are mandatory unless you find either that the information could not be disclosed with due diligence or that it was disclosed immediately upon discovery or that the State's failure to comply was harmless. And neither of those

findings is possible.

We know that these could have been disclosed with due diligence and State has failed to provide any explanation for their failure to exercise that due diligence, and we have explained in countless motions and before you today what the prejudice has been.

The rule itself contemplates the preclusion of witnesses and evidence. You have set deadlines, the rule set deadlines, and they have been ignored repeatedly. We understand that preclusion is not a favored sanction. We cited you to the Chrone case and the Moody case. And the cumulative and on-going nature of the disclosure violations is another relevant circumstance for you to consider when you are determining a sanction. The State hasn't proposed any alternative sanction for you to consider, and they have offered no rationale or excuse or their failure to do what they are required to do.

Your Honor, at one of the last times we talked about a sanction under 15.7, talked about imposing a sanction that is least disruptive to the parties' presentation of the case. And one of the things when we were considering that and what sanctions to propose to Your Honor that we thought about was what affect dismissing the death penalty would have. The State would still be able to seek a life sentence against Mr. DeMocker. And other than that, the

presentation of the State's case would remain unchanged. And that sanction would have, at least in part, an ameliorative effect on the repeated on-going and cumulative nature of the disclosure violations here.

This also accounts for the death is different jurisprudence that we cited repeatedly to Your Honor that the courts are to take extraordinary measures to make sure that death is not imposed as a result of mistake or passion or prejudice or whimsy. We think that takes the count to the requirement that an elevated level of due process is required. We don't think that what's happened here in terms of the State's failure to comply with the rules and Court's orders and, frankly, the constitutional obligations that are behind those orders and those rules meets that heightened level of due process.

Wilkenson which talks about the dismissal of the death penalty as a sanction for late notice. And we think, you know, Your Honor, the State does have the duty to continue to investigate the case, and the defense possibly more than the State in this case has an interest in that. But the State has an equal, if not greater, duty to exercise due diligence, which it just hasn't done in this case.

They can't be excused from complying with their disclosure obligations by simply waiting until the last

few weeks before trial in a death penalty case to do what they should have done months ago. And we are asking to dismiss the death penalty in this case to address the cumulative and on-going nature of these violations so that we can move forward. That is the sanction that doesn't have a tremendous impact on the presentation of their case. acknowledges their repeated failure to do what you ordered them to do and what the rules order them to do and what the constitution, frankly, requires them to do.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, if I might.

THE COURT: Please.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, you know, the defense has repeatedly urged the Court to employ Rule 15.7 and the sanctions contained therein. I draw the Court's attention to the fact that under subsection (B) every motion for sanction should be accompanied by a certification attached of moving counsel after personal consultation and good faith efforts to do so having been unable to satisfactorily resolve the matter, and there is no such certification attached to any of these motions.

Now, in regard to the State's efforts to comply with the disclosure requests of the defense, and having done so, Judge, look at the on-going disclosure that has been provided in this case from day one, the thousands and thousands and thousands of pages of documents; the disks,

the audios, et cetera. The State has made every effort to comply with disclosure in this case.

The Hatzopoulos e-mails are an example of, sure, an omission by the State. A detective that was very peripherally involved with this case had these e-mails that took place between the defendant and Hatzopoulos renting that particular premises, and we didn't disclose them. If the Court orders that we can't use them, so be it, we can't use them. But the fact of the matter is that those were e-mails by the defendant with Miss Hatzopoulos, and so presumably he was aware of what he had done in that regard.

And in regard to the ProLink information, all of these steps were taken immediately upon discovery that they were of any kind of significance and were promptly disclosed. And that goes back to the date of discovery that the shoe prints match, so to speak, or closely or comparable to, I guess would be a better way to phrase it, the shoe prints were closely comparable to La Sportiva type shoes. All of that information was promptly disclosed by the State.

It has been difficult in this case to keep up with the disclosure, but I think that the State has demonstrated, if through no other way, by the sheer volume of the disclosure that has been on-going in this case and will continue to take place.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, I am sorry, just to

if I might deal with this 15.7(B), we did file a motion to compel that outlined the repeated letters to Mr. Butner and his failure to respond and our attempts to contact him and efforts to resolve our requests for information. So, I think that complies with at least the spirit if not the rule and letter of Rule 15.7(B).

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THE COURT: Mr. Butner, I was not sure you were done.

MR. BUTNER: I am done, Judge, at least for right now.

THE COURT: Part of what Rule 15.7 is talking about, also, is for the Court to consider whether there is prejudice, whether the failure to comply was harmless, whether there is opportunity to disclose earlier even with due diligence, and any orders with regard to sanctions have to take in the significance of the information, the impact of the sanction on the party, on the victim, the stage of the proceedings when the disclosure is ultimately made. And then they set forth a whole variety of possible sanctions, which both counsel have correctly pointed out disfavors dismissal of the case, disfavors preclusion of witnesses or evidence, doesn't say you can't ever grant those, but it indicates that the Court is supposed to try to apply sanctions that are not going to affect the evidence at trial, the merits of the case.

That is part of the discussion in Wilkenson, the Barrs versus Wilkenson case, talking about, well, sanctions that affect the sentencing are not sanctions that affect the trial, the merits of the case, which is part of the rationale of why the Court thought of that as a possible sanction available to the courts, because 15.7 is talking about available sanctions include but are not limited to precluding -- preclusion is authorized. It is the first one they even list. And dismissal is authorized. It is the second one they list. But then the case law goes on to say that those are not favored. They don't say that you can never grant those, but they urge the trial courts to look at other possibilities.

Granting a continuance is a possibility, or declaring a mistrial in the interest of justice, holding a witness, party, person or counsel in contempt, imposing costs. We have had, I think it was the Meza case, M-E-Z-A for the court reporter, the Meza case that is talking about sanctions, costs imposed on the prosecutor in that case, attorney fees, I think. And then it has costs of continuing the proceeding, and many other appropriate sanctions.

So, there is a whole variety of possible sanctions limited, I suppose, only by imagination but the courts are also needful, I think, to have the parties address the significance of the information, what sanctions you

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think, if any, may apply if it is not preclusion. I want to make sure that both sides have an opportunity for that.

So, Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Well, Judge, there are other alternatives besides preclusion. In some instances, I think preclusion may be warranted, and I am talking about, quite frankly, the Hatzopoulos e-mails. I can't come up with a reason or a good excuse as to why those were not disclosed a long time ago.

But other things that affect the case much more profoundly, such as the shoe print evidence and so forth, I don't think that is appropriate. Probably the best remedy would be a continuance of the trial date in order for the defense to get their shoe print expert in place in this case, and I am really not sure if they don't already have such an expert. But these things were disclosed as soon as it became apparent that this was significant evidence, had something really to do with the case and changed it, rather than simply evidence of non-matching shoes and continuing to be investigated by the State.

So probably an appropriate remedy in this case might be a continuance of the case, if necessary. And even in the most extreme situation, maybe even possibly a modification of the defendant's release conditions.

THE COURT: The issue with regard to

continuances is that, I think, reflected in the Barrs language about continuance may be an appropriate remedy for a violation, but the problem is that sometimes continuances as was noted by the majority in Barrs, I think it was -- I think, if I recall right, that was a unanimous decision of the panel -- it says trial judges should bare in mind that postponements can complicate already congested calendars, and don't I know that part of it, but it also said, quote, may actually reward wrongdoers by providing additional preparation time, close quote, and it references the Scott case, 24 Arizona Appeals at 205.

That is the troubling part. When you set a trial date on May 12 of 2009 for May 4 of 2010, and we are within a month of that and have begun, as both of you have acknowledged, I think, the preparation for impaneling a jury by having the jury fill out the questionnaires. I don't know that that is an appropriate or effective sanction.

The release issue is an available sanction, also. I think the defendant could be released, but that one has a number of concerns for the Court, which I think I have expressed in previous hearings.

I saw and read and tend to agree with Judge Phil Hall in his descent in the Meza case, the majority essentially assessed attorney fees against the prosecutor who -- the language that Judge Hall used in the descent was,

it makes good sense to hold prosecutors responsible for insuring that relevant information in the possession of law enforcement agencies is disclosed by imposing the sanction of preclusion. For non-disclosure of evidence preclusion is justified as a tool to encourage prosecutors to develop policies to ensure the flow of discoverable information to their offices from local law enforcement agencies, citing the Carpenter case. And maybe that pertains to the e-mails that were referenced but not disclosed until recently from the unpronounceable witness.

Judge Hall goes on to say it is quite another thing to assess attorney fees against a prosecutor who makes a diligent good faith effort to comply with Rule 15.1, but who is frustrated in his or her efforts by the conduct of the law enforcement agency that is not directly answerable to the prosecutor. Under such circumstances the search for truth, the ultimate goal of Rule 15 reciprocal disclosure requirements, is not advanced by awarding attorney fees. And it goes on from there, that I choose not -- I acknowledge is in there, but I choose not to read into the record.

So, I am going to consider this further overnight, and I will talk to you about it in the morning, I think, further. We have about a half an hour left. I appreciate your observations with regard to the effect on the

1 case of the various items that we have talked about and what 2 you think has been or hasn't been diligence on the part of the State agents, either in the County Attorney's office or 3 4 Yavapai County Sheriff's Office or elsewhere. 5 Do you have another one that may take a 6 few minutes not after 5:00? 7 MS. CHAPMAN: The two that I think are left 8 that are properly keyed up would be the Cooper, which I think 9 may take slightly longer than that, and then there was the motion based on the -- to preclude witnesses, for attorney's 10 11 fees or other sanctions, based on the witness interviews of 12 the witnesses who aren't really witnesses that was filed on February 26. And that is Mr. Sears' motion. I am not sure 13 14 how long that will take, but --15 THE COURT: I am trying to find that one. 16 Filed on February 26, motion to MS. CHAPMAN: preclude witnesses for attorney's fees and other sanctions 17 18 including dismissal of the death penalty. 19 THE COURT: Well, I am not putting my finger 20 on that one right now. I will acknowledge not having brought 21 down the whole file. 22 Do you want our copy, Your Honor? MR. SEARS: 23 THE COURT: If you have an extra. So that my 24 comment is explained in the record, we are in a courtroom

that is different than my own. The rest of the file is

upstairs. We are in Judge Hess' courtroom downstairs.

MR. SEARS: Judge, this is from our file.

That is our motion, State's response and our reply, which I have committed to memory.

THE COURT: This kind of goes along with what we were discussing in terms of sanctions, so it makes some sense. Go ahead.

MR. SEARS: Judge, this does in some respects really summarize at least part of the problem that

Ms. Chapman has spoken about at such length this afternoon.

This was a particularly annoying set of circumstances in which we set up in good faith interviews of witness that were on the State's lengthy witness list, conducted them. It was clear that the witnesses, from almost the very beginning of these interviews which were conducted by Mr. Robertson and me, had no involvement in this case, no meaningful involvement. For example, Captain Francis' involvement was to come out and see if anybody needed any water or food at the crime scene. He was on the State's witness list in this case.

And so we spent time. The State's response is, basically, we are crying foul. We shouldn't be upset because these are only a couple of witnesses and undisclosed police report. The issue is this didn't just happen in a vacuum. This is in the context of everything

else that was happening in this case and that has been happening really almost since the first of this year.

And my observation has been, and I pointed this out to the Court on more than one occasion, that something seemed to change in the way in which the State proceeded in this case after the round of January hearings. And the State began with the shoe print evidence at the end of January and any number of places, sending people out, sending Sergeant Winslow out to redo the work because his testimony to us in a defense interview was at odds with other police officers who were at the scene doing the same thing. So he provides an essentially an amended report saying, I guess I was wrong. Here is the new information.

The problem that we have had -- this is my perspective, which is slightly different than

Miss Chapman's, because I have been responsible, largely, for doing the witness interviews in this case thus far, is that because of the constellation of circumstances, the State's failure in any meaningful way to narrow and turn into a real document, a witness list, this constant late disclosure and the rest, we are not only unable to do new work, we are wasting our time doing work that we should not have been required to do in the first instance.

Whether or not it is appropriate under the descent in the Meza case, which frankly, I like, too.

am interested that you looked at that, because I think that was a very thoughtful idea. As much as I think there are cases in which punitive and monetary sanctions against prosecutors might be warranted, I am not necessarily convinced that in a vacuum these violations would be such a

case.

However, the question has arisen, and you have heard from Mr. Butner and Ms. Chapman repeatedly, about what among the panoply of sanctions that are listed in 15.7 would make sense for the various discovery violations in this case. Here is my view, Your Honor. That with respect to the computer forensic information and with respect to the shoe print information, no matter how you slice it, preclusion really seems to be the only remedy that would protect the defendant's right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel under the constitution and demonstrate to the prosecution that these are not suggestions from the Court, these are not the Supreme Court recommendations for criminal procedure, these are rules and orders that have to apply.

I can promise you that if we were in the same position and the State were filing these motions, you can be certain that the State would come down on us like a ton of bricks in front of you as often as possible saying we are dragging our feet, we don't want to go the trial, delay, delay, delay. And, frankly, I think that is everyone's

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collective experience in criminal defense cases that it is frequently the defendant at last minute that wants to do something to stop the train from leaving the station.

This feels very different to me. feels very much like the State, looking at their case a couple of months out, realizing how much of their case was not done, was not prepared. Whose fault it is or why it happened is really not my concern. The reality is they have tried to compress in the last 60 to 90 days all the work disclosure and the like that should have been done and could have been done months and months ago, now even years ago, with no excuse other than it just didn't get done. But the problem is that even though the State may have this continuing obligation to investigate new matters, the more important part this for our consideration, I think, is what is the State's obligation under the rules and the constitution to the defendant and the Court with respect to disclosure of matters that have already been investigated or, as in most cases today, were well within their knowledge and control for many months before they were turned over to the defense.

That is how we get to the problem that we have reached today, which is that four weeks or less from trial, we have 23,000 UBS e-mails that we, honestly, would have to review if you let them use one of the e-mails that

they propose. There is no way that we can effectively represent our client under the Sixth Amendment without doing that. We can't just take the chance that there is nothing else among those e-mails that would support this.

We can't respond in any meaningful way to the 8500 pages of D.P.S. records. We can't respond to the late shoe print evidence for all the reason that Ms. Chapman said. Nor should we have to, nor should Steve DeMocker a month out from a trial for his life have to be in the position that Mr. Butner would have the defense is, which is oh, he knows what he did. He can just tell his team where to look and what to do. That shifts the burden of proof, and it shifts the requirements of disclosure under Rule 15 and the orders of this Court from the State, where it belongs, to the defendant, where it does not belong in this case.

The shoe print evidence is particularly troubling, because I think as the Court has come to see, this was a Brady issue of the clearest sort all Fall and into the early part of this year. The State's interpretation of Brady is really twisted. The State's interpretation of Brady is that it is not Brady unless and until we can make it look bad for the defendant, or it is inescapably good for the defendant and we are forced to turn it over.

This is a very hot topic in the criminal defense bar on both sides. I am sure the Court knows that.

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Criminal Defense Lawyers, this month is all about failure to disclose and Brady and model rule 3.8, which is very similar

to Arizona Rule 15.7 that codifies Brady.

Just because of the Brady violation in this case, I would submit just because we lost five months and litigated a matter which the State knew had evidence in its possession that would have changed the format, the January arguments and the shoe prints, would have changed what we said, would have changed how we proceeded in this case, the prejudice to the defendant by that Brady violation would warrant, I submit, preclusion of evidence on its own. But it is made worse now by this late disclosure of what the State touts as pivotal evidence, crucial evidence, critical But in reality, based on this disclosure that we evidence.

The State has essentially represented to you today that they now have shoe print impression evidence from these bad photographs at the crime scene that essentially match up to a pair of shoes that Mr. DeMocker ordered in 2006. They have not paid much attention to the fact that this crime occurred in 2008, and that the shoes have never been recovered. What they want to argue to the jury, if permitted, is that somehow they are in the burn bag with the golf club and the gloves and coveralls and

have just gotten, the evidence is still equivocal.

everything else that Mr. DeMocker supposedly used in the commission of this crime and disposed of.

On further examination, this latest report dated 3/23/10, less than two weeks ago, from Mr. Gilkerson of the FBI is equivocal. It uses phrases like "could be," "most likely to be," "closest to." It doesn't say "match." It doesn't say anything approximating a match. That means if the State wants to us that, we are going to be in a maelstrom of work necessary to understand exactly what Mr. Gilkerson would say if called as a witness in this case, how the State would try to use that evidence, and what the true state of the evidence is, what the basis for this less-than-two-week-old opinion is on this case.

When you take the Brady violation that led us to the shoe print evidence, and then you superimpose that on this late disclosed evidence so close to trial of matters which the State could have investigated and done the work on in September or October or probably even in April of 2009, puts the defendant in an impossible position when he is on trial for his life. The more the State hangs its hat on this evidence and points to it as being important to try to persuade you not to preclude it, the more it becomes obvious to us on the defense side that this is important evidence that needs further investigation.

But the Court is right, that a

continuance, with Mr. DeMocker sitting in jail, rewards their wrongdoing in this case, gives them more time to pull we don't know what else our of their hat, and put us in the same position. If they are given six months or nine months more to get ready for trial, who knows where this investigation is going to go from the State. We just have no sense at this point that we will ever be in position where we can fully and completely understand and appreciate the State's case and confront it under the Sixth Amendment. That is what this is really all about. That is what this discussion is really all about.

So, with respect to all of this computer information of all types, whether it is the forensic information or UBS information and the shoe print evidence, we don't see another remedy besides preclusion. We don't see another way --

THE COURT: I thought what we were talking about was your February 26 motion, and that is asking for something other than preclusion.

MR. SEARS: It is. It asks for attorney fees. I will be candid with the Court. When I filed that motion, I was upset. I had just wasted my time, which is in sort supply, just like the Court's time and Mr. Butner's time during this, and I thought an award of attorney fees and costs makes sense. If the Court thinks that the descent in

Meza points away from that, I can't argue seriously with you.
Weza points away from that, I can't argue seriously with you.
I wouldn't be candid with you if I told you we had to have

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But, this is the last point I want to make, what about death penalty? What about striking the death penalty in this case? What I am winding up to say here, Your Honor, is that other than the shoe print evidence and everything connected with it, and the computer forensic evidence and everything connected with it, with respect to the other evidence, as prejudicial as it is and as burdensome as it is, we think that on balance striking the death penalty leaves the State's case in tact with respect to that late disclosed evidence.

I suggest to all concerned that there will be an on-going difficult battle about its admissibility, about its relevance and about all of those other matters and whether it is consistent with prior orders of the Court. But striking the death penalty in this case would change the sentencing options available to the State and nothing more in this case. But it would send a message, as we are prone to say when we are sentencing people in criminal cases or for entering orders in discovery disputes like this, it would simply send a message that would let the State know what happened and why it happened, would protect Mr. DeMocker's right, but wouldn't cripple that part of the State's case.

But I do not see the death penalty alone as an appropriate sanction to remedy all of this, because that leaves us in the impossible, unfairly prejudicial position with respect to the evidence that is so difficult to rebut, that is so difficult to rebut. And if you were asking me for my separate opinion in connection with this motion, that is what I would suggest as a remedy across the board. Taking money out of Mr. Butner's paycheck is not something I would want to do in this case. When I filed the motion, we cited the court to Meza, which says that is an option. I was just upset enough that I thought on that day, on February 26th, that that was appropriate. But today, I think we need to look at the big picture. That is what we see the big picture is, Judge.

There are certain parts of this discovery problem that are insoluble, as far as we are concerned.

There is just nothing short of preclusion that would help us out here that makes any sense.

With respect to the other discovery violations, something has to be done. There has to be some sanction imposed, or we are back to the suggestion of criminal procedures. If the rules and Court's orders are to have any meaning and effect at all, that is a sanction worth considering. That is where I would ask you to look, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Meza says costs and fees are one of the sanctions.

MR. SEARS: If somebody wants to write me a check, I suppose I will cash it, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Butner.

MR. BUTNER: Judge, this motion is about the interviews of Captain Francis and the animal control officer Mr. Potts, and also about Jimmy Jarrell. And as Mr. Sears points out in his motion, he began the interview of Jimmy Jarrell and basically didn't finish the interview, because Mr. Jarrell had not provided his reports and so forth. Of course, those will be provided, if they haven't already been provided prior to the completion of his interview.

You know, you have the supervising captain at a crime scene, and quite frankly, I feel that it is necessary to list that person as a witness in the event that there is a problem with people that are under his command that have not done something and he is accountable for that. And so I still think it was necessary to list him as a witness.

Similarly, this is a strange case where we have a couple of little dogs involved, and the issue of what happened to those little dogs. My understanding was that it was left in the hands of the animal control officer, and apparently, of course, they were taken away from the

Scene. Not by the animal control officer, but by neighbors.

Nevertheless, I think that it is appropriate to demonstrate that the animal control officer was called to the scene.

People have a special sensitivity when it comes to animals in the State of Arizona, if not everywhere these days, and to make sure that they were appropriately cared for. I didn't realize that either one of these witnesses had so little to do with this case as it turned out in their interviews. And, of course, all reports that had anything to do with the case in connection with those activities had previously been disclosed. That is not the case with regard to Detective

Jarrell and his reports. And basically, they should have

been provided prior to the time of his interview.

I was in attendance at part of those interviews, and what happened and what resulted in Mr. Sears ending up wasting a bunch of his time, was that there was an officer-involved shooting up in the Ashfork area, and people that were going to be at those interviews got called away. And what would have turned out to be, boom, you know, Captain Francis doesn't have much to do with this case, and similarly Mr. Potts doesn't have much to do with this case, you know, we would have moved on to more productive matters. That isn't what happened because the officers that were also scheduled were taken away.

So I understand Mr. Sears' frustration,

but this was one of those things where the people that would have been productive in their interviews had been called away for an officer-involved shooting, or were called away right at the time Mr. Sears was there. In fact, I talked to John about that while he was there. I think he probably remembers that.

That is basically all I have to state about that.

MR. SEARS: I think, Your Honor, you will see that I raise no complaint about being unable to interview witnesses who were called away on another case. That is not what this is about.

THE COURT: Let me return your matters to you.

MR. SEARS: Here's what I think happened. I'm sure you remember from your days in that office, that often times in disclosure persons other than attorneys prepare the disclosure list from police reports and start pulling out names.

THE COURT: I don't remember that.

MR. SEARS: Maybe you were more on top of that. But it seems like the listing of people, particularly at the beginning of this case, and the list that we get is cumulative. It is like a chain letter. They repeat all the people at each disclosure and add new names in bold. That is what we get.

THE COURT:

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MR. SEARS: This is part of the problem.

Right.

Again, I am not asking for personal sanctions against Mr. Butner, but this is part of -- maybe in some ways an illustration of a larger problem, which is if you don't know your case, if you don't know what your witness will say, why they are witnesses, why they are there, then these kinds of things will happen. This was a particularly bad day when all of that happened at the same time, witness against witness. I am not saying it can't happen every now and again, but this was a day in which the people we were able to talk to one after the other knew nothing about the case and had nothing to do about the case. I don't think for a second it is important or relevant or even logical for the State to call a a dog control officer who got there after the dogs had been removed, or Captain Francis whose sole responsibility was not to supervise people but forced to see if anybody was hungry or thirsty, to call them as witnesses. And to put a witness out for an interview where the State concedes, correctly I think and candidly, that that witness was sitting on a report which had never been disclosed which would have been important for us to have in advance. The State has seen how we prepare for these interviews. They have seen the materials we bring with them. We don't just show up and ask them what they did. We come in with a focused interview

1 based on our review of the materials provided us about that 2 witness in disclosure from a data base that we have created 3 at great trouble and expense. We wasted that whole day 4 there. 5 So, I think that although on the great 6 scheme of things --7 THE COURT: What amount of time was wasted? 8 MR. SEARS: Probably close to two hours. 9 could go back and look at my billing records. 10 Mr. Robertson conducted the interview of 11 Detective Jarrell alone. I was not there for that. He bills at an hourly rate. And then, of course, all of the time for 12 13 our paralegals to assemble the witness books for that and the time I spent reviewing that. So, there is the typical kind 14 15 of time that you would have in preparation and actually conducting the interviews, and of course, the time for the 16 17 motion. 18 Judge, I point out that there MR. BUTNER: 19 were eight interviews scheduled for that date. And those 20 people were not --21 THE COURT: Not just three? 22 Right. Those people were pulled MR. BUTNER: 23 away as a result of that shooting. 24 THE COURT: I quess I am not convinced that it

was done in bad faith substantively. I think an award of

attorneys fees is applicable. So I am going to deny this particular motion.

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Before we leave today, however, I have a petition, and maybe you can cover it in the couple of minutes we have. See what positions you may have with regard to this. I have a combination of documents filed April 1st and April 2nd of 2010, and whether you think this is something that I can address without Mr. Napper here.

I have a petition for use immunity with regard to Rene Gerard testifying at trial. I have a notice of appearance and request for notice filed by Mr. Napper.

And Mr. Napper, specifically, is requesting the right to be present at any hearings relating to this motion. So these were filed on Wednesday -- no, Thursday and Friday of last week.

I guess I am looking for advice on when to set this, if you have any idea of what amount of time I might need for this. Any ideas from either side on that?

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, we have some time with you tomorrow morning, and I think all we have is the 702 motion.

THE COURT: And then tomorrow afternoon, I think, at 1:30 we had the Katie DeMocker subpoena issue.

MR. BUTNER: I don't know, you know, about Mr. Napper's availability, obviously. This is pretty short

1 notice. 2 THE COURT: If I can get him in, do you think tomorrow afternoon would be okay with you folks? 3 4 MR. BUTNER: Yes, I do. 5 MS. CHAPMAN: Tomorrow afternoon? 6 MR. SEARS: That is fine. 7 THE COURT: Probably after Katie's situation. 8 MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, Mr. Butner was also 9 going to inquire of Sorensen at the break. I don't know if there is an update. 10 11 THE COURT: Any updates, Mr. Butner? 12 MR. BUTNER: Yes. I have inquired of 13 Sorensen, if I could find it. 14 THE COURT: I believe we will be back 15 upstairs. MR. BUTNER: Judge, we have Mr. Napper's cell 16 17 phone number, if you would like to try and reach him. MR. PAUPORE: Which may not be on the 18 19 pleading. 20 THE COURT: Don't put it in the record. 21 Well, as soon as we break, if I can call 22 that from here, I will call it from here. So I will see if 23 we can get him in here. I don't know if we need to have Ms. Gerard in here. But see if you can get her in here, if 24

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that is what they want.

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Sorensen?

2	MR. BUTNER: I spoke with the forensic lab
3	director during the lunch break. His name is Dan Helwig. He
4	is the person that was referenced for the State's notice of
5	additional testing, also. He indicated that and I am
6	using terms that he provided to me that the materials had
7	been extracted and amplified and begun preliminary analysis.
8	There was rework to do on two or three samples, and those
9	needed to be reinjected. They may need to do post
10	amplification clean up. He is not certain at this point in
11	time. And they are also in the process of running a known
12	sample for Mr. Knapp in YSTR, and that is in the process of
13	being amplified at the present time. That had never been
14	done, apparently. And he believes that they will start
15	analyzing these materials on Friday, unless there is more
16	that needs to be reworked. And he believes that they if
17	things goes as he expects them to go in the normal
18	progression, that on or about the 14th the 12th or 13th of
19	April they would be completed and we would be able to have a
20	report on or about the 14th of April. And I would provide
21	that as quickly as received.
22	THE COURT: Tuesday or Wednesday.

THE COURT: Tuesday or Wednesday.

MR. BUTNER: To the defense.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, we would note that when it was filed and when we spoke with Mr. Helwig, he told

2 they started their testing, which was approximately one week 3 ago, and if he doesn't get it done until April 14, that is 4 well beyond that date, and puts us a week --5 MR. BUTNER: It actually isn't. 6 THE COURT: It is about two weeks. 7 It is about two weeks or one more MR. BUTNER: 8 day, because they held up the start of the testing to make 9 sure that the defense expert could get there, so they lost 10 about a half a day as a result of that. So basically they are on track. 11 12 THE COURT: My bailiff has returned. 13 THE BAILIFF: She is checking. She is trying 14 to find Mr. Napper. THE COURT: Any notion as to what Judge Hess 15 is doing so I can tell these fine folks which courtroom we 16 17 are going to be using? 18 THE BAILIFF: They are still in our courtroom 19 as of right now. 20 THE COURT: Judge Hess said come 21 you-know-where or high water, he would have a jury selected 22 today, so they would be back down. He is talking about going 23 overtime. THE BAILIFF: He was just down here about 20 24 till and then went back up, so my guess is they are doing 25

us it would take approximately two weeks from the date that

strikes, but I don't know that. THE COURT: I think we will be back upstairs for you folks. And we will go off record and recess this hearing, and I will see if we can call the number and get Mr. Napper on the phone here. With regard for detention staff tomorrow, let's start up again at 9:00. (Whereupon, a discussion was held off the record.) (Whereupon, these proceedings were concluded.) ***000***

CERTIFICATE

I, ROXANNE E. TARN, CR, a Certified Reporter in the State of Arizona, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages 1 - 223 constitute a full, true, and accurate transcript of the proceedings had in the foregoing matter, all done to the best of my skill and ability.

SIGNED and dated this 10th day of May, 2010.

